This is true enough. But does that mean that Musharraf will not get himself elected by the outgoing assemblies; when so elected, will he not nominate a suitably sympathetic caretaker government and proceed to hold an election that will give him a pliable majority without the assistance of any mainstream parties?

Can his constituency (army high command) afford to replace him, considering its institutional interests? And where can the Americans find a better Musharraf? Don't forget that most elite groups -- feudals, bankers, big business, and traditional politicians -- are behind this regime, and the army's own share in the total wealth is at least 25 percent. Isn't all this a dam against change?

Pakistan happens to be engulfed in two separate sets of crises: The uppermost is the immediate existential crisis of the present regime that began with the March 9 events and the subsequent presidential Reference against the chief justice of Pakistan.

The case is now being heard by the full Supreme Court, with the Supreme Judicial Council having been sidelined. This case has polarized the country. The lawyers enjoy full support of the civil society, intellectuals, a large swathe of the media and other professions. The government is also mobilizing its resources, and is showing how popular it is by holding officially sponsored rallies.

Doubtless, this is a first-rate crisis. Just ask the question: where will the regime be if the full Supreme Court finds the Reference to be defective or unproven? The CJP will have to be reinstated. Can President Musharraf and the reinstated CJP, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, coexist?

Since the SC has to decide, a second question arises: What will happen if the finding vindicates the president's stand? How would the polarized country behave? The common conclusion will be that the Supreme Court has again gone the way of Justice Muhammad Munir of yore and will make the judiciary permanently subordinate, if not servile, to the executive. The possibilities and popular reactions might create a frightening prospect.

Important as this is, it is not wise to forget the backgrounds of the structural crises. One counts them as:

Islam-versus-modernism is a conundrum for all Muslim states; in Pakistan it has remained unresolved.

Special mention has now to be made of the reactionary and anti-democratic politics of Taliban; factually, there are any number of religious extremists groups that are struggling for political space and power in Fata, NWFP and adjoining districts of Punjab, without forgetting Balochistan.

Then there is the hardy perennial dispute between lovers of a strong central authority and those who demand regional autonomy based on regional nationalism. Aware Pakistanis know it's history and its potential.

Balochistan is facing an insurrection by the Balochistan Liberation Army. The sabotage and ambushing activities of the BLA are regular events.

Then there is the structural poverty in the society. A good 30 to 40 percent are decidedly poor by any standard. Another 25 to 30 per cent find it hard to make two ends meet in the ambiance of high inflation and growing unemployment.

Total absence of land reforms and growing inequalities of income, both vertically and horizontally, pose major problems. Among other polarizations, there is one over foreign policy.

Another major crisis, also over 55 years old, concerns the losing of power by the political class of 1947 to civil and military bureaucracy. Within less than a decade, the military was able to subordinate civil services and proceeded to assemble a combination of all elite groups -- feudals, bankers, industrialists, and the rest of big business.

An ethnically distinct East Pakistan was an obstreperous claimant of resources from West Pakistan was virtually pushed out, at the first available opportunity. Recent years have seen the apogee of this process. Look at the easy way Gen. Musharraf was able to cobble up the Q League out of PML (N), and draw recruits from PPP and create MMA to win its support. All the grandees of the land, and the moneybags, now constitute a stable ruling elite.

Here one has to return to the possibilities of the current situation. The simple fact is that the regime has tied itself into knots and faces an impossible situation, both internally and externally -- its external friends, the US, Nato and pro-US Arab regimes expect it to prosecute the anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan with more vigour.

The American pressure is relentless. Superficially, it would seem that the west as a whole is concerned about the lack, or insufficiency, of democracy in Pakistan. Actually, they are pressuring a beleaguered regime into doing what they please. The regime does not know what to do or where to go.

The regime's structure being what it is, it can only be replaced either by a revolutionary new force that would somehow subdue all the factors that have so far sustained Musharraf's regime, or by another regime of the same kind. Which is where many commentators have been hinting that a change could only be for the worse because, they fear, it would be a Martial Law, probably by another General.

Look at the situation. Three major political parties -- the PPP, PML (N) and MMA -- disagree on the role of Allah and the Army. The PPP cannot sit with the MMA, and has all the commonalities of political objectives with the Musharraf regime; PML (N), however, is close to the Maulvis by itself.

All three are ready to countenance the army's role, while the general's uniform is now hard to accept. The general has so far spurned both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir. Will he continue doing it? Technically speaking, there is a window of opportunity.

All Musharraf has to do is to call a roundtable conference and ask for alternative policies, without ignoring the leading lawyers who have started a veritably revolutionary movement. If the RTC can agree on a genuinely independent Election Commission and a genuinely impartial caretaker regime, that can lead to free and fair elections.

Should it happen, many doors will open, and the country might move towards resolving some of its older and bigger structural problems. Alternatively, instead of finding caretakers, let the top few party and key lawyers and leaders constitute themselves into a National Government with a one point agenda: holding free and fair election within a short span of time after assuming control over all undercover agencies. That can work wonders.

The issue of who should be the ministers in an interim government is sure to occasion controversy and some pulling and pushing. While the rich dowager queens -- the PPP and PML (N) -- cannot be ignored, some share has to be given to MMA.

One cardinal principle must guide those who agree to an interim arrangement -- it is the lawyers movement that is likely to be the lead force that will persuade the famous three "A"s -- Allah, army and America -- to effect the change.

The leading lawyers' share should not be less than 50 percent of the government, and they should insist on their control over all the undercover agencies to ensure free elections, and a dominant say over a new Election Commission.

If rationality is in sufficient supply, Pakistanis can imitate the Nepalese in agreeing on an interim or transitional government of all parties and new leaders for a limited period, say six months, and for the limited purpose of holding a free election. Let a new set of legitimate rulers emerge from a free poll.

MB Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.