Recent reports coming out of Afghanistan indicate that this new member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is still facing a continuing storm of insurgency that is beginning to mimic operations and tactics now being witnessed in Iraq.

Analysts from all over the world are now beginning to re-think their earlier views about the Taliban being a simple radical Islamist movement with very little strategic ability or imagination.

In this context, it was particularly interesting to read a recent article --- "Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan" written by Thomas H Johnson and M Chris Mason, published in Vol. 51, No. 1, Winter 2007 issue of Orbis. The authors, one, a research professor from the US Naval Postgraduate School and the other, a former US Foreign Service officer serving as a fellow at the Centre for Advanced Defence Studies, have provided a valuable insight into the complex cultural, religious and political underpinnings of the Taliban. They have also urged policymakers to stop falling prey to the Taliban's game plan by continuing Vietnam style kill/capture counterinsurgency in that country. They have claimed that such measures are only alienating the rural tribal infrastructure.

Journalists have been pointing out for sometime now that President Hamid Karzai's NATO supported government has been encountering extreme difficulty extending national control and mandate outside Kabul into country's hinterland regions. A resurgent Taliban backed by Al Qaeda is apparently resisting his efforts. Added to this equation is the tacit and active support extended by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction of Hizb-I-Islami. The juxtaposition of these forces have led to the rapidly diminishing control of Kabul over a broad swath of the country, particularly in the eastern and southern Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan.

Talibans appear to have evolved over the last year and a half. They are no longer just an obtuse, radical Islamist organisation. Their current level and pattern of insurgency suggests a subtle change in their strategic and operational levels. As opposed to their inflexible policies of the past, the Taliban and their collaborators are now rising over existing subsets of ethno-linguistic group-divides and the according of primacy to ties of kinship alone. Through such a move, they are expanding the scope of their association. It is no longer a band of politicised insurgent Mullahs. The Afghan Opposition is gradually morphing into a more inclusive equation rather than remaining just a revolving-door phenomenon.

The Taliban hierarchy and policy planners appear to have moved towards a detached, objective assessment of the governance structure of Karzai. They are identifying weaknesses and then exploiting them to further de-stabilise the situation. They are, in this regard, focusing on the Afghan government's lack of state formation (viewed from a strictly public administration angle) and its inability to establish a significant presence throughout the country. The Opposition is also fomenting dissatisfaction in the insecure rural areas where unemployment and potential credit extension facilities are still very poor. They are pointing out the very slow pace of development and reconstruction that is taking place there as compared to relatively urban areas and in Kabul. This is being specially stressed in the troubled southern half of the country. These factors are not making things easier for Karzai.

It is true that the overall level of conflict in Afghanistan has not yet approached the level being experienced in Iraq. However, the last few months have witnessed an acceleration of deadly attacks that are uncannily similar to the tactics being employed by the Iraqi insurgents. Taliban battle dynamics have also altered from hit-and-run attacks by small groups of guerillas to concentrated assaults on government security posts by bigger groups, sometimes even exceeding 100 fighters. Intelligence reports published by the Centre for International Issues Research in 2006, hint that the Taliban have at least 12,000 hard-core fighters controlling areas in the provinces of Oruzgan, Helmand, Zabol and Kandahar. This now permits them relatively free movement in the east and the south of Afghanistan, and also if necessary, across the porous border into and out of Pakistan.

The other area of serious concern is the introduction of suicide bombings in recent insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. This new factor has added another serious dimension to the crisis. It was generally believed till now that members of the Taliban due to the cultural aversion would not carry out such suicide attacks because suicide is forbidden in Wahabism (the Islamic philosophy followed by the Talibans). The Afghan government has used this argument to claim that some of those participating in such attacks are Taliban inspired non-Afghans, mostly from Pakistan and Arab countries. Through this, they are trying to underline the presence of foreign elements. Nevertheless, one thing is very clear. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for this purpose has demonstrated a significant level of coordination between the Taliban and the Iraqi insurgents and growing technological sophistication within opposition forces.

For decades, Afghanistan's neighbouring states have produced disenchanted groups such as the Uyghurs, Tajiks, and Uzbeks who have used this country for guerilla training and as an operating base. The years before 2001 saw Pakistan exploit this scenario to its advantage. Vanni Cappelli, a political historian has usefully explained this as being consist with Pakistan seeking to exert influence in Afghanistan in order to achieve 'strategic depth' on its northern border in the event of any conflict with India. Successive Pakistani governments have also promoted Islamic radicalism as a counter-foil to the Pashtun and Baluch nationalist movements. These inherent elements have also added to the complexity in Afghanistan.

The South Asian state today is again in danger of being inundated by the flood brought on not only by insurgency but also by the old actors -- narcotics and warlords. Many like Johnson and Mason believe that 'benign neglect by the United States since Spring 2003 has brought Afghanistan back to the brink of state failure.' Comparatively, US has treated it as a lesser problem than Iraq and consequently 'shortchanged Afghanistan in both personnel and resources'. One analyst has shockingly pointed out that the US spent more money every 72 hours on the war in Iraq in 2006 than it spent on Afghan reconstruction that year. It is now estimated that deployment of US troops and NATO International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) dedicated to the stabilisation of the countryside represents the lowest per capita commitment of peacekeeping personnel to any post conflict environment since the end of World War II. It is today roughly one peacekeeper to every 1000 Afghans as compared to one to every 48 and 58 for Bosnia and Kosovo respectively.

Similarly, efforts to re-build Afghanistan have been inadequate. What was envisaged in the December 2001 Bonn Agreement has unfortunately not taken place. This has resulted in lack of employment creation and return to narco-trafficking. The level of committed funding has been shockingly low and there have been very few visible reconstruction projects. Disappointment from such a course of action is having its own strategic impact.

A classical case has been that of the sensitive province of Paktila. Reports indicate that this province is supposed to have 352 elementary schools for boys. There is however only 40 actual school buildings. The rest are just patches of open ground.

It would have made sense if the Karzai government had been sufficiently assisted by the US and other development partners to enable him to undertake visible infrastructure development. This might have had a demonstration effect. There is a lot of corruption in Afghanistan, particularly within the government. Nevertheless, there is also severe resource constraint. I believe that one way of fighting insurgency in that country would be to build more school buildings both for boys and girls and also healthcare clinics, particularly in the rural areas. This will send a different sort of signal about government involvement. This will also nullify Taliban propaganda that the US and its NATO partners are only interested in Karzai and the affluent urban class living within the secure perimeter of Kabul.

It is time that Karzai and ISAF understand that the success metric of body counts and counterinsurgency operations will be irrelevant in the long run if appropriate corruption free constructive engagement is not introduced urgently into the social, health and educational sectors in that troubled country. The sooner this is done, the better it will be for Afghanistan. This will also ensure that the fledgling secular democratic process grows roots in the landmine littered landscape outside the carefully guarded compounds of Kabul.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador who can be reached at mzamir@dhaka.net