True, Pakistanis can find no pleasure in remembering 1971, though Bangladeshis enthusiastically celebrate it as their Independence Day. It was the year of the dismemberment of Pakistan as it had come into being in August 1947. It barely lasted a quarter of a century. It ended in a civil war and an international war with India amidst much bloodshed. Pakistan Army was decisively defeated by the Indian Army that was ably assisted by the Mukti Bahini. Pakistan gave up not only East Pakistan but also surrendered 95,000 prisoners of war. The Pakistanis' shame of defeat and dismemberment can only diminish if they make amends and do the right things now. Otherwise a foolish, indeed malign, forgetfulness will continue to colour their actions, with one disappointment leading to another.

Why did that tragedy happen is a relevant question even today. The answer, in retrospect, is blindingly clear: Bengalis, although a majority of the population, were treated badly. They were deprived of any real share in decision making. The democracy that Pakistan was supposed to be was subverted by vested interests. Which vested interests were they? They should be clearly defined: the big landlords that comprised the bulk of West Pakistani part of the Constituent Assembly -- the ultimate legal authority in Pakistan -- helped create a bureaucratic-military coterie that, with their help, was able to deploy intrigue, threats and bribes in order to manipulate in sovereign Assembly. Once the Assembly could be manipulated, with governments coming in and going out on the whim of the coterie, it lost its sovereignty. Real power came to reside not in the Assembly but in those who could make and unmake governments without any real role of Assembly or voters. Pakistanis were robbed of their theoretical sovereignty in tandem with accretions to the coterie's de facto power.

The elected representatives timidly allowed themselves to be played upon, probably in a mistaken notion of patriotism. They feared bureaucracy would formally takeover. The story is well-known. Democracy was never allowed to work. There were various signs everywhere. The elections to various provincial assemblies were rigged in all parts of West Pakistan. The coterie paid no heed to growing disaffection in East Bengal as was shown by election results of 1954. Ruling Muslim League was wiped out. The government of the Jukto Front that had won the 1954 election so decisively was soon dismissed. And so on. Later, after many more manipulations of the democratic processes by the coterie, the economic policies were so made by mainly West Pakistanis with greater benefit to West Pakistan areas, especially Karachi. East Pakistan earned more foreign exchange and it was spent mostly on West Pakistan for its industrialization, the building up of the Army, and constructing a new capital needlessly.

But when Ayub Khan finally took over in 1958 and declared Martial Law all over Pakistan, the Bengalis were forced to conclude that if they wanted to come into their own and to work for their own zone's improvement, they had no place in Pakistan. The ten years of Ayub Khan finally convinced them that they would always be second class citizens in Pakistan. The conduct of Yahya Khan confirmed all their worst fears. The misdeeds and blunderings of Yahya Khan are well known. Who can blame the Bengalis for opting for independence?

A question needs to be asked whether West Pakistanis did or did not exploit the resources of East Bengal. The amount of economic progress that West Pakistan areas made in 24 years contrasted sharply with conditions in East Pakistan when it became independent. Instead of industrializing the East and developing agriculture in West Pakistan -- as had been suggested by most unofficial economists and at least a few official advisors and which was the normal course that ought to have been followed -- the priorities were reversed or rather skewed to benefit West Pakistan in both sectors.

Then there is the whole tragedy of the year 1971. It was a West Pakistani military dictator who treated Bengalis like dirt. Anyone could deduce his bad intentions from his April 1970 Legal Framework Order that asked the new Assembly to produce an acceptable-to-all Constitution in 120 days or there would be no transfer of power from him. His refusal to accept the 1970 election results and refusal to call the Assembly session were a clear and final signal to Bengalis that their only option was to go on living under a military dictatorship of a basically West Pakistani Army. If the Bengalis refused who can blame them? That makes the tragedy of 1971 poignant. The Army indulged in horrible atrocities. It is necessary to recognize those atrocities by troops as atrocities. What Biharis or rebellious Mukti Bahini did were actions of disaffected individuals. State actions are more important -- and more blameworthy.

What conclusions can we draw from these experiences? First and foremost is that without honest governance and actual democracy, nothing else works. Pakistani rulers and Army commanders mouthed much ideological mumbo jumbo in reply to Bengalis' demand of fairness in allocation of resources, a proper share in decision-making and in maintenance of democracy. Islam, Islamic brotherhood, and other emotive shibboleths were invoked by West Pakistani leadership without recognizing the obvious fact that these things had nothing to do with what was being demanded: Bengali language and culture of the majority must be given their due place of honour, economic policies must address Bengal's true needs and that their votes should decide major questions. Lectures on Islam and patriotism, in the absence of honesty, democracy and accountability were, and are, useless.

It stands proven that Islam, Islam alone, cannot sustain a modern nation state, especially if it comprises two geographically separate zones. Various ethnicities like language, culture, race, etc have to be equally respected along with religion. Now, in retrospect, it is clear that Bengali language and culture were sought to be smothered under ideological hocus pocus in order to misuse the foreign exchange that Bengal earned in West Pakistan; Bengalis should grin and bear disparities because their resources were sustaining progress of other Muslims. Actually subsequent actions caused by Bengalis' protests after 1965 war for being left defenceless and the East Pakistani economists insistence on net transfer of Rs.1000 million worth of resources for investment in East Pakistan per year in Third Plan. Pakistan establishment could scarcely meet Bengali demands without scuttling its own dominance. So they were consciously looking for ways of getting rid of East Pakistan.

Ah! The irony of it all. West Pakistanis are paying the price. Democracy once subverted in early 1950s has never returned either in original or the present Pakistan. This Pakistan is still under a military government in its fifty-eighth year. The prospects of democracy in Pakistan are not bright. For, the Army is now well entrenched. It knows how to "manage" elections. Its foreign policy ensures it American support and a bogus legitimacy has been given it by its peoples being so laid back. The future seems to belong to the Army. Pakistan is likely to go on being run by the Army and for the Army. Pakistanis are paying the price with their own slavery for keeping the East Bengalis slaves for 24 years.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.