Palestine: After Hamas
Saad S. Khan
The Hamas victory in the Palestinian legislative assembly elections must not have come as a surprise since it was the fifth straight win of an Islamist party in the Middle East in almost as many months. The four previous wins were when the Iranians elected Ahmadinejad, the Hizbollah made a good showing in Lebanon, the Islamic Brotherhood routed the ruling NDP in Egypt in the one third or so of the Egyptian parliamentary seats that it was permitted to contest, and the Iraqis returned Sunni and Shia Islamist parties wiping out even traces of secularist politics where Ahmad Chalabi's alliance that could not secure a single seat in 275-member Iraq National Assembly.Palestinians have a longer democratic tradition than that in many of the countries of the region. Even when the Palestinian government and parliament functioned in exile, and the latter used to have its sessions in Cairo or Tunis, the Israeli press used to express surprise and tacit admiration at the level of openness and the democratic debate in the Palestinian legislature, especially when compared with the Knesset sitting in Tel Aviv. The Palestinian people, with the democratic tradition they have, thus could not be bullied into voting for the ruling Al-Fatah which has trailed behind with 45 seats to 74 for Hamas, in the enlarged 132-seat legislature. And within the Fatah tally, less than half of MP's owe loyalty to the Marwan Barghouti's Islamist faction, making the defeat of secularists more decisive. The staple explanations for Hamas victory suggest that it is a vote against America and Israel, than one for Hamas, and that the divisions and factional rivalries in Al Fatah had benefited Hamas. The wave of support towards Islamists parties in the whole region and their victories one after the other may also have influenced the minds of the voters. And just like in many other Middle Eastern autocracies, where Mosque is the only functioning civil society institution that the State cannot ban, political networking and social activism starts from, and mushrooms across, the mosques. Thus targeting secular opposition politicians, persecuting journalists and torturing human rights activists, destroys any meaningful opposition to tyranny except the one channelled through religious forums and religious parties. This has happened in the whole Middle East and in Palestine as well, where Hamas was as much a reaction to Israel's military policies as to Yasser Arafat's intolerance to dissent. The factors leading to Hamas victory are much deep rooted than what meets the eye. The fact Palestine was on the brink of becoming a failed state within weeks of the Israeli pullout from Gaza was as glaring as a midday sun. The Palestinian state apparatus is all but collapsed in Gaza, guns and violence rules the streets, and many people who had jubilated on Israeli withdrawal last year, now nostalgically remember the order on the streets that was at least there. Like all national elections elsewhere in the world, the Palestinian one was to be won or lost on domestic issues -- relations with Israel, including the much trumpeted peace roadmap, which was strictly speaking a foreign policy issue for the electorate, concerned only 15 percent of them. Hamas won because Fatah failed to deliver -- not peace with Israel -- but water, sanitation, education, and law and order. Hamas capitalized on its won "martyrs" like Sheikh Yassin and Aziz Rantissi to sell itself among the people as a party that can give sacrifices in blood for them. It was a stark contrast with the proverbially corrupt image of ruling Fatah Ministers and civil servants, routinely caricatured for their alleged fondness of the Beirut nightclubs. It was the same level of sympathy wave that Fatah had enjoyed when it lost its leaders such as Khalil el Wazir in the late 1980's. Hamas also fell victim of the folly of democracy where you think you are losing, so you make wild promises to discredit the ruling party and strengthen your share as opposition, and end up being victorious, hostage to own rhetoric and promises, and not knowing what to do. This is the dilemma that will haunt Hamas as long as it rules. Be that as it may, Hamas has been elected by the people and the world community has to accept and respect the choice of the people whether anyone likes it or not. It is worth pointing out that the impact of the Hamas victory must not be overstated. Most of the Palestinian institutions are controlled by secular forces. The highest decision making body, the 669-member Palestinian National Council, of which the 132 legislators are also members, is dominated by non-Islamists. And so are the civil service, the army and security forces dominated by Al Fatah. Most important of all, the Presidency is with a very moderate, pragmatic and seasoned politician Mahmood Abbas. And it is his office that controls the security forces and the media. And last, but not the least, who controls the purse controls everything, and Palestinian government does not control its own purse. Of its $1.9 billion annual budget, it is dependant on the European aid for $360 million and another $700 million are collected on its behalf by Israeli customs. Without the cash inflow, the government cannot even defray the salaries of its employees for a single month. All this would have a taming influence on the Hamas, even if the incumbency factor alone were not enough. In any case, the hawks are found to be more likely to make a lasting peace than the doves in any conflicting situation. Sharon and Olmert's Kadima Party on one side and Hamas on other are more likely to make peace, than if both governments were headed by the doves, always on back foot to deflect criticism for being soft on the other side. Both the Israelis and Palestinians are fed up of dying in violence. There is no way to peace in the Middle East any longer; peace is the way. No bigger proof, in concrete, of this could be than the Separation Wall Israel is building. Moral and legal criticism not with standing, the wall is the biggest testimony that Israel does not want to sacrifice any more men or money to retain the Palestinian majority areas. Palestinians and Israelis would do well to stop decrying each other's election results. It is a necessity, rather than mere expediency, to recognize and respect the voters' mandates and to get down to talk with each other's elected governments. There is no short cut to the resolution of the impediments to the peace roadmap. Western media may continue speculation to its heart's content on whether Sunnis or Shiites might have blown up the revered shrine of Imam Hassan Askari, venerated by both the sects; in Iraq and elsewhere a mere suggestion that Israeli intelligence service Mossad might not have done it shall remain a joke. On such like perceptions that translate itself into the region-wide electoral victories for the Islamists, the US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfield, is reported to have remarked that the Islamic extremists have out-communicated the United States in reaching and influencing the people of the region. Well, Al Qaeda and all the organizations put together cannot match a fraction of the resources that the US has. One would be tempted to believe that it was the United States that acted as the PR and advertising agency for the terrorists. Commending tyrant like Hosni Mubarak, condoning his repressive rule and dummy electoral exercises, refusing to accept genuine election results in Palestine, and torturing people in Guantanamo Bay, where the hunger strike has entered the thirteenth week now, US could not have better conveyed the Al-Qaeda message among the masses. The writer is the Middle East Editor of Cambridge Review of International Affairs and a widely read analyst on politics, governance and human rights in the Muslim world.
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