When France refused to play along in the UNSC for a second resolution on Iraq sanctifying automatic military intervention, Colin Powell expressed "disappointment that France has played frankly an unhelpful role in keeping pressure on Saddam Hussein". Echoing Powell's disappointment British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw expressed sadness that because of one country UNSC could not act. "President Chirac's unequivocal announcement" he said "that France would veto a second resolution whatever the circumstances inevitably created a sense of paralysis in our negotiations. I deeply regret that France has put Security Council consensus beyond reach". It has since been speculated whether France would have threatened a veto on an issue of vital national interest to the US had the transatlantic regime and the Soviet threat existed. Almost certainly not. Equally it is doubtful that the US would have tried to put through a second resolution without first clearing the text with her allies.

Clearly the Europeans enriched with centuries old experiences of war had reached the conclusion about the superiority of compromise over conviction (as expressed by European External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten), as no less the other parts of the world are uncomfortable with the precepts of "post-atlanticism". By now the entire world is familiar with the Bush National Security Strategy (NSS). John Lewis Gaddis of Yale University credits President Bush with following Periclean precedent that in a democracy even a grand strategy is a matter of public discussion. He, however, finds differences between Bush NSS and policy objectives of Clinton administration. President Bush told the West Pointers (June 1, 2002) that he would defend peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants, preserve peace by building good relations with great powers, and extend peace by encouraging free and open societies everywhere. By contrast President Clinton promised to enhance America's security, America's economic prosperity, and promote democracy and human rights abroad. The first major innovation, writes Professor Gaddis, is Bush's equation of terrorists and tyrants as source of danger, an understandable outgrowth of nine-eleven. Cold War strategy of containment and deterrence obviously did not work in the case of shadowy individuals who could inflict great loss in human and material terms and incalculable tragedy spending an amount less than the price of a single battle tank.

NSS devised its own legal basis for preemption on the ground that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully defend themselves against the aggressor. This legal basis has expanded the relatively non-controversial concept of preemption -- striking first against an imminent, specific, certain attack -- to one striking first to prevent the possibility of a longer term threat from developing. Preemption, therefore, becomes preventive war. Preemption, argues John Gaddis, requires hegemony. NSS makes it clear that American forces would be "strong enough to dissuade political adversaries from pursuing a military build up in hope of surpassing or equaling the power of the United States". In his West Point speech President Bush declared "America has and intends to keep military strength beyond challenge".

While the international community has already been introduced to Kindelberger's Theory of Hegemonic Stability (1973) where an open world economy requires a dominant global power for its smooth functioning, Swedish Professor Bjorn Hettne warns that a hegemony being a consensual order can decline as a consequence of legitimacy deficit of the hegemon even if the coercive power resources remain intact. Hettne maintains that even reduction in military capability is compatible with maintenance of hegemonic position to the extent that the leadership of the hegemon continues to be accepted by the lesser powers. Bush NSS plans acceptance of American hegemony through cooperation with major powers -- a sharp contrast from Clintonian focus on justice for small powers. At this point one cannot but be reminded of Madeline Albright's observation to the Democratic members of the US Congress that never in American history has there been such a sharp change in the US foreign and defence policies as between Bush and Clinton administrations.

What brought about this change? Simply put: the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire. In the words of Robert Kagan " The collapse of the Soviet empire led to a fundamental reordering of the international system, and to the current situation in which American global hegemony is the leading factor that shapes the present and almost certainly the future." In Kagan's view transatlantic problem is not a George Bush problem but a power problem in which Americans like to confront real or potential adversaries through policies of coercion. Europeans, on the other hand, would approach problems with greater nuance and sophistication, subtlety and indirection, greater tolerance of failure and preferring negotiations, diplomacy and persuasion to coercion.

End of the cold war spelt the loss of strategic centrality of Europe. The great transatlantic divide, therefore, is deep, long in development and likely to endure. The 1990s, a period now remembered as post-cold war era (as described by Ivo Daalder of the Brooking Institution) witnessed not the rise of an European superpower but a decline of Europe into relative weakness as Europe (in the words of Robert Kagan) moved "beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiations...

entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realisation of Kant's "perpetual Peace" (Power and Weakness -- Policy Review no. 113). In greater detail James Steinberg of The Brooking Institution has given other reasons for the transatlantic divide. Demographic changes linked to new waves of immigration both into Europe and the US have weakened the traditional ties of kinship and culture while creating new constituencies with little historical connection with transatlantic partners.

