Security analysts were concerned and stated that the nuclear issue is one that was threatening the peace and stability of the region and consequently there were numerous suggestions for stabilisation of their respective nuclear regimes. However, such development was not forthcoming in the absence of normalisation between the two. Nuclear risk reduction talks, thus, is an integral part of the normalisation process.

The normalisation process or the peace talks effectively began in 1999 but had its ups and downs. The resumption of peace talks after three years, as such, is a welcome development for the region. From the recent development it is discerned that both countries have decided to engage themselves on multifarious issues including Kashmir. And recently India and Pakistan have held nuclear risk reduction talks so that their regimes can be stabilised. Stabilisation of their respective regimes is an imperative not only for India and Pakistan but also for the entire region, as South Asia has been living under the shadow of a potential nuclear confrontation or inadvertent war ever since India and Pakistan became overtly nuclear.

It is noted that prior to 1998 things were different. The international community was then mostly busy in persuading India and Pakistan from not going overtly nuclear. It was believed that neither India nor Pakistan had begun weaponisation of their offensive nuclear capabilities and had only the component of the warheads that could have been assembled for use within the stipulated time. It was believed that these countries had small-dismantled nuclear warheads that could be easily supervised and thus providing a time space in between loading and launching. In such eventuality, the danger of an inadvertent nuclear war or nuclear accidents was remote. But as India and Pakistan went ahead with their respective weaponisation and delivery system the scenario changed from bad to worse. India now allegedly has numerous assembled warheads and has a land-based missile with solid fuel system that can be kept on a hair-trigger alert while Pakistan allegedly have warheads and missiles that can take out every Indian city that is counted.

In this backdrop, when these nuclear rivals came close to wars with one side allegedly considering using it in case of a full-fledged war, who could have predicted that there would not be a nuclear confrontation either by choice or accident? Although such rumours were brushed aside the threats of inadvertent war loomed large, especially in absence of effective confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). As a matter of fact excepting CSBMs like the special agreement of 1991 which stipulated yearly exchange of list of nuclear facilities between the two in order to prevent rivals from attacking each other's power plants and nuclear installations and rudimentary hotline between the two Foreign Secretaries that fell in disuse in 1990s there were no effective CSBMs between the two. This was indeed worrisome. It was argued that if during the cold war the nuclear accidents and inadvertent wars could not be totally wiped out despite the effective CSBMs adopted by Moscow and Washington what would it be like in South Asia where there is none between India and Pakistan? Despite such vulnerability the first attempt to adopt CSBMs became redundant as soon as 1999 Agreement was aborted. Consequently, South Asia was called the most 'dangerous' region in world. Something that was intensely disliked by South Asian elite despite the fact that there was some truth in it. Especially when two nuclear countries were, at the time, not even on speaking terms with each other.

Given the above background -- what transpired during the recently resurrected nuclear risk reduction is noteworthy. It is discerned that both claimed that their nuclear capabilities are based on 'national security imperatives' and constituted 'factor for stability.' Each side also affirmed their 'unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless, in exercise of national sovereignty, it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.' Both being outside the exclusive club of the Permanent Members of the U.N Security Council, for the first time, sought dialogue with P-5 (regular working level meetings) to discuss issues of common concerns.

Both avoided the issue of nuclear disarmament to which both attach considerable importance in international fora. Both have realised that there is a dire need to stabilise their respective nuclear regimes through confidence building measure in order to minimise the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control and agreed to put in place a 'dedicated and secure' hotline between the two Foreign Secretaries, upgrading the existing hot line between the Director-Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) and agreed to work towards concluding an accord with technical parameter on pre-notification of flight testing of the missiles. It is evident that India and Pakistan have come to an understanding about their nuclear capabilities and how to deal with them. By shying away from the Disarmament issue and retaining right for further testing on the basis of national sovereignty and national interest importance and seeking regular discussion with P-5 both have made it clear that they seek equal status with P-5 (NPT may be amended in such eventuality) and that they would not give up their nuclear capabilities but at the same time seek 'strategic stability' through Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).

The burning question is whether or not these rudimentary CSBMs would be effectively operational given the past history of nuclear reduction talks. First, from the lessons learned from the previous attempt to hold nuclear talks, which met with an abyss of failure, the prospects of success of the recent one seem bright. The MOU signed on nuclear talks as part of 1999 Lahore Agreement could not even take off due to divergent interpretation of the MOU. It was India's insistence to delink Kashmir from nuclear and Pakistan's emphasis that Kashmir should be discussed first and both are interlinked that spoiled the broth. Even the Track-II diplomacy constituted under the Provision of the same bilateral agreement signed in February 1999 ended in dismal failure. However, this time around despite divergent views expressed by General Musharraff and Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh on the main issue of contention namely Kashmir the nuclear risk reduction talks have taken place.

This is a positive development, especially in the context of Mr. Natwar Singh's statement that the main problem between the two is not Kashmir but nuclear issues. It seems that despite General Musharraf's statement Pakistan may have delinked the two. Second, installation of effective CSBMs can be fraught with difficulties if the regional environment is besieged with mistrust and suspicion as they require intricate technical modalities and expertise in order to have transparency of the command and control structure, nuclear arsenals and nuclear doctrine. It is a stupendous task if there is shaky politico-diplomatic commitment. Again, on all counts there seems to be a qualitative change in Indian-Pakistani leaderships' commitment towards peace and stability for the region as evidenced by the successful completion of the first round of nuclear risk reduction talks since the aborted talks of 1999.

Besides, both sides have engaged themselves in multifaceted dialogue beginning from water sharing problems to adopting proposals in order to remove mistrust and suspicion to confidence building like lowering the numbers of troops along the Kashmir border. In such swiftly changing scenario it is expected that such dialogue would be an on going process with both sides pledging to remain engaged in bilateral consultations on security and non-proliferation issues. And lastly, the ability of the two sides to take steps, however small they may be, despite their mutual differences on old issues of 'no-first use' of nuclear weapons and the Pakistani desire for a strategic restraint regime has been indeed a positive development for their endeavours to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapon.

However, it should also be noted that recent CSBMs are indeed tiny steps towards preventing the danger of inadvertent nuclear war or nuclear accidents, especially in the context of their nuclear ambiguities and secrecy. For example, no one knows how heightened is their readiness i.e. whether by mistake or miscalculation nuclear warheads could be launched even before the CSBMs could be utilised. The countries, therefore, must move forward and adopt minute, intricate and technologically effective CSBM and make their mutual deterrence transparent. Following the example of the signing of "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War" between USA and erstwhile Soviet Union, which emphasised the importance of talking at the highest level amidst confrontation and competition, India and Pakistan may establish regular contacts at the same level to deal with nuclear issues.

Many such measures, like keeping their nuclear weapons non-deployed, are needed so that the nuclear regimes of South Asia are stabilised. Regretfully India and Pakistan have moved away from disarmament issue, but now that India and Pakistan are de jure nuclear powers it is their responsibility to make sure that the region is not afflicted with any nuclear war -- accidental or otherwise. The recent dialogue seems to have emphasised the leaderships' commitment towards that goal.

Dilara Choudury is Professor, Govt and Politics, Jahangirnagar University.