Insurgency has gained a momentum of sorts in Iraq. It has clearly transcended the so-called Sunni triangle. It also reflects more sophisticated planning and coordination. There are also hints that the armed struggle in that country is no longer restricted to Iraqis but now include the possible participation of foreign elements who have entered Iraq from different countries.

Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek noted in November that 'it has become increasingly clear that the resistance in Iraq is not the work of a small band of dead-enders, but is in fact a more widespread movement.' He then goes on to comment that 'we can tell this, because still, months after the attacks began, we know very little about them.' Recent press agency reports have indicated that there is difference of opinion between the US command in Iraq and the CIA about the actual number of such 'insurgents.' Gen. John Abizaid believes the number to be around 5000 and the CIA puts it at 50,000. That is a huge difference. It also great incapacity in terms of gathering military intelligence.

To this is added variance of opinion in interpreting the nature and background of the 'insurgents.' Some in the coalition are claiming that they are essentially Baathists, others say they are foreign fighters or just mere common criminals. Such disagreement in 'appreciation of the situation' (as the military puts it) can only hamper the planned process of reaction to such 'unconventional' incidents. It will also slowly sap the morale of the coalition forces, facing an adversary who are more familiar with ground conditions.

I believe that a stronger military response, by itself, is not the best answer. Unconventional warfare depends on the sympathy of the people. The more a conventional army manifests itself through bombing, visible presence of tanks and armed personnel carriers, the more it proves the absence of growing normalcy. Such measures will only alienate the local population and their ordinary ways of life. Video footage of young children whimpering in their bedrooms, clinging to their mothers as soldiers check their wardrobes, will not create support for the coalition in the Arab world.

The other aspect that threatens constructive engagement in Iraq is the radical readjustment in the balance of governance. The coalition seems to have overlooked the fact that the Sunni population in Iraq have been central in the intelligentsia component of the country. This section of the community produced many politicians, professionals, engineers, teachers, merchants, and leaders of the armed forces. The Shi'ite population on the other hand were more involved in theocratic disciplines and minor areas of governance. Current efforts to create a formal Shi'ite majority in the echelons of power and to marginalize the Sunni influence have raised suspicions. It has left the Sunnis worried. It would therefore be wise for the coalition authority to strike a balance between Sunni demands for power and Shi'ite demand for direct democracy instead of an indirect election.

There have also been two other elements that have affected the public psyche within Iraq. The Coalition's reliance on Iraqi expatriates as 'favoured sons' in the reformulation of power bases and the so-called perceived tilt towards the Kurdish elements have both created their own dynamics.

On October 16, the United States, after considerable lobbying was able to score a diplomatic victory of sorts in the United Nations Security Council. On that date, that body, unanimously adopted a resolution on the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq. It reaffirmed many previous Resolutions including Resolution 1483 of 22 May, 2003, Resolution 1500 of 14 August, 2003, and resolutions pertaining to threats to peace and security caused by terrorist acts such as Resolution 1373 of 28 September, 2001. It also underscored that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq and reaffirmed the right of the Iraqi people to determine freely their own political future and also control their own natural resources. It also recognised the need for international political support for not only the reconstruction of Iraq but also for restoration of conditions of stability and security that is essential to the well being of the Iraqis.

Since then, we have had a donors meeting in Madrid where a large sum of $37.5 billion was pledged in aid and loans to help rebuild the war-ravaged country. Many pious expressions of support were heard but the notable fact is that till now India, Pakistan, Germany, France, Russia and Japan have not sent any of their troops for peace-keeping or for restoring conditions of stability and security. The potential Turkish presence was also stopped at the last moment.

In the months prior to the Coalition attack on Iraq, the world witnessed the opposition of France, Germany and Russia to any force being used in Iraq without the sanction of the Security Council. This European mantra upset the Coalition. Their action indicated that for them the Security Council was not the sole, primary source of legitimate authorization for the use of military force. The United States in particular articulated a policy of strategic 'pre-emption' firmly rooted in the traditional jus ad bellum principle. On the other hand, proponents of the European position cited the United Nations Charter as an instrument that does bind the United States and limits its rights of self-defense.

The legal debate about armed engagement in Iraq has now become more complex with the decision of the US Command to pursue a more aggressive policy. The 1977 Protocol 1 Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions are being referred to by civil society groups with regard to the growing incidence of 'collateral damage' being sustained by civilian populations. These are not helpful signs. Deteriorating conditions will definitely affect and influence the unfolding and implementation of legal measures required for the future forming of a legal Iraqi Administration.

Chris Patten, European Union's Commissioner for External Relations, writing recently in the reputable publication Foreign Policy has correctly pointed out that 'freedom is a human aspiration, democracy is not inimical to development, and the case for open society applies just as much to the Islamic world as to the Christian and the Confucian.' Islam, it must be understood is not coterminous with the countries of the Arab League. More Muslims live outside the Middle East and most of them live in democratic countries.

Democracy in the truest sense of the term will also be possible in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will take time and lots of patience. However, this process of change, both political and economic is unlikely to be achieved through the barrel of a gun.

It is important that confidence building measures are seen to be what they are sincere steps for bringing back normalcy. Credibility has to be restored for the process to succeed. There must be understanding within Iraq that democracy and the fostering of democratic principles are not part of a western geostrategic option. The importance of President Bush's secret Thanksgiving visit to an American base in Iraq should not be over-emphasized. Yes, it will be significant for the US domestic electorate, but one does not know if it will in the long run influence events on the ground in that conflict ridden country.

Given the continued support that the West has extended to many oppressive Arab regimes, it is quite understandable if talks of democratization arouse suspicion today in the souks of Baghdad, Basra and Tikrit. The immediate reaction is that the Coalition Forces are seeking expediency again and trying to prop up pro-Western figureheads.

The Governing Council has announced their medium term plans in Baghdad. This quasi-Afghan model involves selection of delegates for a National Assembly. This body in turn would form a provisional government of 'elites' by next June. This will be followed by a constitutional convention, a referendum and then national elections, but not till 2005-06. The US Administration has also indicated some of the measures they hope will take place over the next year.

Time is of the essence for President Bush. The US presidential elections will be held in November, 2004. President Bush's approval rating has dropped to 50 per cent in the recent USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll. These figures are still very much within the traditional threshold for success for an incumbent President's re-election bid. Bush knows that. However, his supporters also know that unless the Iraqi imbroglio is sorted out soon, his support base might dwindle fast. This factor has gained particular significance as recent days have seen death and casualty of more Coalition personnel from the use of high tech weapons by those opposed to the occupying forces.

Democracy is desirable but the path to democracy is not always predictable. One can only hope that in Iraq, the process of returning the country to an elected Iraqi leadership will take place sooner than later.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador