India recognised Israel in September 1950 but established embassy-level relations in February 1992. The pertinent question to be asked is why it took India four decades to send an ambassador to Israel. India's reticence was largely due to its perception of Israel through Islamic prism and India's argument that the establishment of Israel should have had the consent of Arab inhabitants. This, perhaps had influenced Indian decision as a member of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (in 1947) to vote for a minority plan which called for the establishment of a federal Palestine with internal autonomy for the Jewish population. When the UNGA voted for the majority plan India joined the Arab and the Islamic world in opposing the partition of Palestine. The 1956 Suez crisis brought Nasser and Nehru closer in the promotion of the non-aligned movement along with Sukarno and consequent marginalisation of the Indo-Israeli relations occurred. Israel, on its part, was indifferent towards India which was perceived to belong to the Soviet camp and as such was opposed to US-Israeli interests in the area. It took Rajiv Gandhi's pragmatic and non-ideological approach which was pursued by Narashima Rao and helped by a conjunction of international developments to finally result in ambassadorial exchange between the two countries. The international developments i.e. the end of the cold war, easing of international tensions, Arab willingness to negotiate a final settlement with Israel and, most importantly, India's determination to acquire technological and qualitative superiority in defense capability helped promote robust bilateral relations with Israel. Surprisingly, it was the same India which demanded secrecy of Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's 1979 visit to India that promoted a flurry of high level political, trade and defense related exchanges between the two countries after 1992.

One must recognise the validity of Indian disenchantment with the Islamic world over its totally partisan position on Kashmir issue in favour of Pakistan. Year after year the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in almost all its meetings adopted resolutions at the insistence of Pakistan which castigated India on Kashmir. The 9th OIC summit at Doha, for example, recalled that the UN resolution relevant to Jammu and Kashmir has still remained unimplemented; reaffirmed the importance of the right of self-determination of the people enshrined in the UN Charter; expressed concern at "the alarming increase in the indiscriminate use of force and gross violations of human rights committed against innocent Kashmiris"; noted the "rejection of Indian sponsored elections"; welcomed the "the restraint exercised by Pakistan on the line of control despite repeated violations by the Indian army" etc. The tone and tenor of these resolutions, mainly drafted by Pakistan, generated anger at Delhi and indifference over time of these blizzards of pious declarations in pursuit of an absurd dream. India's disenchantment with Arab sympathy with Pakistan over Kashmir grew along with the increase of Islamic militancy in the Arab world.

End of the cold war obviously contributed to the reshaping of Indian foreign policy.

Disappearance of the Soviet Union meant a great loss not only of a very important supplier of defense equipments but also its diplomatic crutch. If one glances at the events of 1971 Indo- Pakistan war over Bangladesh one can realise the seminal role played by the Soviet Union in the birth of Bangladesh. Former Indian Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit in his book Liberation and Beyond stated that Soviet Union had cast veto in favour of India seven times between December 4th and 16th against US and other Western sponsored resolutions. The Polish and Soviet resolutions which generally supported Bangladesh's cause received similar treatment from the western permanent members of the UNSC. The resolutions moved by the USSR, US and Poland, according to Dixit, were most significant. The US consistently demanded an immediate end to Indo-Pak hostilities; withdrawal of their forces to pre-war boundaries etc. There was not a single reference to the political aspirations of the Bengalees or the manner in which these should be fulfilled in the US resolutions. The Soviet resolutions, by contrast, called for political settlement in East Pakistan and urged Pakistan to direct its armed forces to end all acts of violence. Dixit assessed that because of India's close relations and strategic equations with the Soviet Union bolstered by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971 the UNSC was prevented from taking any mandatory and punitive actions against India which could have frustrated the Bangladesh freedom struggle.

The scenario described above has evidently changed after the end of the cold war when friends and foes were clearly identifiable. During the 1970s and 1980s US maintained close relations with Pakistan using that country as a base for Islamic fundamentalist guerillas' fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union maintained economic and defense ties with India and supported her on Kashmir issue. But the collapse of the USSR as has already been stated left India looking for new friends, not to supplant but to supplement, Indo-Russian relations. Others, notably the US, despite her dire need for Pakistan in it's war against Afghanistan, was reassessing its relations from rhetorical to practical terms. This was demonstrated by President Clinton's five-day visit to India, first by a US President in decades. Though Putin's visit to India did not get equal media attention it was nonetheless a reiteration of one of the foreign policy fundamentals of the cold war era. Albeit one has to look at Putin visit from the point of view of per-nine-eleven complexities. During the visit Putin and Vajpayee were looking at each other as a counter to American pre-eminence in the world. The joint declaration after the visit stated a preference for a "multi-polar global structure" and opposed the "unilateral use or threat to use force in violation of the UN Charter and intervention in the internal affairs of other states" (a reference to US/NATO bombing of Yugoslavia). The two countries also shared common hostility towards Islamic fundamentalism (Russia due to Chechnya and India because of cross border terrorism in Kashmir). Putin's visit logically resulted in considerable arms purchase by India which still remains largely dependent on Russia for spare parts and technical assistance.

