Iraq elections and thereafter
Kazi Anwarul Masud
As mandated by the UN Security Council general elections are scheduled to be held on 30th January in Iraq to elect a 275-member interim National Assembly. The National Assembly will select a government and draft a new constitution. The National Assembly will then dissolve itself to pave the way for the election of a new Parliament under the new constitution.January 30th election will be based on proportional representation system with one fourth of the seats being reserved for women. Proponents of the proportional representation system argue that this system will enable the Iraqis in exile to vote in their places of exile. The opponents argue that the system will deny major cities particularly in the Sunni areas where people may not be able to vote due to deteriorating security situation. It is estimated that 9000 polling stations will be needed all over the country. Given the escalating violence in Iraq it is unlikely that elections can be held peacefully throughout the country. Fearing Shia domination after the elections, particularly because many Sunnis may not be allowed to vote by terrorists, some have suggested that the seats in the National Assembly be distributed in proportion to the size of the population instead of the actual number of votes cast. This proposal is opposed by another quarter who feel that it would mean appeasement of the Sunnis who, the quarter allege, have not been able to adjust to the loss of power caused by Saddam's downfall. Since the holding of the elections cannot be postponed without another Security Council resolution and also in view of the affirmation by President Bush and Iraqi President Ghazi al- Yawer that the elections be held as scheduled, interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi has suggested that elections be held over a period of 15-20 days to ensure security of the polling stations and the voters. Increased number of voter turnout will provide greater credibility and legitimacy to the elections than a truncated and turbulent election held only in parts of the country. James Dobbins of Rand Corporation apprehends that even if the elections are held on schedule the new government will emerge with only modestly enhanced legitimacy because though the Shiites and the Kurds will be adequately represented the Sunnis will not be. Therefore participation by the Sunnis who were largely ignored by the Coalition Provisional Government of Paul Bremer, perhaps due to CPA's suspicion of their loyalty to post-Saddam Iraq, is of utmost importance. Hoover Institution's Larry Diamond who served as a senior advisor to Paul Bremer fears that it may already be too late to bring the Sunnis in for the January 30th elections. Writing in the Foreign Affairs (Sept/Oct 2004) Diamond observes that a country must first have a state before it can have democracy and the primary requirement of a state is to hold monopoly on the use of violence. By that measure, writes Larry Diamond, the body that the US transferred power to in Baghdad last June may have been a government but it was not a state. Diamond emphasises the need for political, economic and social reconstruction to build up on a shattered war torn economy. In a post-conflict situation in which the state has collapsed providing security becomes the primary concern if a state is to be reestablished. This is the paradox facing Iraq today. James Dobbins correctly diagnoses the Iraqi situation through his observation that continued insecurity could prevent anything approaching a free campaign and a fair ballot but at the same time a prolonged postponement of the elections can ignite a civil war. Though President Bush would like to see his reelection as an endorsement of his Iraq invasion by the American voters, the United Nations and the world at large know better. James Dobbins who was US Special Envoy to Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and Afghanistan advises that the beginning of wisdom is the recognition that the on-going war in Iraq is not one that the US can win. In the same vein General George Casey, commander of the coalition forces in Iraq has conceded that the on-going war "is not about winning hearts and minds: we are not going to do that in Iraq... It is about giving the Iraqis the opportunity to govern themselves". As for the insurgents only Iraqi forces under Iraqi leadership independent of the US command can defeat them because the American forces have lost the support of the Iraqi population. The quest would not be easy in a war torn society steeped in tribalism where "primordial loyalties" i.e. loyalty to the tribe overrides loyalty to individual choice and where internecine conflict is immediately substituted by common enmity towards foreign elements. The only factor, observes Dobbins, that unites Muslim fundamentalist mujahedeens, secular Baathists, and Shiite extremists is their desire to expel American forces -- a goal that majority of Iraqi people seem to share. But the UNSC resolution's ambiguity about the post-election role of the US forces in Iraq has raised concern among many in Iraq and abroad. According to the resolution (No. 1546) US led multinational forces may take "all necessary measures to keep peace, subject to review after one year". Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawer hoped that Iraq would reserve the right "to ask them to leave if we thought it was in the interest of the people". According to Colin Powell in a situation where the US forces may be required "in some way that might not be in total consonance with what the Iraqi interim government might want to do at a particular moment of time, US forces will remain under US command and will do what is necessary to protect themselves". As against that James Dobbins feels that until Washington's democratisation campaign can be purged of its association with preemption and occupation it will have little resonance in the region. It is interesting to note that amidst this chaos relating to the forthcoming elections in Iraq the Shiite community has been consistent in their advocacy of the elections to be held on time. The most senior and influential Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah al-Shistani adamantly maintained throughout the political turmoil that only free elections could restore legitimacy to the Iraqi government and end the occupation. He issued a statement that abstaining from voting "is treason against the nation". The second most important Shia cleric issued a fatwa equating voting with Islamic injunctions relating to prayer and fasting. Unlike Iranian clerics their Iraqi coreligionists do not appear to be wedded to the concept of a theocratic state. Al-Shistani is not only sensitive to ethnic, religious and cultural structure of the Iraqi society, he is also reported to have said that he would not mind if a Christian were to be elected President of Iraq. The difference between the Iraqi and the Iranian Shiites was evident during the long Iraq-Iran war when the Shiite majority Iraqi army fought with the Iranian Shiite army because to them Iraqi nationalism got precedence over sectarian similarity. Besides the existence of Sunnis, Kurds, Chaldeans and Turkmen in Iraq have contributed to a comparatively secular character of the Iraqi Shiites. Perhaps the most telling influence on the Iraqi Shiites was the secular character of the Baathist regime. Sectarian violence was not frequent or widespread. Seed of Saddam Hussein's brutality towards the Kurds was not based in religion but in his desire for totalitarian control over all sectors of Iraqi society. In the case of the Shias their decision not to rebel against Saddam Hussein during the Iraq war shows more than anything else their refusal to accept US forces as liberators and fervent wish to see the Americans leave their country as soon as possible. In the ultimate analysis flawed elections in Iraq may imprint in the Iraqi mind the iconography of American torture and mayhem as a testament of unbridled American ambition for global domination and neo-cons in the Bush administration as ideologues of hatred. However tragic, despicable and morally reprehensible the 9/11 terrorist attacks might have been sentient people throughout the world will always wonder if the retribution for the 9/11 carnage needed the destruction of one of the oldest civilizations of the world based on grounds which have now proved to be totally baseless. If the Bush administration wishes to usher in the fourth wave of democratisation (first being pre-colonial, the second being post-colonial and the third being in East Europe, Latin America and East Asia) in broader Middle East and North Africa, the first card being dealt through Iraq elections then the White House may be in for disappointment. Western thinkers are unanimous in their belief that building blocks for a modern democratic political culture are not elections, parties and legislatures. Rather building blocks are supportive cultural values -- political trust, social tolerance, basic political liberties and gender equality. While it may not be possible to build these blocks in an election or two, unwavering international cooperation with Iraq preceded by an unambiguous US declaration that US forces have no design on Iraqi resources nor any intention to stay longer than necessary, preferably giving a time limit to end the current occupation of Iraq would help calm the prevailing restless situation. Otherwise any government following the January 30th elections could be considered as lackey of the Bush administration. Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.
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