Yet his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, after having seen Russia suffering an all around decline accompanied by widespread corruption and mismanagement -- mostly the result of his own bungling -- and with his own health falling fast due to excessive alcoholism identified in Putin, a former KGB apparatchik, a certain passion to revive Russia's power and a commitment to the reforms needed to revitalise it.

Russia did inherit the great power status of the Soviet Union after the latter disintegrated in 1991. Before that, Mikhail Gorbachev tried to revitalise the Union through his reforms: perestroika. But Yeltsin whose power base lay in Russia hastened the break up of the vast multi-ethnic union in a power struggle with Gorbachev -- thus demolishing the edifice of the once powerful superpower. Boris Yeltsin and his protege Putin completed its liquidation by repudiating the communist system. In a way Russia abdicated the greatness bestowed on it by the history. Can the status lost by Putin's own default be regained?

While Gorbachev's Soviet Union under reforms melted away, the Russian Federation as the successor state of the former couldn't avoid its disastrous fate either. The federation neither achieved political democracy nor a viable free market economy to which Russia was lured for quick prosperity by the West. The country's wealth was speedily taken over by an alliance of corrupt bureaucrats and Mafia underworld, while the great majority of Russian people were pauperised and reduced to the living standard of a third world country.

The loosening of the ideological control and the demoralisation of Russia's armed forces due to the country's decline led to the insurgencies rearing their head in many areas that had never accepted Russian suzerainty. A relatively obscure Putin gained Yeltsin's confidence and public acclaim by the decisiveness he displayed in asserting Russian authority in Chechnya and several other areas agitating for autonomy/independence. As a result he was named Prime Minister in 1999 by then President Yeltsin and won the presidential election the next year.

Putin, however, soon realised the hollowness of Russian power. He realised that his country, apart from courting defeat in the cold war, was also suffering terribly from internal mismanagement and decline of the once powerful state apparatus. Yeltsin's long weak rule and cronyism had already eaten away the country's vitals. The writ of the central government no more prevailed everywhere.

Also the former republics of the Soviet Union, which Moscow considered to be lying in its backyard and thus in its sphere of influence, began to break away by seeking closer relations with the West, which attracted them with aid and largeness. Russia's ruling elite became increasingly alarmed over the steep decline of their once powerful homeland. They gradually realised that the long term aim of the US as the sole superpower was to permanently clip the wings of its former rival and to cut it down to size.

In the post 9/11 scenario, the US strategic goal of extending its direct influence in what Russia calls its "near abroad" couldn't but generate resentment in Russia. Taken together with the eastward expansion of Nato and the candidacy of some of the former satellites of Russia for membership of EU, this only intensified Russian suspicion that the marginalisation of Russia still remains a strategic western goal.

Hamstrung by western pressure to introduce liberalism, democracy, and free market economy, it is paradoxical that Putin was concentrating power in his hands for his twin objectives -- the country's internal recovery and greater international influence. Putin has raised his sights and has invoked recently the memory of Russia's role in the allied victory over the axis powers.

He used the 60th anniversary of the allied victory in Europe to organise an impressive military parade to remind the world of the enormous contribution of the Soviet Union which sacrificed 27 million lives in the struggle against Hitler's legions. Putin, the protege of Yeltsin, interestingly described the break up of the Soviet Union as the "greatest catastrophe of the century." He also stepped up the pace of Russia's diplomacy by visiting the Middle East to reestablish Moscow's credibility as a major player in global affairs.

Russia has definitely improved both politically and economically since Putin assumed power. The Russian economy, though now reduced to the level of tiny Belgium, is no more in crisis thanks to the rising price of oil and gas of which Russia is a major exporter. Even politically, Putin can now be expected to step up efforts to challenge US hegemony as President Bush now faces worldwide condemnation for his unilateralist preemptive policy.

Yet few think that the great Soviet power can really be regained. The recent analyses of Russia's assets and liabilities for resuming its previous world role haven't painted a very promising picture. The assets are, of course, its enormous size and rich natural resources. It also has a huge stockpile of nuclear weapons and missiles. Russia also retains a comprehensive military capability though its quality of maintenance is poor.

However, a careful examination of the elements necessary for regaining the position of a great power shows major weaknesses and raises doubts about Russia. The first and perhaps decisive element is the size and quality of Russia's human resources. Russia's population was something like 160 million in 1991. It has declined steeply, bringing the figure now below 120 million.

In most years, the reduction in population has been around half a million due to declining birth rate and greatly reduced longevity which is due mainly to poor nutrition, increasing alcoholism, and poor health care. The current life expectancy stands at 53, as against over 70 in US, Europe, China, and Japan. Unless there is a dramatic change in the trend, Russia will come to a standstill as a functioning state due to the lack of manpower.

Putin has not only revived nostalgia for the Soviet period but also has brought back the vogue for Stalin and his firm leadership, although he carried out some of the bloodiest purges and massacres in history. While claiming to honour democratic values, Putin is paradoxically reviving Stalinism as the recipe for restoring Russia's greatness.

There is no doubt that this has touched a responsive chord among a large number of Russians who believe that they need to revive the harsh discipline and commitment to national prestige and progress that Stalin stood for, forgetting his excesses. All they are now seized with is an irresistible craving for Russia's great power status -- but alas without a rationale and sense of direction.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.