Comitted to PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Vol. 4 Num 109 Fri. September 12, 2003  
   
Focus


Arab-Israeli conflict has tremendous potential to destabilise the whole region
There seems hardly any way of bridging the gap between what needs to be done and the reality on the ground
Recently the German daily Handelsblatt interviewed Federal Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in its issue of 29 August 2003 on inter alia criteria for the deployment of German troops abroad, the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq and transatlantic relations. It gives answers to several of the crucial questions German foreign policy has to deal with at present. We excerpt:

NATO Secretary General Robertson said recently that Germany should get used to the idea that in future it will have 10,000 to 15,000 troops continuously serving with missions abroad. Is that how you, too, see Germany's future? Is that in our interest?

I warn against viewing this issue from a solely national perspective. Germany is the largest economy and one of the three biggest countries in the European Union. If the EU in the 21st century is to have a role in the maintenance of our security and international stability, we will have to talk about European contributions. And that means the big countries above all will have to contribute - us included. And it is also clear that these deployments abroad are not going to be one-off events in the world of the 21st century.

But nevertheless -- troop deployments after all are decided at national level...

Our core national interest is Europe. That is why I strongly advise that we eschew from the start any attempt to define our interests in national terms. Even if it sounds like a paradox: it is in our own interest to define our interests in European terms.

But do France and Britain not take a different line?

That is true up to a point. But not only for historical reasons Germany's situation is different. Even today the attitude of our partners towards us is still ambivalent. On the one hand they want us to pull our weight. On the other hand, we have to exercise restraint in order -- especially as regards the smaller countries -- not to create a false impression that would generate resistance. Nor should we undervalue all we have gained from the multilateral approach we have pursued since 1945. With their different traditions, France and Britain certainly tend to think in more national terms. But in my five years as foreign minister I have found that they, too, are becoming more European in outlook.

You are talking now only of Europe, but where do transatlantic relations come into the picture?

They are one of the main pillars, possibly even the cornerstone of peace and stability in the world of the 21st century. Only if Europeans and Americans work together is there any chance of creating from the present disorder in the world something that resembles order. However, the relationship is not always free of tension, if only because of the changes in Europe that enlargement will bring about. Europe is growing together -- which is also in the interest of the United States. In the past the European foreign and security policy, for example, used to be viewed with some scepticism, since it might lead, it was thought, to Europe becoming detached from its NATO partners. Today, however, close cooperation between the EU and NATO is absolutely routine. Yet in the transatlantic family there are always going to be differences of opinion. That is completely normal.

That brings us to the current hotspots. Are Europe and the United States really building stability in Afghanistan?

There is clearly substantial progress in Afghanistan, even if the situation remains very critical.

Is there not a danger that, in the absence of success, we slide into ever increasing commitments from which no one dares to pull back?

I do not see us sliding into anything -- the situation is not as bad as some would have us believe. Almost everywhere in Afghanistan today the relief agencies can do their job. In many areas reconstruction work is making good progress: schools are being built, nearly all the refugees have returned. So there -- as in the Balkans -- I cannot see any kind of slide. But Afghanistan is certainly a long-term commitment.

And where is the political concept that also Red-Green politicians demand if they are to approve a Bundestag mandate?

At the Petersberg Conference we created under UN auspices a political framework for the country's future. That is the difference between Afghanistan and notably Iraq: parallel to the anti-terror campaign we have a UN-led political process to restore Afghan stability and sovereignty. In December the constitutional assembly will convene and elections are scheduled for the middle of next year. All that is based on a consensus among nearly all civil war parties which, though certainly fragile, nevertheless exists. There is a consensus on the different stages of the process and on a timetable. None of that exists in Iraq.

So you see merely chaos there....

The problems there are precisely those we had feared. To reiterate, I want to see a UN-led political process similar to the one on the Petersberg. It must be clear that what is at stake is liberation and the restoration of Iraq's sovereignty on the basis of an agreed timetable and an agreed process. The yardstick of success is whether Iraq's citizens view the presence of foreign troops in their country as occupation or liberation. The process of Iraqisation must be pursued with all speed and Muslim countries, too, should be involved in the efforts to stabilize the country. That is possible only if the UN has a leading role. Unfortunately our arguments failed to convince. We have to accept that the war coalition wants to retain sole responsibility for Iraq's security and stability.

Is it already too late to change course now?

I do not think it is too late. But we are watching developments with great concern.

Is domestic pressure on President Bush not getting so strong that he will ask also Germany for a contribution?

That is pure conjecture...

But Washington is looking for more money for reconstruction.

Our position is well known and clear. For good reason we were against the military operation in Iraq. Nevertheless, we are willing to provide substantial humanitarian aid. For example, the Federal Minister of the Interior has offered the services of the Federal Disaster Relief Institute. We are also willing to support the reconstruction effort, provided concrete plans exist and the security situation makes the deployment of civilian relief workers feasible. As soon as reconstruction proposals are on the table, we will be glad to see how -- given our limited resources -- we can best help.

Is it not almost our duty to help our American partners, given the seriousness of the situation?

We will never forget what the United States has done for Germany. We will examine what we can do to help in every area where such help is desired. However, we have also learned there must be some prospect that such help will be of real use. Without a strategy that emphasizes the liberation character of the whole process, Iraqisation and the increasing involvement of Arab countries under UN auspices, that is going to remain very difficult.

Do you not find it rather strange that just a few months after the Iraq war there is no longer any talk of the domino effect people had feared, a situation in which the US began one war after another? Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Defence Secretary, did after all show you a long list of possible rogue states.

I was never too worried about any domino effect, since such a situation would very soon be more than even a superpower could cope with. The crucial thing after 11 September was that the world found the right response to the terrorist challenge. It was clear that the status quo that had generated such monstrous threats was not and is not defensible. But it is important to weigh up very carefully what strategy is appropriate for a crisis zone that stretches from the Atlantic almost to the Pacific.

The 1991 Gulf War gave a positive impetus to developments in the Middle East. That does not seem to be the case now. Is it still too early to make a final judgement?

The situation in the Middle East seriously worries me. It is one of those core regional conflicts which, while not explaining everything that happens, does impact on a whole range of issues. For many of its Arab neighbours Israel has, ever since its founding, served as a scapegoat. Moreover, this conflict has of course tremendous potential to destabilise the whole region, quite apart from all the human and humanitarian tragedies it is causing. Things are not going well. I see here a crass contradiction:

all members of the international community in positions of responsibility know what needs to be done to achieve a compromise that will settle the conflict. But there seems hardly any way of bridging the gap between what needs to be done and the reality on the ground. I believe the Quartet has a very clear responsibility here.

Has the Iraq conflict had a more negative or a more positive impact on the situation in the Middle East?

If there have been any positive effects, then positive. If there have been any negative effects, then negative. Other than that I prefer to make no comment.