Strategically Speaking
US National Intelligence Estimate and trends in global terrorism
Shahedul Anam khan Brig Gen, ndc, psc (Retd)
The only judgment that one can make of the five years of the US war against terror, culling from the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), issued in April 2006 but declassified last week by the White House, is that there is very little chance of its ending very soon. The NIE was deliberately leaked, according to some commentators, so that President Bush could, among the many negative remarks, exploit one sentence to support his case for remaining in Iraq.Terrorism and its spectre continues to grow, fanned by those that have very little political aim but are motivated by their "misanthropy cloaked in a Islamic robe" as one author so starkly and appropriately characterises the present Islamic radicals. The NIE is bad news for the Bush administration, and indeed for those that want to see an end to the spate of terror-driven violence one witnesses in some parts of the world. This has intensified since the occupation of Iraq by the US and its Coalition of the Willing, and, as the NIE states, Iraq has become the leading inspiration for new Islamic extremist networks and cells that are united by little more than an anti-Western agenda. We are yet to hear of any changes in the US strategy on Iraq, although a new national strategy, for combating terror, of which the US has made Iraq the focal point, has been formulated which was made public in September, motivated, one assumes, greatly by the major comments in the NIE which emphasises the need to shift reliance on raw power and really go for the hearts and minds of the terrorists and would-be terrorists, in view of what the estimate has forecast about the direction that international terrorism is moving towards. What is disquietingly noticeable in recent times is the acknowledgement of defeat by the US administration, albeit impliedly, in the comments of its secretary of state: "I don't think that this is a battle, if you will, or a struggle that's going to be won on George W Bush's watch," that she made in a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal, commenting on the war on terror. Also of significance is the change in the characterisation of the "war" against terror that has now transformed into a "battle," or a "struggle" that is going on. NIE assessment is bad news for several reasons, but most of all because it has belied the Bush administration's assertion that reducing Saddam to submission would see the end of international terrorism, a wrong strategy to start with. On the contrary, not only has Iraq spawned terrorism, it has also become the rallying point of Islamic terrorist to hit most directly at US forces. There is very little credit in pointing fingers at Syria and Iraq and accusing them of being the sponsors of international terrorism when the US itself stands culpable of similar offense by creating the cause celebre, that has provided the justification to the terrorist outfits to recruit gullible Muslim youths against the US and its allies. That, and also the fact that its actions, now and in the past, in various regions of the world, have been equated by many commentators with state terrorism, going by the definition of the term that is available in official US literature. US calling others states "terrorist" reminds one of the story related by St. Augustine, of the pirate and Alexander the Great, recounted in Chomsky's Pirates and Emperors, Old and New. A pirate captured by Alexander, who asked him: "How dare you molest the sea?" replied: "How dare you molest the world? Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy, are called an Emperor." St. Augustine calls it an excellent and elegant reply. And very few would contest Chomsky's view that the story is an accurate reflection of the relations between the US and various minor actors on the stage of international terrorism, and illustrates the meaning of the concept of international terrorism in contemporary Western usage, where these incidents are being used as a cover for Western violence. Said well before the second phase of the US global war on terror, these assertions have stood the test of time. There would perhaps be very few dissents against the contention that the US had any strategy at all for the situation that evolved after the invasion of Iraq. The war on terror that was designed to actually bring al-Qaeda and its allies the Taliban to book has paid very little dividends with the major thrust that ought to have remained on Afghanistan diverted to Iraq. And what has Iraq delivered? Precious little by way of the security it was supposed to afford the US. As the NIE has concluded: "The war in Iraq has become a primary recruitment vehicle for violent Islamic extremists, motivating a new generation of potential terrorists around the world whose numbers may be increasing faster than the United States and its allies can reduce the threat." Indeed a very ominous forecast by the US intelligence community. NIE reports are not always trustworthy, though. NIE drawn up by the National Intelligence Council in the past had their estimates proved wrong, as was the 2002 report that concluded that Iraq had "continued its weapons of mass destruction programs," "possessed stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons," and "probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade," all of those conclusions, used to prop up the rationale for invasion of Iraq, turned out to be false. However, an important feature of the current intelligence estimate, although disquieting, but not surprising, is worth taking into account, which is that many new terror cells have grown up independently without any link to any central structure. They restrict their communications to their own members only and derive their ideological and tactical inspiration from the many Islamic web sites. This is important because it will have to be factored into any plans to combat terrorism at the global level. And since these are structures whose rise is germane to the local environment, even though the ideological motivations are drawn centrally, there will be need to examine to what extent a common strategy would be appropriate to combat the local cells, and to what extent do we need to cooperate regionally and internationally, particularly for a country like Bangladesh, that has seen the sudden appearance of a form of Islamic radicals who seek refuge in religion to justify their vile acts. A more important issue that should occupy our thoughts is: What should our strategy be to fight these elements at home? The author is Editor, Defense & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.
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