Plain Words
What's sure about the opposition?
M B Naqvi writes from Karachi
These are the days of no confidence motion and popular agitation. Various opposition parties are said to be uniting. Should the regime fear? Rulers are a known category: They mean to stay in power; indeed, cannot afford to leave it. They can only be forced out by a superior force. But this is absent. Which superior force it can be is known: a united and aroused people's will that has, so far, been unavailable. Which political party is likely to mobilize enough popular will to force the army out of politics? They are all uncertain quantities. There is talk about one-point unity. An Alliance for Restoration of Democracy has been uniting the opposition parties for several years. MMA has also been doing it. Which are the main opposition parties? Is it the PPP? Can we accept MMA's claim to be an opposition party? Is PML(N) really willing to cooperate with PPP, without reservations? Answers vary. Where stands ARD today? Is MMA with it or against it? One-point unity has a long history. It began in East Bengal with the Jukto Front in 1954. It succeeded in toppling Muslim League in East Bengal. The power structure in the west wing remained unaltered -- and in power -- and it soon retaliated. But that is another story. Leaving aside East Pakistan, the Combined Opposition Parties in 1964 memorably opposed the self-promoted field marshal. Its failure was predictable. The parties then united to struggle against Ayub Khan in 1968-69. In a way, they succeeded: the Ayub regime was toppled. But the people were saddled with another military dictator. The next dictator, Yahya, played an ambitious game. He implemented, in slow motion, what Ayub had agreed to in the 1969 Round Table Conference. Yahya restored one-man one-vote, doing away with the parity of East and West Pakistan, and held a free poll -- but just. Yahya held free polls under the misconception that he would get the results he wanted. Which of course did not happen. He rejected the results and what followed was a disaster for Pakistan and a new beginning for East Bengalis. There are further instances of one-point unity. Under the Pakistan National Alliance banner the opposition parties brought the Bhutto regime down in 1977. Again the army gathered the fruits of a popular struggle, and another military dictator, Ziaul Haq, took over -- and hanged Bhutto for good measure. The opposition had yet another go at unity: the Movement for Restoration of Democracy in 1983. MRD struggled but was brutally suppressed -- and not all opposition parties had joined in. The movement was largely a PPP protest and was confined to Sindh. Punjab's failure to take part in the struggle underlined a major ethnic fault-line. Consequences of this fiasco are still being felt. The army, conscious of becoming unpopular after eleven years of Zia, adopted a new strategy: it experimented with an intelligently-controlled democracy with real power staying with the army. The army retained most of the institutions of a democracy, but put unseen limitations on civilian power. This military rule in mufti ran from 1988 to 1999. Now, the Musharraf regime is another hybrid, Martial Law combined with a controlled democracy, but with a semi-free press. The opposition's answer was ARD. But it is still a work in progress. It is uncertain whether the PPP, the PML(N), and MMA are fully united, or only partially. With a heavy heart one ignores smaller parties, that are the salt of the earth, in ARD. Nawaz Sharif and Benazir have certainly signed a Charter of Democracy, theoretically a major step. The people want to be sure that the two will struggle closely together inside ARD and remove the uncertainty regarding MMA's status vis-a-vis ARD. MMA's internal disunity is causing uncertainties. Will not the parties fall out among themselves once the system is defeated? Will not MMA insist on its program of Shariah being made the constitution, and the law, in place of the present statutes, indeed subordinating everything to the Shariah? Will PPP not insist on making its right-wing democracy more closely aligned with the Americans, and with a defence policy that pleases the army? Some entertain a persistent doubt that PPP may yet cut a separate deal, if only Musharraf does. Each party has to define its America policy now. Which party will change these relations, and give up subservience to the US by striking out on a course of non-alignment, and do without the dole? Then there are social policies. Will not the opposition continue the present economic policies? Or can there be a paradigm shift in favour of the common man rather than the globalization that is only enriching the rich and making the poor poorer. This is increasing unemployment and making it worse by failing to control inflation. This is not to argue that there should be no united struggle against the military's overlordship of Pakistan. The point is whether the struggle is being conducted with eyes open about the natural differences over the policies to follow. What is paramount is that there should be an interim common minimum programme for a transitional period of, say, a year after the ancien regime ends. Let it be an open, honest democracy for that year. All parties should propagate their programs and ideologies for a second election that would reconstruct Pakistan. Let each party spell out what it wants Pakistan to become through a reasonably well worked out program showing how it would implement its aims. It means that positions have to be taken on the rights of the minority provinces clamouring for autonomy and control over their resources. That second Assembly would, in essence, be a Constituent Assembly to extensively amend the constitution, or write a new one, and begin reconstructing according to a popularly accepted programme. In the meantime the Charter of Democracy needs to be signed by all parties and it should specify major social, political and economic reforms. The Charter is vague on social and economic issues. Let these issues be discussed by all parties and added on later, or they may agree to differ. The starting point should certainly be to take the Army out of politics. National security has to be redefined after a new India policy is formulated. Major issues of foreign policy need to be formulated by people's majority, not by Praetorian guards. Pakistan's present foreign policy is what America dictates, or allows. Who wants a change is the question. An alternative cannot be confrontationist. It has to be a policy of neutrality in world confrontations. Pakistan must reject all hegemonies. But let Pakistan be an honourable and independent second class power, with no leadership role anywhere -- certainly not in Afghanistan. Crafting a new India policy will be controversial. PML(N) and an MMA party, JUI, happen to agree on befriending India. But there will be opposition from the Army, and the politicians supporting it. They regard India as a radical threat to Pakistan. What they want is to continue the Army's policy of talking peace but also keeping the powder dry, with cold war and arms race intact. Nuclear weapons are the next divisive question. Should Pakistan move toward nuclear disarmament, or continue the arms race, is the question. Fact is that the Bomb has no relevance to the military security of Pakistan. It has, indeed, made Pakistan less secure, and more vulnerable, as was shown in 2002, when India dared Pakistan to use its nuke(s) first and see what follows. The Pakistani Bomb did not prevent war in 2002. What did was Musharraf's acceptance of India's main demand. The issue requires to be sorted out. Land reforms and the changing of agrarian policies to favour the poorer peasants, and to discourage corporate farming, ought to be the starting point in fighting poverty in rural areas. This reverses the regime's thinking. Who advocates it? MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.
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