It is also very heartening to see at least one Service Headquarter, the AHQ, respond with its comments, attempting to remove some of the misgivings in the said analyses, while at the same time not holding back its reservations, though in some cases ill-founded as many are disposed to think, on the motive behind such an exercise by the reporter.

The reports, and the comments that followed, were serialised analyses and observations by Mizanur Rahman Khan, in the Prothom Alo appearing from August 5 to 8, on interviews of the chiefs of staff of the three services published in the Jane's Defence Weekly (JDW) not many months ago.

It merits more than the limited space of an op-ed and a detailed and threadbare dilation on the interviews, the report, and the responses thereto. However, an attempt will be made to touch upon briefly some important aspects of the "debate." Other issues brought out in the report will be addressed subsequently. One hopes that it will generate views, hopefully many differing ones, and help, rather than hinder, what I feel was the very purpose of the article, which is to determine how we can spend less on defence but be more secure. This, I am sure, is also the ultimate objective of the defense as well of the national level planners.

To start with, let us dwell first on the three interviews. These are extremely well articulated views on the projected shape of the three services. One can make out that the year 2020 is the datum year for the purpose of planning the force structure. The interviews dwell on the weaknesses at the macro level and suggest option to reverse them. The forces goal is spelt out with the current state of expansion, highlighting some of the major responsibilities both at home and at international level, like the peacekeeping engagements under the UN. Not only are we made aware of future plans but also of what have been approved. The details of the weapons inventory, in some cases, are perhaps more than what needed to be bared.

All in all, the statements fit into the mode of a very classical white paper on defense except for the fact that they did not spell out the detailed policy as a white paper should (and indeed the chiefs' statements to JDW was not meant to do that) nor do we get an indication of cost appreciation of the requirements of the three services. However, what it does, though, is provide a reference point on which to proceed on a discussion on the way ahead for defence in Bangladesh. That is what, one feels, the report in the Prothom Alo wanted to do. And that is what we shall dwell on next: the report and the responses thereto.

Defence has always elicited interest in the public. It is just as well that it is so. That we have the JDW interviews translated into Bangla with analyses and comments of several senior retired military officers on various aspects of the interviews, shows that the armed forces are no longer considered sacrosanct, better left out of public scrutiny. There is very little difference of view on the need for the military's accountability to the public, ensured on its behalf by their elected representatives in the parliament and the media.

However, it is not always that service chiefs talk to the media, much less the local media, and the Bangla daily should be commended for bringing to the public important statements made to a foreign journal by the three service chiefs that outlined the way the armed forces were moving in the days ahead rather than ascribing ill-motives to the author of the articles, as a few commentators have.

It has, not unexpectedly, generated a crosscurrent of arguments, and quite justifiably so. Thus, one cannot but take issue with those who rationalise the tendency of keeping the local media out of the discourse regarding the military, for fear of misinterpretation, either due to misperception, or lack of detail knowledge of military matters.

This calls for all concerned to seriously address the necessity to develop a crop of defense correspondents and the lead must be given by the armed forces to generate the link and sustain it. Regular interaction will certainly remove many misperceptions about the defence forces. It ought to be noted, too, that a lot of the observations on the rationale of certain plans are those of retired military officers.

It would be advisable to focus on the macro and not the micro aspect of the report. Very little will be gained from splitting hairs on arguments centering on whether the howitzer has a higher trajectory than a field gun or whether a fire-and-forget anti-tank weapon is more effective than a wire-guided or a optical-guided missile, where the nature of our terrain impacts on the effectiveness of the weapon.

The piece on the army elicited most comments on various aspects of the CAS's observations, and quite a lot on the title of the article where the translation of more "teeth" for the army was taken in a negative light by the establishment. For an ex-military man, "teeth" conjures up easily the idea of being an "effective" entity by possessing the ability to influence issues rather than the reverse. A non-military person may quite easily characterise it in the way that the reporter did, and the AHQ clarified the matter in its rejoinder, but not before questioning the motive of the writer.

The final part of the report does very well to highlight the issue of defense policy and various views on it. The long and short of the articles was the very justification of going for development plans that are not the result of specific policy. And the argument that the ad hoc manner of acquisitions is wasteful in money and time, bears very strong rationale.

However, the onus for not having a defense policy, at least not in the way that it should exist, is not that of the services but entirely on the political leadership. It is good to have a written policy or a guideline. It ensures continuity and saves wasteful expenditures. The Mig and the frigate issues are very classic examples of regime, rather than strategy oriented planning, and the consequence of the absence of a well-considered policy. This reinforces the demand for restructuring the AFD and the post of a Chief of Defence Staff.

But not having a defense policy does not preclude the armed forces from planning on the minimum basis of operational requirements, derived primarily from the military perspective, not an ideal situation, but has to do for the interregnum. The problem is that the interregnum has lasted for nearly thirty five years, again not the fault of the services.

The statement of the air-force chief puts in context the point we are trying to make, when he says to the effect that he was asked by the government to plan his force development through to 2020. Very well and good, but what are the planning criteria that the plan will be circumscribed by? This is perhaps the moot point that the Prothom Alo reporter was trying to highlight.

Some see in the statements of the service chiefs an aggressive stance that might not go down well with our neighbours. It should be remembered that the prime concern of any government is to provide security to its people, and physical security is one of them. And we must not hesitate to identify and articulate the threats before we contemplate appropriate actions. Our security posture cannot be dependent on how others feel about it. Aggressiveness is an attitude of mind apart from capability. Our military strategy may be defensive, but that should not keep us from vesting the military with tactical offensive capability.

The author is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.