Panorama
The charade of democracy in Pakistan
Dilara Choudhury
Recently the Lower House of Parliament in Pakistan passed a bill with overwhelming majority authorising President Pervez Musharraf to continue as the Chief of the Army besides being the president of the country until 2007. In another word, he would continue to hold both offices -- the Office of the President and the Office of Chief of the Army. This is something which no other military rulers in Pakistan had ventured to do. Other military rulers had relinquished their army positions once the civilianisation process started. Moreover this is not in line with Musharraf's previous commitment of giving up his uniform by December 2004. This promise was made to Islamic opposition group MMA in 2003 for their support for the constitutional amendment bill that was to increase the powers of the President. The present bill, which awaits its approval of the upper house (Senate) in which Musharraf has the majority and, as such, will have a smooth sailing, was bitterly contested by the opposition. The opposition rightly pointed out that, once passed, the bill would have adverse effect on Pakistan's fledging democracy. But the treasury in its usual manner of toeing the line stated that it was needed for Pakistan's role in war on terrorism and for the territorial integrity of the country. The parliamentary Affairs advisor Sher Afghan went far enough to emphasise that it would not only empower the President to deal with the war on terrorism but actually pave the way for consolidation of democracy. So in effect the ruling party is claiming that democracy in Pakistan has actually gotten a boost. They have reasons to feel that way, especially when the champion of democracy -- the US -- turned a blind eye and only mildly chided its staunchest ally in its war on terrorism for acting against the country's nascent democracy's potential consolidation. However, both ruling party and the US fail to see that it is a setback for democracy, as if needed, and it would only help to keep the country under martial law. The controversy about as to whether the bill enhances the democratic consolidation or subverts the process is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan's turbulent political history. Most of the time of its 59 years history it has been under direct or indirect military rule. The civilian rule was intermittent and shaky. Every civilian government was overthrown through army coup beginning from Ayub to Zia ul Huq. However, Musharraf's capture of power has been rather different. He declared martial law after a high profile and dramatic capture of power from then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who still commanded two-third majority in the Parliament. Even then people, thanks to the misgoverance and corruption of the civilian rulers, welcomed his capture of power. Pakistan entered into another spade of uncertainty by deviating from the short-lived path of democracy. But clamour for democracy from both within and outside the country continued unabated. Eventually due to the verdict of the Pakistan Supreme Court, Musharraf promised general elections and they were held in October 2002. The constitutional package offered by Musharraf prior to elections created quite a stir in the country as it contained along with changes in country's electoral laws the restoration of then defunct article 58(2)(b). Clause (2)(b) of article 58 was inserted in the constitution by then military ruler Zia ul Huq which made the Office of the President more powerful than anyone before excepting the martial law administrator during the military rule. Under this clause, the President retained the power to appoint a Prime Minister or dismiss him according to his wishes. Nawaz Sharif had repealed it with his two-third majority. Musharraf wanted to bring it back along with a proposed National Security Council in order to retain the army's grip on power. It was argued that the formula was to ensure smooth functioning of the state institutions and prevent any potential army interventions in the country's politics. But the political parties and civil society leaders pointed out that in such eventuality the elected Prime Ministers would be nothing but puppets in the hands to the all powerful President who would be undoubtedly guided by the advice of NSC. In another words by the Army. As such, the opposition was hell-bent not to let it pass in the Parliament. It is in this connection that President Musharraf promised to coalition of Islamic parties MMA that he would shed his uniform by December 2004 if they supported its passage. Now that he has gone back on his word and has kept both offices -- the future of democracy in Pakistan is fraught with difficulties. First, under the guise of checks and balances between the President and Prime Minister, Musharraf has installed a system where all power is concentrated in the hands of the President. In such a system, the freedom and capacity of the peoples' representatives have been seriously curtailed to a point that the President can hire and fire any Prime Minister without paying any heed to the representatives' wishes. He can make and unmake them. The unceremonious fading of former PM Jamali and entry of Shaukat Aziz as current PM aptly demonstrates the impotency of the Parliament. It is to be noted that check and balances are a must for any democracy but this type does not fit into what democratic concept of checks and balances is meant to be. Second, there has now emerged a "King's" party -- the kind familiar in the United Pakistan's constitutional history during 1950s -- in the Parliament whose only task has been to please the President. They know that the President's wishes are more important than the people's wishes. This kind of rubber stamp Parliament can never serve the people. As such, no concrete steps to institutionalise Pakistan's nascent democracy can be expected from such a Parliament unless the President wants them to. And why should a President like to take any steps that would dilute his grip on power? For example, Pakistan's electoral process is in disarray and it is fairly easy to manipulate the results of the elections. Now in order to have a meaningful election the process must be made transparent through much needed reforms. Again no such urge is expected from the President whose referendum results are marred with controversy. And lastly, with Musharraf remaining both as President and Chief of the Army -- when the chips are down -- it is the army who will call the shots. There is actually no need for the army to intervene since they themselves are the main power holders. Musharraf has gone one step further than Zia ul Huq in this respect. By reinserting article 58(2)(b) and also remaining the Army Chief, Musharraf has made Pakistan's transition to democracy nothing but a charade. He has twisted the basic law of the country to an extent that the framework i.e. basic democratic institutions are not in place. How can then the process of consolidation begin? However, by Musharraf's accounts, every country should have a system according to its special needs and environment. And by all counts it seems Pakistan's political order can't do without the army's supervisory role. Such being the case, the kind of democracy Pakistan would have and how it would consolidate are of major interest to the political analysts of South Asia. Dilara Choudury is Professor, Govt and Politics, Jahangirnagar University.
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