Nasa administrator Sean O'Keefe is due to give his formal response to the report on Wednesday but has already said some of the recommendations are being implemented.

They include a new centre overseeing the safety of all Nasa's programmes as well as an independent task force to check steps taken to get the remaining shuttles flying again.

Management blunders were as much to blame as technical problems for the destruction of the shuttle, the Columbia Accident Investigations Board (CAIB) said on Tuesday.

Columbia disintegrated as it re-entered the Earth's atmosphere on 1 February, 2003, killing its crew of seven astronauts.

The final conclusions of the CAIB inquiry reaffirmed the view that a breach of the heat shield caused the break-up.

It concluded a piece of foam insulation hitting the shuttle's left wing had blown a hole in the panel. This allowed super hot gases to penetrate, leading to the shuttle's disintegration as it prepared to land.

It said Nasa managers missed at least eight opportunities to evaluate possible damage to the orbiter's heat shield, since similar foam strikes had occurred in the past with no adverse effects.

The problem was overlooked because of a growing culture within the space agency whereby "little by little, Nasa was accepting more and more risk in order to stay on schedule," said the report.