The terrorist attacks of nine-eleven quickened the pace of Indo-US relations through heightened relations with Israel. Coincidentally on September 11 an Israeli defense delegation headed by National Security Advisor was having meeting with Indian counterpart at Delhi to discuss common security threats. A strategic partnership was being built up from relative obscurity to the centre fold of Israeli foreign and defense agenda. Israel started looking upon India as an extension of her parameters of external strategic partnership beyond the Arab "envelope" while India's security environment was facing a burgeoning post-cold war Sino-Pakistan military relationship. Given Israel's considerable role in defense development India's gravitation to Israel was natural. India and Israel though lacking immediacy of threats from the common enemy faced hostile regional nations which had acquired ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and these adversaries, in time, had the potential to become or align themselves with Israel's enemies. Post nine-eleven also brought about common perception of the two relating to counter terrorism. As Hindustan Times editorialised (September 11, 2003), both countries have known terrorism long before it became "international". The paper opined that Ariel Sharon's visit to India "finally removes the stigma that New Delhi had harboured about making its relationship with Israel come out of the closet".

The question which may very well be asked is: why now the bilateral relations are advancing by leaps and bounds? Palestine problem remains unresolved; Ariel Sharon's targeted killing of Palestinians and wanton destruction of property are unabated; the Middle East Road Map (riddled with Israeli reservations) is in tatters; Abu Mazen's brief tenure as Prime Minister was effectively sabotaged by Sharon's obdurate refusal to give him any chance to appease the militants. It has been suggested that India's ruling party BJP having a US oriented Pakistan obsessed foreign policy proposes a unique "core" alliance to fight international terrorism consisting of the US, India and Israel for which development of relations with Israel is of utmost necessity. Meanwhile, the US has been warned of two kinds of allies the first type would be partner in the war on terrorism out of convenience while the second type will consist of those countries that are already victims of "Islamic terrorism" and thereby opposed to religious activism out of conviction devoid of heteroglossia of alternate voices. Their fight against terrorism is unwavering, not duplicitous, and free from risk of the contagion of dissonance. Perfect examples of the second kind are India and Israel whose very existence, the argument continues, depends on daily fight with terrorism and in the case of India the constant fight with cross border terrorism in Kashmir.

Last tear's January visit to India by Foreign Minister Simon Peres reflected a growing Israeli acknowledgement of common perception on transnational threat by Islamic militants. This was further fleshed out by Indian National Security Advisor Brajesh Misra while addressing the annual dinner meeting of the American Jewish Committee in May this year in Washington. At that dinner Misra advocated for the emergence of "a core, consisting of democratic societies which can take on international terrorism in a holistic and focused manner… to ensure that the global campaign against terrorism is pursued to its logical conclusion". He suggested that the US, India and Israel triad or axis would form the core of this "democratic alliance". Misra was sharply critical of "diversionary argument", especially the "motivated" propaganda that terrorism can only be eradicated by addressing its root causes. Brajesh Misra's adamant refusal to consider the root causes of terrorism was refuted by Kofi Annan (on 22nd September) while addressing the Conference on Fighting Terrorism for Humanity: A Conference on the Roots of Evil in New York Kofi Annan called for understanding "this deadly phenomenon and carefully examine what works and what does not work in fighting it". He pointed out that terrorists are "often rational and intentional actors who develop deliberate strategies to achieve political objectives .We should not pretend that all terrorists are simply insane or that decisions to resort to terrorism are unrelated to the political, social or economic situation in which people find themselves". He warned that the world would delude itself if it thought that terrorism can be eliminated my military force alone and that just because "a few wicked men or women commit murder does not make a cause any less just" nor does it relieve the governments of responsibility to deal with legitimate grievances.

Brajesh Misra's enthusiasm displayed at the AJC annual dinner could be explained by the assistance given by AJC in the formation of India caucus in the House of Representatives with 160 members, perhaps the largest single country caucus formed in the Congress. Other reason could be BJP and Likud parties' anti-Islamism and conviction of Hindutva and Zionism. It is doubtful whether Misra's proposal of an anti-terrorism axis has the support of other political parties. Opposition Congress is reported to have found it perverse and reflective of BJP's obsession with Israel. India's other political parties are also reported to be not very enthusiastic about it.

While India's drive through Israeli route for closer ties with the US may be congruent with its security needs and political ambitions; one can not but wonder about the effects such a policy would have on India's 200 million Muslims; India's relations with the Arab world (estimated annual remittance by Indians working in the Middle East amounts to $16 billion annually); the opportunity given to Pakistan to further intensify its anti-Indian propaganda in the Arab world. One hopes the NDA government in its determination to follow through the ideology of a segment of a coalition partner would not totally disavow a policy which served India well for several decades.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and ambassador.