Committed to PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Vol. 4 Num 170 Fri. November 14, 2003  
   
Editorial


Straight talk
Time to rethink Article 70


It's the same old story. The AL has announced that it has no intention of joining the 10th session of parliament which commences November 16. "The question of joining the session does not arise," AL General Secretary Abdul Jalil told The Daily Star on Tuesday, "We will not go to parliament anymore, rather we will launch a unified movement against the coalition soon."

Nor is the AL the only party that sees no merit to opposition participation in parliament. Speaker Jamiruddin Sircar has been reported as opining that parliament runs more smoothly without the opposition present, and I suppose from his perspective this is true. Their absence saves him and his deputies the additional trouble of having to switch off opposition members' microphones when they are trying to address the chamber.

There thus seems little hope that the 8th parliament will function any more effectively than did the 5th or the 7th parliaments from 1991-1996 and 1996-2001 respectively (and let us say nothing of the short-lived 6th parliament).

On the surface, the AL's refusal to join parliament looks like the height of irresponsibility. Why does the opposition have so little respect for the parliamentary process? But then let us pause for a moment to consider that the boycott of parliament has been a constant feature of our democracy. We didn't have much opposition representation in the 5th or the 7th parliaments either. Is it possible that there is a reason for this, other than the intransigence of our political leaders? As it so happens there is -- it is called Article 70 of the Constitution.

Article 70 of the Constitution reads in pertinent part:

"A person elected as member of Parliament at an election at which he was nominated as a candidate by a political party shall vacate his seat if he resigns from that party or votes in Parliament against the party."

Now, I have no particular argument with the provision that you lose your seat if you switch parties. But the second provision -- that you lose your seat if you vote against your party merits a closer look.

When you take the time to think about it, this is an astonishing provision. It was included in the Constitution so that parliamentarians would not be able to sell their votes to the highest bidder -- a laudable objective no doubt -- but I think that the available evidence suggests that the problem it has created is worse than the problem it was intended to solve.

The whole point of parliament is to serve as a forum whereby the crucial issues of the day can be debated. But there is very little point to debating an issue when the outcome of the argument is pre-ordained. Under Article 70, it does not matter how persuasively you debate or with what clarity you can demonstrate that the other side's position is untenable. It is impossible to get anyone on the other side of the aisle to join forces with you for the simple reason that the Constitution forbids it.

Article 70 therefore essentially guts the principal reason for having a parliament in the first place.

A second function of parliament is to operate as a check on the power of the executive branch of government. Backbench parliamentarians have the ability to join forces with members of the opposition to check the excesses of the executive. The government is thereby made more responsive and more accountable. The need to win over a majority of the chamber ensures that the government must craft legislation that has broad support. But once again, Article 70 essentially eviscerates this crucial parliamentary function.

It has become fashionable to criticise the AL for not being able to settle its differences with the government in parliament instead of taking to the streets, just as it was equally fashionable to criticise the BNP for its boycott of parliament when the AL was in the majority. I may have been guilty of such criticism myself. But when you think about it, what is the point of the opposition attending parliament when there is no way for it to win any vote that comes to the floor? The opposition might as well stay away since there doesn't appear to be any function for it to perform under the current rules.

Now it could be argued that allowing a politician to vote his or her conscience is a laughable proposition in Bangladesh, and indeed this was the reason Article 70 was enacted in the first place. The idea was to create a system that would prevent parliamentarians from selling their votes.

But to my mind, even if parliamentarians do sell their votes, such a situation more closely resembles democracy than effectively not permitting them to vote in the first place. At least then they would be representing someone. Under the rules now in place a parliamentarian can represent no one other than his or her party leadership.

If we cannot trust our lawmakers not to sell their votes then the obvious solution is to simply dissolve parliament and have the country run solely by the executive branch, which is basically the reality of the current situation. Essentially we have a de facto presidential system of government. Article 70 ensures that our political system is parliamentary in name only.

Nor do I subscribe to the point of view that Article 70 simply reflects the political reality in Bangladesh -- that our elected representatives are so corrupt that it would be foolish to allow them to vote their consciences. Let me clarify. This may well be the political reality, but the point, surely, is to change it. It will never change under the current system. If we have a rottenness in the body politic, laws that accommodate this rottenness may be pragmatic, but they won't effect the change that we need.

The way you effect change is to create institutions that allow for the change that you wish to bring about. The way to create a functional parliament is to create a parliament that is able to function. First you must build the institution -- only then will it be possible for politicians to amend their behaviour accordingly.

It could be argued that I am being hopelessly idealistic, and that creating a functioning parliament will in no way impel change. Actually, I am being brutally pragmatic. Simply put, under the system we have in place right now, it isn't possible to bring about the change that is needed.

One can also argue that things will never change as long as the bitter bipartisan divide between the ruling alliance and the opposition parties continues. No politician in Bangladesh would dare brook his or her party's leadership even if it were permitted.

But the point is that right now it can never change. If we instituted the reform I am advocating then things might well not change for the better, indeed things might even change for the worse -- but the point is that such a reform at least makes change for the better possible.

Repealing Article 70 -- or at the very least amending it so that parliamentarians are permitted to vote against their party -- might not solve all our political problems, but it is a necessary first step to reforming parliament. There is no guarantee that amending Article 70 will cause parliament to begin functioning effectively -- but one thing which is certain is that parliament will never function effectively until Article 70 is amended.

Zafar Sobhan is an Assistant Editor of The Daily Star.