In a forthcoming book, The Bulging Pocket and the Rule of Law: Corruption, Inequality and Trust, Professor Dr. Eric Uslaner (University of Maryland; he recently visited Bangladesh) questioned the premise that economic reform should precede political reform.

Dr. Uslaner bases his arguments on the premises that democratic institutions are not a source of clean government, and elections can breed corruption. He states that the simple adoption of democratic institutions, without bringing the people out of the inequality trap (both economic and unfair legal system), goes against the poor who cannot afford to buy-off the authorities concerned, and would not reach the fruits of democracy to the people.

It is important for us to understand this phenomenon because Bangladesh and some other countries (a few are on the verge of becoming, or have become, failed states) have been repeatedly ranked as some of the most corrupt countries of the world.

In any analysis like that of Dr. Uslaner's, a problem arises due to lack of clarity of the term "institutional reform." It is not readily understood if economic reforms in the form of monetary or fiscal policies and banking reforms, to name only a few, that are mainly undertaken by the government and the central bank are to be kept out of the definition of institutions.

In this age of democratisation, widely advocated by the Western world particularly in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the tragic events of 9/11, realisation has dawned upon the combatants of the Cold War that "democracy deficit" allowed by the then super- powers due to cold war dynamics ultimately boomeranged upon the West in the form of Islamic extremism.

The stunting of the growth of institutions supportive of democracy through the promotion of authoritarian rulers by providing them with money and materials has produced anger and frustration among the local people, who logically felt aggrieved against the supporters of these rulers who were mostly the Western countries.

After the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, many of the Third World countries that were dependant on the largesse provided by the then super-powers were abandoned, reducing them to the status of failed states and failed governments.

Failed states have been variously defined. But the consensus is that these states are juridical shells that shroud an insecure and even a dangerous condition domestically. They have international legal existence but very little domestic political existence.

Because the UN charter specifically forbids external interference that could be construed as violation of sovereignty, the failed states have so far been immune to intrusion by others despite international consensus on the principle to protect unanimously embraced by the UN during the 60th anniversary of the World Summit in September 2005.

The concept of inviolability of a state's sovereignty underwent a change when non-state actors inflicted death and destruction upon unsuspecting civilians, as seen in the events of 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings, and, most importantly, in Bangladesh by the Islamic extremists belonging to JMB.

Some leaders of the immediate past alliance government who had given them encouragement in their criminal activities have been given stiff prison sentences. It is ironic that the reports by NYT, Wall Street Journal, Time, etc. on the rise of Islamic militancy in Bangladesh, were dismissed by the then government in power as a concoction of the media and as a slight to Bangladesh.

Though the kingpins have been executed after trial in a court of law, it would be premature to believe that Bangladesh has totally got rid of Islamic extremists, because there are sixty thousand madrasas churning out students well versed in religious studies but completely unsuitable for a competitive modern world.

Another question that readily comes to mind is about the utility of economic reforms, in the absence of political reforms, that aim at egalitarian distribution of national wealth through establishing democracy on firm ground. If the economic reforms are directed at denying what Professors Bruce Bueno and George Downs of NYU call "social coordination" defined as "the set of activities that people must engage in to win political power," such as disseminating information, recruiting and organising opposition members, choosing leaders, and developing a viable strategy to increase the group's power and to influence policy, then such reforms should be rejected.

The state's raison d'etre lies, points out German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, primarily "in the guarantee of an inclusive process of opinion-and-will formation in which free and equal citizens reach an understanding on which goals and norms lie in the equal interest of all." Similarly it has been observed that "the democratic plurality that generates political power is conceptually distinct from, and very possibly incompatible with, the top-down, centralised coercion exercised by the state [and] … the very legitimacy of the law depends on its being the expression of a voluntary public agreement between equals who have communicated their aims to one another."

The third worry that comes to mind in ascribing greater importance to economic reforms than political reforms is that faster growth in the economy may not necessarily bring about a more cohesive social structure due to increasing disparity of income between the haves and the have-nots.

This has been seen in Bangladesh and, among others, in the two fastest growing economies in the world -- China and India. The corollary effects of economic growth, without what Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz would call "moral growth" and Amartya Sen's "development as a fundamental right," are invariable growth of unplanned urbanization or slums, increase in criminalisation of society, and development of a nexus between politicians and criminals.

The 1/11 declaration of emergency has spurred political leaders to go in for reforms in the political parties, and in some cases reforms in state structure.

Freedom House, that ranks countries according to political rights and civil liberties enjoyed by the citizens, has accorded Least Developed Countries median scores (1 being freest and 7 being the least free), with Bangladesh scoring 3 for political rights and 4 for civil liberties, and being defined as partially free.

It is generally accepted that a correlation exists between good governance (and democracy) and economic development. That some command economies during the Cold War era had achieved remarkable economic development does not negate the argument that there is congruence between democracy and development mainly because, under democracy, the government is accountable to the people.

In short, economic reforms without political reforms, in order to give firm footing to a democratic dispensation, appear to be meaningless. One would suggest that in our preferential schedule both should be given equal weight so that all segments of the society are benefited, and that economic growth does not become a vehicle for corruption and kleptocracy.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.