They claim this is a "historic" achievement and fulfilment of India's "Second Tryst with Destiny."

The deal's critics range from the Left to the Far Right. Their grounds are that it compromises India's sovereignty, interferes with foreign policy options (e.g., on Iran), and shifts the goal posts of the Manmohan Singh-George Bush agreements of July and March.

Former Atomic Energy Commission chairmen Homi Sethna and PK Iyengar condemn the deal outright. They believe it will block India's "credible minimum" deterrent. Mr Sethna says it'd be better to sign the much-hated Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It at least gives a signatory the exit option; the deal doesn't.

In the media, the deal's supporters greatly outnumber its opponents. Certain newspapers have conducted a crusade for it. Never before have we witnessed such a well-orchestrated media attempt to shape foreign and security policy.

The supporters are led by "pro-Washington pragmatists" who want India's nuclear weapons legitimised by America at any cost. At the other extreme are super-hawkish "nuclear ultra-nationalists," who oppose inspections and public accountability of India's nuclear programme.

Politically, the deal's opponents clearly outnumber its supporters. The Bharatiya Janata Party strongly rejects the deal and says it shouldn't bind future governments. The Left is moderately critical, especially of the foreign policy baggage involved. The Congress party is on the defensive.

Strangely, the RSS welcomes the deal because it presents India a "new opportunity" to step into the global Big League.

What's the truth? Is the deal being radically altered in the US? Will it undermine India's national interest? What does it imply for global nuclear disarmament? Consider some myths, contrasted to realities.

Myth 1: The deal will cap India's nuclear weapons program. Reality: It won't! Under the agreed civilian-military separation, India will put only 14 out of its 22 power reactors under IAEA safeguards. The other eight, two fast-breeders and military-nuclear facilities can continue to produce fuel for bombs. India can also build many new military facilities.

The un-safeguarded reactors can annually yield enough plutonium for 25-plus bombs, adding to India's existing estimated stockpile of 100-plus. This surely fits any definition of "minimum" deterrent. Just a handful of nuclear weapons can kill millions.

Myth 2: The deal is tantamount to signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Reality: India has made no greater commitment than its unilateral testing moratorium of 1998. True, the House Bill says the Presidential waiver will "cease to be effective" if India tests. But amending Section 129 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which triggers such cessation, was never on the agenda.

It's absurd to equate India's voluntary moratorium with the CTBT, a multilateral agreement with universal application and verification. Besides, India doesn't need more tests to develop a deterrent.

Myth 3: The deal imposes symmetrical obligations on India and America. Reality: India isn't treated like the NPT-recognised Nuclear Weapons-States (NWSs). These only safeguard a minuscule fraction of their civilian facilities (11 out of hundreds). They can take them in and out of safeguards. India's safeguards are perpetual.

India must adhere to Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) guidelines, although it isn't a member. India's testing moratorium was specifically noted -- but not America's. Yet, the US is far likelier to test than India.

India is a Johnny-come-lately in the Nuclear Club. It can't expect to be treated as a first-class member. India must make a show/pretence of "responsibility" (a contradictory term for a nuclear power willing to kill millions of unarmed civilians).

Myth 4: India will be subjected to harsh IAEA inspections: "you can't move even a chair without their permission" (AEC ex-chairman Srinivasan). Reality: India's experience at Tarapur and Rajasthan hasn't been one of intrusive IAEA inspections. Inspections for the 14 to-be-safeguarded reactors will probably be less strict, given the agency's budget constraints.

Myth 5: India's commitments under Congress resolutions and earlier bilateral agreements are identical. Reality: They aren't. Under the original plan, India would negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and get NSG approval after Congress ratification. Now, it must do so before ratification.

Myth 6: The deal has no larger foreign policy implications. The demand that India must help Washington isolate Iran and promote America's non-proliferation objectives is non-binding. Reality: Implicit in the deal, and motivating it centrally, is harmonisation of India's foreign policy with US objectives. India's two shameful IAEA votes against Iran prove this.

Normally, Indian diplomats would have objected to the resolutions' language. They find it "intrusive and even offensive." But they have lumped it -- to seal a strategic alliance with Washington.

The March agreement binds India to even bigger policy shifts, including the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture driven by US corporations, completing the WTO Doha Round in 2006, implementing the Asia-Pacific Climate Partnership, etc. India is likely to yield to other US pressures too -- including on the Non-Aligned Movement.

The US is recruiting India as a junior partner in its global alliance system. India will be asked to contain China and help America dominate the Eurasian landmass. Undermining India's policy independence is a huge achievement.

India's only gains will be legitimisation of its nuclear arsenal and access to civilian nuclear materials. But nuclear power, as this column has argued, is expensive, hazardous, and unsustainable.

Even worse is the legitimisation of nuclear weapons. Once India is admitted into the unequal global nuclear order ("Atomic Apartheid"), it will be forced to abandon disarmament.

India then will betray the National Common Minimum Programme's promise to fight for a nuclear weapons-free world. It'll become complicit in undermining the cause of world peace -- and its own security.

Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.