Yet, it was expected that in view of the ongoing talks between New Delhi and Islamabad, Pakistan would stall infiltration. This impression got strengthened after President General Pervez Musharraf gave such an indication after meeting with former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee last year at Islamabad. The quantum of infiltration is still small. One cannot say for certain whether it would reach the proportion which it had in the past decade. Nor can one be sure about how far Pakistan was behind it. There are some jehadis who, even Musharraf admits, cannot be checked since they are like a loose gun beyond anybody's control.

But if infiltration is beginning in the same old way, it is an unfortunate development. It will be a clear message from Islamabad that it is not happy over the content of talks. The Pakistan spokesman in his last week's briefing dropped a hint: "There are some differences. Pakistan has its own position and India its own. We have been talking about it for quite some time without reaching any conclusion."

Was the hush-hush meeting between Security Advisor J N Dixit and Musharraf's advisor Tariq Aziz at Amritsar meant to break the deadlock? Surely, the resumption of infiltration was too rapid a reaction even if the two had failed to find a way out. One should not, however, underestimate the interest, which Washington was taking. Secretary of State Colin Powell's statement at Washington was significant. He said: "We continue to monitor the rate of infiltration and that we continue to express our concern about the structure that remains behind." That he made the remark in the presence of Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh assumed greater significance.

Powell's observation was on infiltration and it should have been left at that. There was nothing to suggest that America was exerting pressure on Islamabad for accepting the Line of Control (LoC) as the international border. Still that was the general impression in Pakistan. An angry reaction from the least expected quarters, the Lahore Bar Association, told all. The association said that "a well contemplated plan by America on Kashmir" was in the offing.

Such a sharp observation by an organisation like the Bar Association meant two things: either it did not know what it was talking about or it was speaking somebody's voice. Whatever the truth, it served no purpose. If Washington had made up its mind to advocate a particular solution, Islamabad could do little because it was too dependent on America. But the Bar Association's other observation in the same resolution it passed was more serious. It indicated that it did not understand even the ABC of the problem. The Association said that Pakistan would not be 'complete' without Kashmir. Once in a while such statements emanated from the other side.

But, by this time it should have been clear that India would not be a party to any solution which recommends the state's division on the basis of religion. Pakistan's claim over the valley does not become weightier just because this part has Muslims in a majority. New Delhi cannot afford to reopen partition and pose a threat to its ethos of secularism. Had the state acceded to Pakistan when the British rule lapsed in August 1947, India would have taken the development in its stride.

But now, after 57 years, how can it accept a solution on the basis of the two-nation theory which even its exponent, Qaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had discarded after the creation of Pakistan? He said that the Hindus and Muslims in Pakistan were Pakistanis and the Hindus and Muslims in India were Indians, free to pursue their religion but not to mix it with the state.

Even today's Islamic state of Pakistan, although preponderantly Muslim, does not follow the two-nation theory. The Pakistan nation comprises Muslims, Hindus and Christians. The inorities are not a separate nation, nor do they have a separate electorate. The solution of Kashmir, whenever found, will be on the basis of Kashmiriyat, which is pluralistic in content and secular in character.

Whatever be the rhetoric on both sides, my impression is that the talks on Kashmir are taking place behind the scenes. That may be the reason why Musharraf too is silent after having said that he would wait for a solution until August before ending the confidence-building measures. The two foreign ministers after meeting at Beijing have said that the "chemistry" was good. They obviously talked about Kashmir.

However, my conviction is that if ever the two countries find a solution to the Kashmir roblem, it would not be at the negotiating table. The settlement would be reached somewhere away from the public gaze and media glare. And it would be anvilled by non-officials.

This almost appened three years ago when two non-officials, former Pakistan foreign secretary Niaz Naik and former MP R K Mishra met secretly a few times to achieve something "close" to the solution during the regimes of Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. Such efforts take time.

What does one do in the meanwhile to lessen the sufferings of Kashmiris? Many books have come out to describe their agony. The recent one, Kashmir: The Untold Story, is by Humra Qureshi, a sensitive journalist. She has poignantly etched the life of ordinary people, sandwiched between militants and security forces. So has nuclear physicist Dr Parvez Hoodbhoy in his documentary, Kashmir, Pakistan and India -­ Crossing the Lines. According to the Economist, "a 15-year war has claimed 40,000-110,000 lives." The two countries should ponder how to stop the killings.

One way is to silence the guns of militants as well as those of security forces. New Delhi may be willing for a complete ceasefire but Islamabad is not likely to do so because even after ordering a ceasefire on the LoC it has looked the other way when the militants from Pakistan have operated in India. Such an approach is unproductive and only encourages the militants.

Violence cannot possibly lead to a solution of any major problem today because violence has become much too terrible and destructive. If the society we aim at cannot be brought about by big-scale violence, will small-size violence help? It won't because violence breeds more violence and produces an atmosphere of conflict and of disruption. We have too many fissiparous tendencies in the two countries to take risks.

The basic thing, I believe, is that wrong means will not lead to right results and this is no longer merely an ethical doctrine but a practical proposition. I told this to the Kashmiri youth at a seminar in Srinagar. They did not relish the idea. But imagine the impact on Indian civil society even if 1,000 died through a non-violent struggle. It is not too late.

Kuldip Nayar is an eminent Indian columnist.