Plain Words
Will she, won't she?
MB Naqvi writes from Karachi
The question is: will the US make limited or unlimited, as it might become, war against Iran? There are two opinions: one says that the US has assembled an amount of military wherewithal in the Middle East and Persian Gulf that should ensure victory against Iran, so that it can enforce a regime change. Fact is that American hearts are still bleeding over the events in Tehran 28 years ago; the loss of Iran is still not acceptable to the US. The whole post 9/11 US policy, under which it attacked Afghanistan and Iraq for mainly trumped up reasons, strongly points to the "compulsion" that America feels to reshape the area, including subduing Iran if it wants its own position to stay secure in the strategically vital Middle East. Against this is the so-called realistic school, and the recent trends of American opinion now supposedly show that Iran will be off the hook, much like the way North Korea has got off the same hook. The neo-con school of thought is said to have lost favour within the Bush administration after the Iraqi misadventure, and the proof of it is that the US has dealt face to face not only with Iran in two recent conferences -- one in Sharm-al-Shaikh and later in Baghdad, where the contact was genuine and substantive -- but also with Syria. The US is said to have yet again focused on solving the Palestine problem as a necessity for rendering Hamas and Hizbollah less credible. And this shows the way Iran might escape the otherwise likely war. Besides, Iran is not a pushover. It would be astonishing if the arrogant American policy makers fail to realize the likely political and economic costs of unilateral action. Yes, the US can mount air action against however many Iranian targets. But then, what happens later depends on Iran's political, military and economic capabilities. Iran's smart ordnance -- that can cost the American navy a ship or two -- may be in or near the mouth of the Hormuz Straits. Conceivably, Iran can stop all, or most, oil exports from the Gulf region, sending world markets into a tailspin. The damage the world economy will suffer cannot be assessed. Notwithstanding the paranoia of the Americans, Iran cannot support al Qaeda in Iraq or elsewhere. But it can cause a political earthquake throughout the region by its actions against Israel, in concert with Hamas, Hizbollah and any other Arab power (Syria?) that may also join in. Iran will remain capable of rebuilding itself in the present orientation. The Americans have to think again. There is no disputing the plausibility of both schools. Still, it is not easy to visualise Americans resiling from their program of regime change in Iran. The fact is that North Korea was a different kettle of fish. For strategic reasons, it is sure to be supported to the hilt by both Russia and China. The Americans haven't also forgotten the lessons of the 1950s Korean war. The idea of America getting into a war with North Korea without South Korea is inconceivable. Even Japan does not want such a war, though it has had a lot of heart-burning over the North Korean missile program. The idea that North Korea could be easily invaded was a non-starter from the beginning. Even today, Americans would not dare to repeat their earlier mistakes of the late 1940s and early 1950s. None of these considerations apply to Iran. To be sure, there is no comparison between the military strengths of Iran and the only hyper-power. Iran, all said and done, can be invaded, though it is not going to be an easy morsel to swallow. A regime change in Iran remains as urgent for the Americans today or tomorrow as it is axiomatic to most The American schools of thought believe that the US should continue to control the Middle East. There is no doubt that the Iranians are a consciously anti-US force in the region. Iran is playing the role of a natural leader of the Middle East, and has many qualifications for it. Iran's recent behaviour is based on the assumption that it is already a pre-eminent power in the Middle East, and it is intent on winning the hearts and minds on the Arab streets. It has gone some way in that direction. The question boils down to how vital the Middle East is to the US. On that will hinge the question of taking military action vis-à-vis Iran. Controlling the ME tightly is of prime importance for American strategic planning. Can it let the ME go its own way, especially with Iran leading it against American interests? And controlling the ME tightly seems to involve a regime change in Tehran. Therefore, it is hard to visualize even a Democrat-led US will let Iran adopt an adversarial orientation. The role of American politics in policy-making cannot be denied: American opinion is decidedly against the Iraq war, and wants American soldiers back home. True enough. But there is total silence in the Democratic party regarding the American troops in Afghanistan, or in nearly 150 foreign military bases. There is simply no talk of any withdrawal from Afghanistan or elsewhere. Mr. Robert Gates, the new US Defense Secretary, visualizes a permanent US presence in Iraq, irrespective of what happens there. This seems to how permanent US strategic interests are defined. The present differences of opinion, and the ballyhoo of Democrats regarding withdrawal from Iraq, is mostly electoral politics; it may not be proof that America is likely to change its strategic thinking, or will let Iran and the rest of the Middle East possibly slip out of its control. If this line of thinking has any merit, it would involve the assumption that American strategic thinking is not actually partisan; all major stakeholders in America share it. If this assumption is granted, the lie of the land is altogether different. It is easy to note that Americans of most stripes think that they have to remain Numero Uno in the world, militarily, economically and politically. That involves management of the new power-centres that are definitely emerging, while preserving what the US already has. The US policy in Asia can easily be seen as being mainly aimed at containing and countering the rising influence of China on the one hand, and of Russia on the other. The US is the head of a coalition with Australia, Japan, South East Asian states and South Korea and Taiwan. The US is trying to absorb India into its power system. In Europe, America is tightening its grip on the European Union so that it does not develop into a rival power centre but remains tied to the American chariot as an allied power. The struggle for the soul of the EU is intense today. The Americans seem to desire a virtual division of the EU into what they call Old Europe and the New Europe, the entry of which, into Nato and the EU, they have ensured. All these are requirements of their leadership concerns. They have to manage the whole world the same way, and remain in control of all areas where key raw material are produced. Europe cannot be left out of the loop of the American power system if the ME is to remain securely under American control. From that viewpoint, control over the Middle East is as vital as it is over Europe. Once this is granted, it means that a regime change in Iran would remain the American priority. Whether it means war now or later is secondary. MB Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.
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