Between the lines
Beating around Bush
Kuldip Nayar, writes from New Delhi
I do not know why America does not dismount from the high horse it is riding to ask for assistance like any other country does when it needs it. On the one hand, Washington preaches democratic principles which presuppose equality. On the other, it expects nations to fall into line with America and accept the policies it lays down as the supreme power in the world.India's decision not to send troops to Iraq has evoked from the American government a reaction which is typical of that sort of thinking. The reaction is patronising in tone and presumptuous in tenor. A US official says that Washington's bilateral relations with New Delhi will not be affected by India's decision. At the same time, he says that America had hoped that India would take "a different decision." If America believes that India, as a sovereign democratic country, has every right to decide its course of action, then why this observation or the one that India would remain "a strategic partner" of the United States? The assurance evokes doubts. It sounds like going on record for the sake of doing so. US ambassador Robert Blackwell in Delhi conveyed something else a few days earlier: India would miss an opportunity if it did not send troops to Iraq. What opportunity? Such observations smack of arrogance which does not go down well in a country that waged a struggle for independence for 50 years to free itself from British bondage. America's attitude on the question of sending troops, notwithstanding what it did to Iraq, has been haughty from the beginning. When Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani met President Bush at Washington some time back it was clear that America expected India to send its troops. The very first thing that Bush reportedly said was to ask when India was sending troops to Iraq. It was not a request but a veiled fiat. Advani naturally said that a consensus on the issue would have to be built in the country. Bush brushed aside the plea as if that was only a matter of details which he said a Pentagon team would sort out. The problem any independent country faces is not whether America likes its particular decision or not but whether what it does has the backing of its people. Had there been a provision in the Indian constitution to hold a referendum the decision not to send troops would have got an overwhelming support. There are many reasons for it. People in India did not like the manner in which America and Great Britain attacked Iraq without having the UN sanction. India wanted a proof of their contention that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. It was on the basis of this that the common man in Iraq was subjected to carpet-bombing and what not. It now turns out that the intelligence was doctored to suit the wishes of Bush and Tony Blair. Not only that. According to newspaper reports, a high official sold some fake documents to the Italian government about what Saddam was doing. The Italian government shared the information contained in the documents with the US. Can anything be more preposterous than this? New Delhi is also conscious about the sensitivity of the Muslim world. Although the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) has again rejected India's entry, it has not lessened New Delhi's interest in the Middle East in any way. Barely a few hours before the resolution for the admission of India was to be passed, Pakistan's Information Minister checked with General Pervez Musharraf, who directed him to make Pakistan's reservation known to the OIC. Over 30 million Indians are gainfully employed in the Gulf and Arab countries. New Delhi's "yes" would have hurt them. When I met some Indian Muslims recently in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and Qatar, I found how proud they felt over India's policy to stay distant from America. It was not merely the question of saving their jobs but of confidence that New Delhi, although pressured, would never distance itself from India's traditional and independent policy. By not sending troops to Iraq, India has sent a clear message: The country's foreign policy is not up for sale because America has money to give (contracts were offered for Iraq's reconstruction) or muscle power to flaunt. The feedback of Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal to the government was not positive. When he spoke of the "grey areas" in Washington, he was not referring to the "ambiguities" in the original UN resolution alone but also to his perception that Washington had once again tilted towards Islamabad after General Musharraf's visit to Camp David. Bush was reportedly falling head over heels in wooing Musharraf. New Delhi might have felt that it could not change America's attitude even if it sent troops to Iraq. Then why do something which was palpably wrong on all counts? In fact, a couple of ministers in the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) fought a last-ditch battle not to take a categorical stand on America's request for troops. The ministers wanted to postpone the decision on the ground of seeking further clarification. But Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was not in favour of deferring the decision, particularly when public opinion was nearly unanimous that India should not send troops to Iraq. That all political parties, including the BJP, were strongly against the deployment of troops negated even the semblance of support for America. It is believed that the words"were there to be an explicit UN mandate for the purpose, the Government of India could consider the deployment of troops in Iraq"were added to mollify America which might feel annoyed after receiving India's "no." The reported view at the CCS was that America should be assured that India was not against sending troops but against bypassing the UN, a legitimate body to decide on such issues. Russia, France and Germany have been telling India behind the scenes to do its bit to retrieve the pre-eminence of the UN. Whatever America's initial reaction is, it is sure to take some steps to hurt India. New Delhi should be prepared for it. India's decision not to send troops to Iraq has put the Pakistan government on a sticky wicket. In the course of a recent tour of the United States, Musharraf had in "principle" agreed to send two brigades of Pakistani soldiers to Baghdad. But following sharp criticism of this announcement, the Pakistan President modified his statement when he returned home. He said that a decision on whether or not to send troops would be taken after a "national consensus" was reached. Now the only option left for General Musharraf seems to be to tell Washington to provide Islamabad a respectable umbrella under which it could send troops. Before the General made his commitment to the US on sending two brigades, he had said that since the UN was not willing to take the responsibility, options such as involving the OIC and the Gulf Cooperation Council should be explored. But all this is between him and the people of Pakistan. As for India, his new linea national consensusis the country's gain. Kuldip Nayar is an eminent Indian columnist.
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