Bare Facts
Why not a constitutional council?
M Abdul Latif Mondal
THE constitution of Bangladesh has not made any provision for constituting any body/bodies to recommend appointments to the constitutional bodies like the Election Commission (EC) and the Public Service Commission (PSC), as well as to the higher judiciary. As a result, appointments to these bodies/institutions depend upon the wish of the prime minister who has been vested with the executive power of the republic. Though such appointments require approval of the president, but that is a mere formality, because, the president is under constitutional obligation to act in accordance with the advice of the prime minister in the exercise of all his functions, save only that of appointing the prime minister and the chief justice. The politicisation of appointments in these constitutional bodies/national institutions to satisfy the desire of the party/alliance in power in the past fifteen years' successive rule of the BNP and the AL has adversely affected the national interest. Analysts and observers are, however, of the opinion that the politicisation of appointments in these bodies has been all time high during the past four plus years of the BNP-led alliance rule. A passing reference shows that appointment of the ruling BNP henchmen as the chief election commissioner (CEC) and election commissioners (ECs), ignoring the opposition coalition demand for making appointments to these posts in consultation with the opposition political parties has created a serious crisis towards holding the next general election scheduled to be held in January 2007. The main opposition AL-led coalition has already declared that they will not participate in the general election held under the incumbent CEC and ECs. They have so far refrained from participating in any by-election held under the present EC. Similarly, appointment of ruling alliance loyalists as chairman and members of the PSC has influenced recruitment of activists and supporters of the ruling alliance depriving meritorious candidates. The much-talked-about recruitment of 150 or so activists of the JSD, the student wing of the ruling BNP, as upazila election officers last year is a case in point. Furthermore, in the absence of constitutional requirement to consult the chief justice to appoint judges in any of the two divisions of the Supreme Court as well as non-existence of an independent body to recommend appointment of persons as additional judges to the High Court Division, their confirmation as judges to the High Court Division, and to recommend appointment of High Court Division judges as Judges to the Appellate Division, the appointment of judges in the higher judiciary is at the pleasure of the executive. This has led to the continuous allegations of appointment of judges in the higher judiciary on political consideration. Not that the allegations are totally baseless. The much-talked-about appointment of 19 additional judges to the High Court Division in the latter half of 2004 on political consideration and resented by the Supreme Court Bar Association is a case in point. Now the question is: how to stop politicisation of appointments to the constitutional bodies and/or national institutions? In some countries, constitutions have provided for Constitutional Council to recommend appointments to the constitutional bodies. In some countries, appointments to such bodies/institutions are routed through parliament on the recommendation of a broad based committee. In a landmark vote, the Sri Lankan parliament passed a bill on September 25, 2001 by a two-thirds majority to amend the constitution to administer police, judiciary, public service and elections. This 17th amendment has provided for Constitutional Council (CC) consisting of the prime minister, the speaker, leader of the opposition in parliament, one person appointed by the president, five persons appointed by the president, on the nominations of both the prime minister, the leader of the opposition, one person nominated by the majority of the members of parliament belonging to political parties or independent groups other than the respective political parties or independent groups to which the prime minister or the leader of the opposition belong. The speaker is the chairman of the CC. The CC recommends to the president appointments as chairmen and members of commissions, namely: (a) The Election Commission, (b) The Public Service Commission, (c) The National Police Commission, (d) The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, (e) The Permanent Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption, (f)The Finance Commission, and (g) The Delimitation Commission. No person shall be appointed by the president to certain offices, unless such appointment has been approved by the CC upon a recommendation made to the CC by the president. The offices are: (a) the chief justice and other judges of the Supreme Court, (b) the president and other judges of the Court of Appeal, (c) the members of the Judicial Council other than the chairman, (d) the attorney general,(e) the auditor general, (f) the inspector general of police, (g) the parliamentary commissioner for administration (ombudsman), and (h) the secretary general of parliament. The 1990 constitution of Nepal is the product of people's struggle against the autocracy of King Birendra for democracy. King Birendra, who was slain in a palace intrigue, was succeeded by King Gyanendra. King Gyanendra, who dismissed the elected government and seized absolute power by dissolving parliament, had to submit to the people's power to restore democracy and parliament. The parliament has already started clipping the wings of the king to be reflected in the new constitution to be framed by the constituent assembly. Anyhow, the 1990 constitution, hurt by King Gyanendra, provides for a Constitutional Council (CC) to recommend appointments to the constitutional bodies. The prime minister heads the CC and the chief justice, the speaker of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the National Assembly and the leader of the opposition are members of the CC. For the purpose of appointing the chief justice, the CC shall include among its members the minister of justice and a judge of the Supreme Court. The constitution of France provides for a nine-member Constitutional Council (CC) comprising the nominees of the president of the republic, nominees of the president of the National Assembly, nominees of the president of the Senate, and ex-presidents of the republic as ex-officio members, to discharge the functions and responsibilities that relate to ensuring: (a) regularity in the election to the office of the president of the republic, (b) regularity in the election of the deputies and the senators, and (c) regularity of referendums and proclamation of the results there of. Experiences of the last three decades or so of the independent Bangladesh show that time has come to make provision for the Constitutional Council, following the Sri Lankan model to the extent possible, in the constitution to regulate appointments to the constitutional bodies, higher judiciary and quasi-judicial bodies like Anti-Corruption Commission, Tax Ombudsman to protect them from politicisation by the party/alliance in power from time to time to serve their narrow political interests. M. Abdul Latif Mondal is a former Secretary to the Government.
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