Pakistan's foreign minister is heading an official delegation which is now in Washington, negotiating specifics with American officials. The emphasis remains on extending and deepening the strategic partnership. Local perceptions are concerned mainly about Pakistan's internal problems. Why so?

The Americans had prepared for these visits for some time. The importance of these negotiations, and of the issues involved, goes without saying. There was a strange campaign in the US media, as well as the pronouncements of congressmen and area experts in the think-tank community and in academia, that came down heavily on Musharraf regime. They wanted Musharraf to do four things.

First, to leave the position of Chief of Army Staff; second, not to get himself elected by the existing assemblies before the general election; third, to hold free and fair elections; and fourth, to resolve the political crisis through Pakistan's own constitutional means, and not resort to repression. These things were clearly spelled out.

What came out of these American demarches? It seems that President Musharraf was bombarded with demands for cutting a strategic political deal beforehand. What remains of the American demands, as far as can be inferred, is the sole desire for free elections.

What of the other three demands? Negroponte himself said that the question of resigning from the army will be decided by Mr. Musharraf himself. It means, not now.

There is deafening silence about the other demands: There is no mention of the planned presidential election by the soon-to-die assemblies. Nor is anyone talking about a constitutional process to resolve the judicial crisis.

So what of the free election ukase? If memory serves, the US was not among the loudest who objected to the 2002 elections; that did not prevent the Americans from taking Musharraf as their dearest friend and non-Nato ally in the war against terror.

The US calls Iraq and Afghanistan democracies today. Could it be that the mention of a free election is routine; it is certainly an unexceptionable thing to say. Specific demands are now absent.

That would presuppose that there were specific agreements that have given satisfaction to the Americans, and they are now happy enough to announce $ 750 million fresh aid for Fata development. With American satisfaction in the bag, the foreign minister's delegation will work out the details in Washington.

It would seem that major propositions have been agreed upon, and what remains is fleshing out of major policies with specific details. It would also seem that Pakistan and America are embarking on a new plan to do some "good and great" things together, and the relationship will be deepened and extended for strategic purposes.

Insofar as Pakistan's domestic questions are concerned, it is now clear that Washington is satisfied with whatever Musharraf is planning to do.

The real question is, what more is Pakistan required to do, and what "good and great" objectives would it cooperate with the Americans to achieve? The focus from this point onward would be on what the American plans are, in which Pakistan might play a bigger role. The first interest of America is Afghanistan; it has to be pacified. What is the situation in Afghanistan?

It does seem as if the Taliban have fought the Nato forces to what looks like a stalemate. The victory of the Nato forces looks doubtful. No one can say that the West is winning in Afghanistan, and the fragility of the Karzai regime is about to end.

Americans have long wanted Pakistan to be more active in combating and containing the Taliban. The specific demand was that they should not be allowed to use Pakistan territory as a sanctuary from where to go into Afghanistan, make attacks and return. Pakistan has tried, but, obviously, there are limits to what it can do.

The Taliban are not a purely Pakistani phenomenon, though Pakistan had played a decisive role in their formation. They are now as much an Afghanistani phenomenon as Pakistani.

Behind this imbroglio in Afghanistan is also an ethnic conflict between Pushtoon and non-Pushtoon tribes in that country. The west, in its wisdom, chose to align itself with the non-Pushtoon Northern Alliance, which was earlier being supported by Iran, Russia and India.

Moreover, the Pushtoons had thrown up narco-dealers who supported the Taliban, who were then under Pakistani influence. The geographical part of the war in Afghanistan shows that the Taliban are a force in Helmund province, which is as far as one can go westward into Afghanistan and is not contiguous to Pakistan.

If the Taliban were able to make trouble in Helmund and areas near Mazar-i-Sharif, then it seems that they have bases and sanctuaries inside Afghanistan also. Who can deny that the Taliban cross the Durand Line either way. But Pakistan's role now can only be discreet and minimal, because the Taliban represent a big and growing threat to Pakistan itself.

Large areas of Federally Administered Tribal Areas and southern parts of the NWFP are coming under the Taliban's sway. The Taliban's version of Islam is on the ascendant in various areas of Pakistan. Factually, there are various versions of the Islamic system that are competing in the field, each representing a specific sectarian interpretation of religious tenets, and its supposed relevance to social and political affairs. The issue is not amenable to the use of military force, and requires a political approach.

This point has been made repeatedly, and all American area experts should appreciate it. The Taliban interpretation is based on Sunni orthodoxy of the Deoband school, on which is superimposed is a Wahabi orientation.

It is strengthened by their current view of what is happening in the Middle East, and that America is fighting Islam. The Taliban see the latter aim as a Western campaign against their Islamic ideology.

The Taliban want that people should live in accordance with the austere Wahabi tenets. They attack music shops, force barbers not to shave beards, and want girls and women to stay at home and not be out alone.

As for the Americans, their ME designs are in trouble. They have met either reverses or success in Iraq, depending upon how one interprets the American aims vis-à-vis Iraq. However, Iraq is steadily descending into chaos and disintegration.

American designs are Israel-centric: Israel is to be the American viceroy in the region to control it. Palestinians have to vacate land for more Israeli settlements, and remain subservient to Israel. So should Lebanon and Syria.

That aim has received a clear setback in Lebanon recently, though Israelis continue expanding into what was Palestine Mandate of the 1920s, and easing out as many Palestinians as possible. It almost amounts to a quasi-genocide by stages.

But the Palestinian resistance stands fractured, thanks to the US, Israel, and even EU. The West is refusing to recognise the results of a genuinely democratic election, and supports those who lost the electoral battle. Iran remains a great challenge for America.

Iran will not accept American dictation. The American schemes will remain infructuous if Iran is not contained, and undergoes a regime change imposed by the West.Equally important is Afghanistan's integration into the American power system. This is the strategic aim of the US. Where does Pakistan fit in?

M.B. Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.