Many people I have talked to have expressed astonishment that the protests have been so tame. They expected, or feared, that the nation would explode. And it was, in fact, the fear of violent protest that accounted for the hesitation and equivocation of the interim government in its efforts to move against Hasina.

I was always less persuaded of this likelihood. The evidence of the past five years suggests that the AL had, in fact, extremely limited capacity to mount comprehensive street agitation, even at the best of times. From October to January, their winter offensive if you will, the AL made its most concentrated move to control the streets, but was unable to do much more than fight the combined forces of law enforcement and four-party alliance activists to what essentially amounted to a draw.

Now, with dozens of senior leaders in jail and thousands of grass-roots level activists and organisers also either behind bars or on the run, to say nothing of the fact that the party remains split over the issue of Hasina's leadership, it does not surprise me that there has not been more of a showing.

Let us not minimise the fact, either, that we are under emergency rule, that the army presence is much more pervasive than before January 11, and that the consequences for taking to the streets would be much more dire than during a period of non-emergency.

Nor is this a bad thing, necessarily, either for Hasina, or the party, or the country. Indeed, it would be wrong to suggest that there hasn't been a strong movement mounted for Hasina's release -- the movement merely has not principally been defined by fighting in the streets. Instead, it has taken the form of sophisticated lobbying and different kinds of pressure, both internal and external, being placed on the government, which is surely how protest should be registered in a mature society.

This was precisely the way pressure was mounted back in April and May when Hasina was being kept out of the country. There were no demonstrations in Bangladesh (such demonstrations would have been illegal under emergency rule) against the government at the time, but one way and another, it was made clear to the administration that its position was untenable, and the government eventually was forced to reverse its original stance due to the combined weight of national and international opinion.

It seems to me that this is healthier than the hartal and oborodh and street fighting option as a means to mount pressure on a sitting government, elected or unelected. In fact, I had always thought that prior to January 11 had the then-opposition concentrated on mobilising the public behind peaceful civil disobedience (e.g. silent marches, human chains, etc) that it would have had more effect.

There was a great deal of discontent brewing in the country at the time due to the massive malgovernance of the four-party alliance. Prices were sky high, there were widespread power and water shortages, and shortages of fertiliser and diesel fuel for farmers. In fact, considerable sections of the country were simmering against the four-party alliance government, and there were spontaneous public demonstrations against it from Demra to Kansat, leading to fatalities on several occasions.

The signal failure of the then-opposition was its inability to unite the people behind it against unarguably the most corrupt and least responsive government this country has ever seen.

Come October 2006, when the then-opposition decided to oppose the caretaker government headed by President Iajuddin Ahmed, it again decided to go for full-on violent confrontation, and, as a result, was never able to muster more than several thousand hard-core activists and street fighters to its cause.

The trouble with relying on the violent confrontation option is that this precludes the participation of the more sedate party supporters, to say nothing of those millions who do not support the party at all but are eager to register their opposition to an unpopular and ineffective government, meaning that the movement cannot, by definition, turn into a national one.

Under the emergency rules, any kind of public protest is banned and people are too intimidated to go to the streets to voice their complaints. To the extent that this keeps the streets from being taken over by brawling mobs and snuffs out violent, coercive protest, this is no bad thing.

But to the extent that the emergency rules would work to silence everyday men and women seeking to register protest in a peaceable manner, then it would be a different matter. At present the situation is moot since the general public is: a) sufficiently intimidated that no one wants to take his or her chances by taking to the streets, and b) still reasonably supportive of the current government.

But the interim government should not make the mistake of thinking that the AL's failure to put large numbers on the streets in the wake of Hasina's arrest means that they are home free.

In the first place, as noted above, there are other avenues of protest which are being explored effectively.

In the second place, right now Hasina's popularity is just beginning to make a comeback. Her incarceration (like the abortive move to keep her out of the country) has only increased her stature and popularity, and, in time, she may grow into a far more formidable opponent than she is today.

Three, if the economy goes south or the common people are sufficiently unhappy with the interim administration, then they may well at some point take to the streets in protest, and that would be a far different proposition than the AL taking to the streets.

The public taking to the streets is the last thing, surely, that anyone wants. If there is a mass moblisation then the interim government will be put in a more or less untenable situation. It does not want to be put in a position where it will need to order a crack-down by law enforcement. Nor is it clear that such orders would be followed or what the consequences of such an order being followed would be. Even more worrisome would be the consequences of what might happen if orders are given and not followed.

I don't think there are too many people who would argue that these are eventualities we would rather not even contemplate. Thus it is in the government's interest as well as the interest of even those who oppose the current government that we never reach that point.

But the government needs to be more responsive to ensure that we do not. It should not take the lesson from the Hasina incarceration that it is invulnerable. It needs to take into account the genuine grievances and concerns that the public has.

Dismissing genuine grievances or pushing through unpopular or unacceptable measures would be the height of folly for an unelected government that is dependent on the people's good will.

The monsoon looks like it is here for another couple of months. I don't expect to see much mass mobilisation during this time period.

But when the skies clear, it is a different story. The government should ensure that it remains on the good side of the people and that nothing it does would incline them to take to the streets. Nothing would end the government's honeymoon quicker than a demonstration that it would have to use force to put down.

So far, the interim government has been given time. It is raining. People are being patient and forgiving. But they will not be so forever. It should understand the importance of public opinion while time, and the rain, is still on its side.

Zafar Sobhan is Assistant Editor, The Daily Star.