Waiver on TRIPS
According to the Marrakesh Agreement that established the WTO, LDCs were given 10 years to implement the TRIPS Agreement. This extension was to expire on January 1, 2006. This period has now been further extended by another seven and half years (up to July, 2013) with a possibility for further extension. LDCs have been asked to provide plans, within next two years, for implementation of the IP regime by their respective countries. Development partners are to provide the necessary support for implementation of this plan.

TRIMS
One of the potential areas of S&DT agreed in Hong Kong relates Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). The transition period has been extended by seven years, i.e. till 2013. The LDC proposal was to extend it up to 2021. More importantly, LDCs cannot only continue with old TRIMS (subject to notification) but also introduce new ones. One needs to explore to what extent Bangladesh can use this provision to support its strategic trade policy funding by withstanding the pressures from the World Bank and the IMF.

3.2 An Explanation of the Outcome

Bangladesh's ambition for market access was justified; but a number of factors contributed to the non-realisation of this ambition. Indeed, from Bangladesh point of view, the adopted Declaration was of lower value in comparison to the Geneva text.

Option 2 of the Annex F of the Geneva text was adopted with modification which effectively deprived Bangladesh.

Regretably, there was a self deceptive attitude on the part of Bangladesh which impressed on others that DF-QF for all countries would pass through at the Conference. Bangladesh also failed to understand about the depth of the resistance on the part of the USA. The campaign for US TRADE Bill also generated a sense of false optimism.

We also did not adequately appreciate that Bangladesh is situated at a 'peculiar' level of development. Bangladesh neither generates sympathy as sub-Saharan African LDCs, nor does it command reverence as emerging developing economies such as India and Brazil. Too much emphasis on LDC cap did not deliver, particularly in case of apparels. When it was much needed, Bangladesh could not draw on the sympathy of the AGOA beneficiary African LDCs.

Role of Developing Countries

• Bangladesh did not anticipate adequately that certain textile importing developing countries would play such an open and active role against Bangladesh. The role of Pakistan and, partly, Sri Lanka was to the detriment of Bangladesh's interests. Our South Asian solidarity was of no help to Bangladesh.

Countervailing Political Clout
Bangladesh failed to activate its political connections and mobilise political clout to withstand these pressures.

Formation of G14 +1
The initiative Bangladesh to set up a separate G14 +1 was done on a very ad hoc basis and at a late stage of the negotiations (on the fourth day). There was no analytical and conceptual background paper explaining the rationale, articulating the objective and setting the concrete goals. The initiative diverted scarce negotiating capacity at critical juncture of negotiations.

4. AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

• Raising National Capacities: At the end of the day Bangladesh has to competently fight for its national trade interests. What is necessary in such cases, apart from technical preparation, is political steadfastness, familiarity with the WTO process, effective political outreach and the nerve to withstand pressure. Regrettably, Bangladesh was not sufficiently endowed with all those.
• Export Diversification: Export diversification should have always been a top priority for Bangladesh. Given the overwhelming dependence of Bangladesh on one product, apparels and clothing, the real possibility of textiles being excluded from preferential market access opportunities reinforces the need for identifying new products which are to be promoted through appropriate trade and investment strategies.
• Revisiting Export Strategies: Bangladesh also needs to revisit its export promotion strategies from another perspective. Bangladesh has quite often tried to promote its exports through tariff concessions. In the light of the Hong Kong Declaration, as well as MFN liberalisation in general under the NAMA and Agriculture negotiations, this possibility is getting increasingly thin. Bangladesh now needs to put more emphasis on acquiring competitive advantage through efficiency gains in the area of trade supportive infrastructure (port, electricity, telecommunications) as well as overall economic governance.
• Work on Modalities for Market Access in USA: The Chairman in his concluding speech has mentioned that the modalities for designing the 3 percent exclusion list will be thrashed out in Geneva in 2006 through negotiations on a framework. Whilst this may give the LDCs an opportunity to voice their concerns and interests in terms of items to be included in the inclusion list, it is difficult to imagine that developed countries such as the USA which opposed the idea of 100 percent duty free access for LDCs in Hong Kong would be ready to demonstrate a high degree of flexibility in negotiations pertaining to modalities on 'Exclusion List'.

The authors are the researchers of the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Bangladesh.