The nine-eleven events encouraged the US to establish close links with countries like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan etc. that shared US commitment of war against terror despite their leaders' undemocratic credentials. In order to secure Pakistan's cooperation, adds James Steinberg, in the war against terror, the US considerably downplayed its concerns about Pakistan's proliferation activities and the continuing restriction on democracy by a military government. The danger that terrorists might acquire WMD increased Bush administration's predisposition towards unilateralism. Despite NATO's immediate invocation of article 5 of the NATO charter declaring attack against one as attack against all members immediately after nine-eleven and its expressed willingness to act "out-of-the-area" the US accorded NATO a secondary role.

"Coalition of the Willing" replaced the traditional allies while "sovereignty" meant the freedom of action for the US and the concept of non-interference in the territory of another country was subordinated to the need by the US to act against perceived threats. President Bush's announcement to the US Congress in the aftermath of nine-eleven that henceforth US relations with other countries would be judged by whether they were " for us or against us" in the war against terror became the cornerstone of American foreign policy.

As Charles Krauthammer wrote (Washington Post -- June 8 2001) "After a decade of Prometheus playing pigmy, the first task of Bush administration would be to precisely to reassert American freedom of action". Framers of hegemonic foreign policy began to regard international institutions, regimes and treaties with considerable skepticism (which) inevitably constrain the ability of the US to make most of its primacy (The End of Atlanticism -- Ivo Daalder -- Survival, Summer 2003). The policy of either you are with us or against us applied no less to the traditional allies on the other side of the Atlantic. Donald Rumsfeld's distinction between "old" and "new" Europe primarily referred to US attempts to win over support in the UNSC before Anglo-US invasion of Iraq. He was so incensed with German opposition that he had no compunction in relegating Germany to the proverbial dog house and to put Germany in the same category as Cuba and Libya of countries opposing the US invasion of Iraq.

American obsession with the trinity of terrorists, tyrants and technology of WMD has not only challenged the Westphalian concept of sovereignty which served the world well since 1648 ending the Thirty Years' War but has also trampled on many international laws framed with great care in concert with the great Americans of the past, marginalised the UN, NATO and European Union. Legality of the Iraq war continues to be discussed in the media and the academia. Veiled threats to other members of the axis of evil and few other truant states (in the eyes of the US) are disturbing to peace mongers. Marginalisation of the UN despite Kofi Anan's advice to President Bush that the UN lends unique legitimacy to extra-territorial actions has caused unease in the international community.

That the situation is critical is not in doubt. The question remains as to how to resolve the crisis. Justin Vaisse sees three plausible European reactions. The first reaction is to play by the new rules as there is no other alternative. The second reaction would be to stick by the old transatlantic rules hoping that the Iraq episode was an aberration. The third reaction could be to foster European unity and independence in order to regain some leverage and follow a foreign policy more adapted to Europe's collective ideals and interests and cooperate with Washington on a case by case basis. Even truimphalist Robert Kagan advises the US "to show more understanding of the sensibilities of the others, a little more of the generosity of spirit that characterised American foreign policy during the cold war...

It could pay its respects to multilateralism and the rule of law and try to build some international political capital for those moments when multilateralism is impossible and unilateral action becomes unavoidable".

Andrew Moravcsik (Striking a new transatlantic balance -- Foreign Affairs -- July/August 2003) urges the Americans to learn a lesson from the Iraq war that winning peace is much harder than winning war. Intervention is cheap in the short run bur expensive in the long run. And when it comes to essential instruments of avoiding chaos or quagmire Europe becomes indispensable and thus the unipolar world becomes bipolar or even multi-polar. Should Europe keep its distance and leave the US to its own devices then the US which lacks both the will and institutional capacity for nation building will be left out in the cold.

It has, however, been argued that security challenges facing the US and Europe are more shared than divergent. While the US remains the prime target for terrorist attacks one should not forget the attacks on French tanker in the Persian Gulf and the French workers in Pakistan; bombing of the discotheque at Bali and the Al-Qaida threats to attack western targets in general. Besides, transformation of Russia into a cooperative and stable member of the international society should be of equal interest to both the US and Europe. Of no lesser interest should be to guard against possibility of WMD materials from the Soviet era falling into wrong hands. Both transatlantic partners should have a stake in the stabilisation of the Balkans and perhaps more importantly in the successful implementation of the Middle East road map.

In the ultimate analysis, foreign policy of all powers -- major and minor -- has to be globalist in character. In today's globalised world trade and banking, security and insecurity have become borderless. Therefore while separation in the fifty-year old marriage may occur complete divorce is inconceivable. Though the swagger, the pugnacious language, and deep religiosity (not that Europeans are atheists or agnostics) of President Bush is foreign to many Europeans, in the post-atlanticist era transatlantic cooperation and mutual respect as shown in the earlier period is sine qua non for the prosperous future of the world.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.