It concerned Pakistan's situation, domestically and vis-a-vis the region, soon after Musharraf's meeting with Indian Premier Dr Manmohan Singh in Havana. The Musharraf-Bush meeting over bilateral matters took place on September 23, while there was a second, trilateral, Bush-Musharraf-Karzai meeting on September 27. It concerned the war in Afghanistan, role of Taliban and the row between Kabul and Islamabad. What the Afghan authorities say is what the US, Nato and their army believe.

It is hard to specify what these meetings achieved, though they were extraordinarily significant for the immediate future. Pakistan policies are changing after the Indo-American strategic alliance and its offshoots: the Framework of Military Cooperation and the US decision to supply India with nuclear reactors. Pakistan felt jilted and lurched towards China.

True, Pakistan has always welcomed the Sino-Pakistan cooperation, irritating America. All new Sino-Pakistan ventures continue an old trend, but changes in the international context bestow a new meaning on them. Given China's rise as a near superpower, Sino-Pakistan friendship may have become an alternative route to strengthen Pakistan security. The less charitable will say that Pakistan is playing the China card vis-a-vis both the US and India.

Not only did Islamabad ask China to build the Gwadar deep seaport, so near the Straits of Hormuz, its cooperation in defence and power generation stands out. Musharraf wants to make Pakistan an energy corridor for China by building energy pipelines to China, a railway to reinforce the Karakorum Highway, fibre-optic cable links, etc. The latest call from him is for the IPI gas pipeline to be extended to China. China is sure to provide as many reactors as Pakistan asks for. No matter that the Chinese are doing so for balance of power reasons, the Pakistani elite are hell-bent on running an arms race with India. If demand exists suppliers will be found.

The American reaction to Sino-Pakistan cooperation will depend on its own strategic purposes. So far the Bush administration has been committed to neo-con thinking. America's purpose, on this basis, is imperialistic. Bush says he is promoting democracy and capitalism. The actions so far, and capitalism's compulsions, have a linkage with oil and gas, the key resources, and the control over which is the aim of strategy. An eventual clash of objectives between the US and China is already there, though at an early stage, but is restrained by America's own need for cheaper imports from China.

The specific American grouse against Pakistan concerns Afghanistan. Doubtless, the Taliban use Pakistan territory as a staging post for their war on foreigners in Afghanistan. Powerful and resourceful people provide them shelter, and help them keep supplied. Karzai, Nato, and American commanders are not entirely wrong, as Musharraf admits. The American dislike of the Taliban, despite their culpability in acquiescing to using them, is genuine. But it is largely the fear of what will happen if the Taliban, and their mentors, inherit Pakistan with its army and atomic arsenal. It is too horrible to contemplate because they will be a great threat to Israeli and American interests.

Musharraf-controlled Islamabad cannot do much to discourage the growth of the Taliban. The Taliban's domestic politics are winning them supporters. They are becoming a state within the state in at least some areas of NWFP and Balochistan. Not that their cells do not exist in Punjab and Karachi. They cannot be fought effectively by the army and PML(Q); that requires vigourous open democracy with many parties advocating different solutions to Pakistan's social and economic problems. That hopefully can dam the current of Islamic militancy; if only a chance could be given to such politics.

That is unlikely to happen. The bilateral summit with Bush yielded most gratifying results for Musharraf, but not for Pakistan. Bush showered praises on his leadership qualities. Given American influence over the Pakistan elite, this is a signal to give Musharraf another five years in power. The army and the elite will do their magic, and get his supporters elected to the National and Provincial Assemblies which will formalize Musharraf's election early in 2008. Thus, Pakistanis are being gifted Musharraf till at least 2012, with or without uniform.

The second summit was all about the blazing row between Islamabad and Kabul over the Taliban's resistance to Afghan and Nato troops. To repeat, there is little that Pakistan will do to restrain the Taliban, even domestically. Behind Kabul and Nato stands the US; what they say echoes what the Americans say. What Musharraf said about Kabul's inability to solve Afghan problems itself is true, though Karzai was right in asking Pakistan to share the responsibility. Well, none of the three parties is blameless. But the facts of the case suggest that none of the three parties is able to achieve the solutions to problems facing all three.

The Kabul-Islamabad row is rooted in history. Afghanistan's was the only vote against Pakistan's membership of the UN. What made the Afghans angry was that, for Pakistan, the Durand Line is its national boundary, whereas Kabul keeps referring to the troubled history of British-Afghan relations throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

The Afghans fought three wars, and in the second war they defeated the British Indian Army -- the superpower of the time. Afghan nationalism has claims on Pakistan's two western provinces by one reading of history, just as Iran claims a different part of Pakistan (Balochistan) by another reading of history.

Pakistani rulers had adopted a lofty and arrogant attitude as the strongest Muslim state of 20th century. They unashamedly believed that they were the natural leaders of the Islamic world, and that Kabul had better come under their protection; they adopted British stances, that were plainly imperialistic, towards Afghanistan.

They adopted all British stances and methodology in border areas; they also made British assumptions and purposes their own, indeed, evolved an Islamic imperialism of their own.

In the 1950s Karachi began thinking of a confederation of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as the successors of the Moghuls and the British. That alienated both, the Iranians and the Afghans. The Iranians had their own dreams, as the most ancient civilization, and thought they knew how to handle upstarts.

This dream was of leading the Ummah to, somehow, become as important as India. Rivaling India has been the true motivation of successive Pakistani regimes. This is how Pakistani rulers have wanted strategic depth, whether or not there is any common objective or historical basis.

The Afghans were forever emphasizing their Aryan race and origins as the foundation of their nationalism, despite their state being a partner of the British in their rivalry with Russian imperialists. The Iranians and the Afghans look down upon Pakistanis as being little better than Johnny-come-latelies who remain at bottom uncivilized and unclean. So much for the dream!

MB Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columist.