This is no mean achievement for the two nuclear rivals locked in a continuous half-century long hot-cold war. One must welcome this extraordinary turn -- without reservations, but without illusions.

The gains made in Islamabad exceed those of the Lahore summit, which took place nine months after the India-Pakistan nuclear tests. At Lahore, they wanted to reassure themselves, wishfully, that they could live in peace despite their nuclearisation.

They should have negotiated restraint measures such as a moratorium on missile tests and nuclear deployment. Instead, they only agreed to inform each other of test-flights. Within three months came Kargil.

The peace process at Islamabad follows the Eid ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC), and numerous confidence-building measures -- and an unprecedented spate of goodwill visits by parliamentarians, businessmen and citizens' groups.

Much groundwork went into the Islamabad joint statement, including "back channel" contacts over seven months, and a meeting reportedly in London between India's National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra and Pakistan's National Security Council Secretary Tariq Aziz. Pakistan made three ceasefire offers. New Delhi accepted the third.

The high level of comfort between the two governments is trickling down to the lower bureaucracy. Upon my return through the Wagah border after the SAARC summit, I had the very pleasant experience of Pakistani officers going out of their way to help me cross over even after the gates had closed by the designated hour.

Numerous conditions made Islamabad a success. Not all of them were of Mr Vajpayee's or Gen Musharraf's making. Their meeting was long overdue after 9/11 and the United States' "war on terrorism", which Pakistan was compelled to join.

Turning against jehadi extremism in Afghanistan would lead sooner or later to Gen Musharraf restraining jehadi extremism in Kashmir. He promised as much in January 2002.

What clinched the issue was external and internal pressure, and the Musharraf leadership's realisation that the "Jehadi Project", which stretches from Afghanistan through Kashmir to West Asia, is indivisible and cuts through Pakistan itself. Its most lethal manifestation for the General lay in the two assassination attempts on him.

Four other circumstances influenced events. First, a growing realisation within the Pakistani establishment that its 14-year-old policy of bleeding India through "a thousand cuts" in Kashmir has failed. India has absorbed the damage, and won sympathy from the international community, especially the US.

Besides, the Kashmir situation has improved since the Assembly elections. Islamabad now reckons it's wiser to pursue negotiations.

As for New Delhi, it too officially acknowledges that Pakistan has recently reduced its support to militant infiltration in Kashmir. This was confirmed by Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha.

Secondly, the confidence-building measures (CBMs) negotiated by the two governments have actually produced what was intended: confidence and trust. After initial resistance, Islamabad has acted in good faith. The resumption of bus, air and train services showed positive attitudes. New Delhi was pleased that Pakistan stopped dragging its feet on the South Asian Free Trade Agreement.

A third factor was US pressure -- confirmed by Secretary of State Colin Powell in the US News & World Report: "We've been working with the Indians and Pakistanis for almost two years …

I think a lot of these seeds that were planted are now germinating and you'll have us harvesting crops".

It's the US that first proposed the ceasefire. It offered $3 billion aid to Gen Musharraf last June, on three conditions: Pakistan's "cooperation" in the "war on terrorism", improved relations with India, and internal democratisation. This is part of the larger US agenda to push Pakistan towards "moderation" and build a close (but not equal) relationship with India.

Finally, recent disclosures about leaks of Pakistan's nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya have alarmed Washington's policy-makers and increased their leverage vis-à

-vis Gen Musharraf. He responded by speeding up the peace process with India.The peace process is real, but vulnerable to attacks from Right-wing hawks. Sections of the sangh parivar have lambasted it. The RSS's Ram Madhav says: "Pakistan's record of delivering on promises is poor. But we are glad that the PM has extracted an assurance … to end cross-border terrorism …" He insists that the only Kashmir-related issue to discuss with Pakistan is how to get Pakistan-occupied Kashmir back!

The VHP's Giriraj Kishore describes the entire effort as "bakwaas" (rubbish). "Since the days of Moahammed Ghauri we have been trying to talk reason to these people. But it's of no use." Similarly, Pakistan's Islamists have sharply attacked the peace process as a "sellout" of the Kashmir cause.

Mr Vajpayee and Gen Musharraf must defend the process from extremists. But they will also have to take some imaginative, pro-active CBMs to promote people-to-people contacts and transportation links between Sindh and Rajasthan-Gujarat.

They must also agree to multiple-entry visas, open more border posts, and promote cultural exchanges, tourism, scientific cooperation, and free circulation of periodicals.

In the military field, there is an urgent need to take nuclear risk-reduction measures, end shelling at the LoC, agree to a moratorium on missile test-flights and non-deployment of nuclear weapons.

New Delhi must seize the initiative on Kashmir. It must stop detaining Hurriyat leaders and treat them on a par with Indian citizens. It must gradually "soften" the Kashmir border and lift draconian laws.

India will win an incredible amount of goodwill if it announces a phased reduction of troops in the Kashmir Valley by, say, 50,000 to 100,000. This can be done without jeopardising security.

All these steps together can make a clean break with the shameful past of rivalry. They will open the door to cooperation and peace -- and to handsome dividends.

Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.