Perhaps any other person in the place of Mr. Larma would have had no other alternative but to suggest taking to the jungle and taking up arms, given that he has risked his credentials as a leader of the tribal people of the CHT, to a section of his people, when he decided to join hands with the government in 1997 to put an end to the quarter century of tribal struggle for autonomy or self-rule, settling for an arrangement that falls short of what they had initially wanted, but which does ensure a measure of devolution of power through the various clauses of the agreement. The CHT Accord has divided the indigenous people of the hills, with the opponents of the deal feeling let down by what they feel is a "sell out'' to the government

The question is, after nine years of the signing of the Accord, why has no substantive progress been made in implementing it? Not only is there a polarisation in the hills on the Accord and its potential to meet their demands, the plains too have been split on the rationale of the Accord itself, with a segment feeling that much too much has been acceded to the tribals to the detriment of the Bengalis. In fact, the signing got off on a very negative note with the then opposition, the BNP, rejecting the deal out of hand as a "sell out" by the AL since the treaty impinged on the unitary nature of the state as laid down in the Constitution. And since December 1997, in the more than three years of the AL rule during which the Accord was signed, and the five years' of the BNP, very little worth the mention has been done to implement the Accord, except for some cosmetic actions.

Waging peace in the hills was not an AL agenda only; it was also pursued with a degree of intensity during the BNP's first term in office. A nine-member team consisting of the members of the parliament was entrusted with negotiating with the PCJSS, and as many as thirteen dialogues were held until mid-1994 when perhaps political problems diverted its attention elsewhere. It was during this period that PCJSS declared unilateral cease-fire (Aug 10, 1992) following the then PM's expression of the hope that it would be possible to find a solution within the framework of the constitution.

Thus, lack of substantive follow-up action during the AL tenure in office, and soft-pedalling on the issue by the BNP, which has now toned down its initial idea of scrapping it totally to changing certain provisions of the Accord, is what riles the hill people, and quite rightly so. The accord is not any one party's baby to tend and ensure its maturity. What our political leaders tend to forget is that the Accord was concluded between the state and a group of people in Bangladesh. And it was only possible as a result of negotiations whose groundwork was laid by the BNP, and even before the 80s. Therefore, no one individual can claim to be the architect of the peace deal in the CHT, or personalize the achievement, as one has been given to understand by the AL, and that is perhaps why the reluctance of BNP to own to it and do little about its implementation. By the same token, since we all have a stake in the Accord, it should be for all the parties to ensure that it is implemented fully, and the blame must be equally shared for failing to do so.

It would also not be out of place to ask whether the details of the Accord were penned in a hurry, and whether all the major parties should not have been taken into confidence before finalising the details. No doubt there are aspects that need to be addressed in the light of the constitutional provisions. Whether there is need to change the relevant clauses of the constitution, or whether there is need to renegotiate on certain issues which might allow us to retain the spirit of the Accord without having to change the constitution, is something we ought to consider. What is very disappointing is that there has been no palpable effort on the part of successive governments to approach the matter with the intention of resolving those issues that stand in the way of implementation of the accord. At least we are not aware of any move to involve the PCJSS in discussions on clauses that needs to be reframed. We cannot keep the matter on the backburner any longer.

What is disconcerting also is the perception of some tribal leaders. Some of them continue to consider the CHT still under "military occupation," One fails to understand how one's own territory can be under the "occupation" of one's own army. Unless, of course, the protagonists of such an idea think that the army is not in its own territory. Therefore, the underlying thoughts and the fine nuances of the statements cannot be overlooked. It is trust and confidence, that have been eroded by government inaction, that we must restore among the people of the CHT if such perceptions are to be removed. Surely, we cannot have a situation where the hill people feel that the land is not theirs. But by the same token can the plains people be made to feel that they do not belong to a part of their own land?

It is clear that the Accord must be made acceptable to all concerned. The government must ensure that the apprehensions of the Bengalis are allayed and any devolution of power does not go against the grain of natural justice and the rights of a citizen. We must also not keep the commitment made to the hill people unmet. As for Mr. Larma, he must make sure that the tribal infighting over the agreement is ended, because even if we were to have the full implementation of it, would it assuage the UPDF?

Mr. Larma's unhappiness is not without reason, but his warnings are not without basis either. We must take both seriously. It is quite another matter how much will the new strategy be efficacious in helping the implementation of the accord. Should that not happen more blood is likely to flow in the CHT, and it will be Bangladeshi blood that will flow.

There are anomalies in the peace accord, which must be reconciled keeping intact the integrity of the country. No doubt we will have to compromise and give ground, which will need great political will. The question is, how much are we willing to give for the sake of peace and justice.

The author is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star