Trouble ahead?
Md. Iqbal Chowdhury
October 28, 2006 to January 10, 2007, everyday was a nightmare for the people On January 11 the public felt relieved with the hope that they will be able to move around hand in hand with family members/friends. Life will be easy. Syndicates will be finished; prices will come down to the land. Economy will be booming. Everybody will be in merry mood. But what are we experiencing now? Prices of essential commodities have been increased by more than 30% from the level they were at the time of BNP leaving power. It was unbearable at that time. How shall we now explain, what word can supersede unbearable? Price of coarse rice was Tk 18 per kg now it is Tk 22. Price of 5 ltr soybean oil was Tk 230, now it is Tk 330. Potato was Tk 14 per kg now it is Tk 18-20 per kg. The person who needed Tk 3,000 per month before October 28, 2006, now needs Tk 3,900 to meet his expenditure. Reality is, the income of day labourers has been reduced significantly. Prior to emergency he would almost work 30 days a month (if we do not consider strike). Now he is getting work for 15 days at best in a month. If per day income is Tk 120 now, he is getting Tk 1,800 per month. He needs Tk 3,900 per month. He has to take loan of Tk 2,100 per month to maintain his living standard. It means the day labourers have been suffering from severe decline in exchange entitlement, i.e. they are losing their purchasing power. He is taking loan from friends or relatives as far as possible. How long he will live on loan? Maybe he will go to NGOs. It will be another pain to repay weekly installment. Frustration of this labour class will reach to a level, which the government will not be able to contain. More and more people from rural Bangladesh are joining the 100 or more labour spots in the city these days. And most of these hard working people are unaware of their rights. If the government fails to contain this inflow of labour forces from rural Bangladesh, the situation will become worse. There was famine in the year 1943, The Great Bengal Famine. The reason was not the shortage of food in Bengal. The reason was that there was no work for agriculture labourers and those who had work, drastically reduced their exchange entitlement. The index of exchange rate between agricultural labourers and food grains stood at 34 during the first half of 1943-44 whereas it was 101 in 1940-41. They were coming to Calcutta in groups for jobs. The famine took about 1.5 million lives officially and unofficially three to four million. Amartya Sen in his book Poverty and Famine concluded: "The disastrous Bengal famine was not the reflection of a remarkable over-all shortage of food grains in Bengal. A dramatic decline in the exchange rate against labour emerged. It is quite clear that agricultural labour did not share in the inflationary rise enjoyed by many other sections of the community in the war economy of Bengal. The Food Availability Decline (FAD) approach provided no warning of the development of gigantic famine arising from shifting exchange entitlements." There was fall in employment compared with the normal pattern The distress of the rural population, especially of agricultural labour, arising from shifting exchanger entitlements had already been quite substantial. In the famine period, the worst affected groups seem to have been fishermen, transport workers, paddy huskers, agricultural labourers, those in "other productive occupations," craftsmen and non-agricultural labourers, in that order. Causes of sharp movement of exchange entitlement in 1943: The price rise to a great extent, a result of general inflationary pressure in a war economy. We are also experiencing to some extend same inflationary pressure for emergency economy. Second, the demand forces were reinforced by the indifferent winter crop and by vigorous speculation and panic hoardings. We do not fall under these criteria. Third, speculative withdrawal and panic purchase of rice stocks was encouraged by administrative chaos, especially the inept handling of three procurement schemes, tried and hurriedly abandoned between December and March, ending with the sudden abolition of price control in the wholesale market on March 11. Presently the government is unable to control the prices. Fourth, the prohibition of import/export of cereals in general and of rice in particular from each province, which had come into operation during 1942. In our case, import L/C opening drastically dropped because of fear. Fifth, an important aspect of the famine was its association with an uneven expansion in incomes and purchasing powers. This situation is prevailing in Bangladesh. The abundance of labour in the agricultural sector made the economic position of the labourers in the agricultural sector weak. Abundance of labour in agricultural sector is still prevailing. Sixth, as distress developed generally in the rural economy of Bengal, the demand for the luxury goods declined sharply -- a phenomenon that has been observed in other famines as well. This helped to plunge additional groups of people into destitution. At present there is a trend in reducing demand for luxury goods. Finally, it is perhaps significant that the Bengal famine stood exactly at the borderline of two historical price regimes. Prices had been more or less stationary for decades (the 1941 rice price was comparable to that in 1914), and the price rises (especially of food) that started off in 1942 were to become a part of life from then on. Institutional arrangements, including wage systems, were slow to adjust to the new reality. We have now entered into a historical transitional period of post-MFA. As an LDC we shall be severely affected because of resource constraints. To address this situation Amartya Sen suggested: "Since no matter how a famine is caused, methods of breaking it call for a large supply of food in the public distribution system. This applies not only organizing rationing and control, but also to undertaking work programmes and other methods of increasing purchasing power for those hit by shifts in exchange entitlements in a general inflationary situation." If we take the index of exchange rate between unskilled labourer and food grains in October 2006 was 100, now it is about 50. If it comes down to 30 then the government will have no time to combat the disaster. Right now is the time to take adequate measures to halt the fall of exchange entitlement of the lower earning groups.
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