The most unenviable institution
The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is arguably the most unenviable institution of Bangladesh. Deservingly or not, ever since it was set up in November 2004, the ACC has drawn high public expectation. Its effectiveness and independence have been intensely debated in the media and beyond. It has been under direct and indirect pressures politically and administratively. It has been ridiculed in the parliament and outside. Its leadership has been intensely debated. The degree of professional excellence, integrity and credibility of its staff has been criticised.
Overwhelmed by an aggressive rally of high profile corruption cases, like the Padma bridge project, Hall-Mark, Destiny, railway, share market, etc., ACC has found itself in a relentless test of credibility and confidence nationally and internationally.
ACC has been a victim of a hesitant ownership of the political and bureaucratic authority. When it came into being, it was regarded as an opening for corruption control distance. However, it did not take long for disillusionment to set in. The then government's lack of commitment to let the commission function independently was evident when they appointed commissioners on partisan political consideration. A powerful minister declared that the ACC was a part of the executive wing and therefore it should work within the framework of the government.
As a result, for the first two years of its existence the commission failed to demonstrate the seriousness of purpose and sense of direction expected of the leadership of an organisation that was mandated with the highly challenging task of fighting corruption.
All that the commissioners did was to engage in creating tension and mutual mistrust of each other. The commission also allowed itself to take on the baggage of the infamous Bureau of Anti-corruption when it sweepingly absorbed without due scrutiny the Bureau staff, and therefore exposed itself to risks of deficit of efficiency and integrity.
The reconstitution of the commission by the 1/11 caretaker government provided it some degree of dynamism and vibrancy. Large number of high-profile individuals suspected of involvement in corruption was arrested. Special tribunals were set up for speedy trial. A high-powered and controversial task force worked parallel with the ACC, often dictating terms.
Despite raising expectations to the pinnacle, the role the ACC played during the caretaker government has been widely debated, especially with regard to the due process in corruption control. Rightly or wrongly, the commission has been criticised for such controversial actions of the task force and/or government as the setting up of the so-called Truth & Accountability Commission, and collection of arbitrary penalty and/or ransom without due process, part of which was reportedly deposited to government exchequer. The question of accountability of the commission's policies and actions also loomed large during the period.
There were multiple power centres, each having a say in the high profile and high speed anti-corruption drive, lacking clarity and a sense of strategic direction.
The way some high-profile individuals were taken to custody and denied bails, and then subsequently awarded the same in record-speed did not leave any positive impression of due process. As a result, the drive to control abuse of power soon became abuse of power as such. Worse, ACC was perceived to be directly or indirectly associated with what came to be known as de-politicisation and more specifically the so-called “minus-two” formula. The failure to ensure the due judicial process did tarnish the image of the then government's commitment to rule of law, and more importantly, it turned out to be counter-productive to the cause of anti-corruption in general and came as a challenge to the image of the post 1/11 ACC in particular.
Public interest in the Commission's effectiveness intensified further after the 2008 national elections that brought to power the grand coalition government led by Bangladesh Awami League which identified corruption control as one of the top strategic priorities. Among a series of related commitments was a pledge to strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the ACC. However, within a year of assuming power, the government introduced a set of amendments to the Anti-corruption Act that could have further curtailed the independence and effectiveness of the Commission.
In the face of criticism and protest by stakeholders including media and TIB, the government eventually backed out from those proposals. According to reliable sources, a new set of proposals was more recently under consideration, which has not been made public. Whatever may be the outcome of this process, the commission has been under psychological pressure from the political and administrative authority for the whole period of the present regime.
Weak political will has often undermined the authority of the ACC. Because of political interference the Commission has been subjected to a “don't touch us” syndrome, making it difficult for ACC to take actions against people in positions of power.
Political pressures, real or perceived, have often created an impression that the commission gives itself in to be used to promote the political agenda of the ruling party and therefore its actions are interpreted as targeting the opposition. Ironically, this on occasions undermines the fact that corruption allegations against individuals belonging to opposition party may have merit.
Take the case of the repatriation of the laundered money from Singapore. Even if one doubts the efficiency and credibility of ACC, and even if one may not like to give credit to ACC for it because the transaction appears to have taken place more at the initiative of Singapore than from this end, the fact remains that the money has come back only because it has been proven according to Singapore law enforcement authorities that it was laundered money from Bangladesh.
On the other hand, deficit of Commission's own skills, capacity and integrity are no less important in terms of its effectiveness. There are allegations of corruption of a section of the ACC staff in the Dhaka office as well as field offices. The Commission has not addressed the question of integrity, transparency and capacity of its staff, nor has it adopted such preventive tools as code of conduct and manual for internal governance complemented by a set of positive and negative incentives for its staff.
It should also be added that ACC cannot be a truly effective organization without the supportive environment which includes other vital institutions of the national integrity system. These include the parliament, executive, law enforcement agencies, judiciary, public service, election commission, Comptroller & Auditor General's Office, media and the private sector. The ACC is located quite rightly at the core of this institutional structure, but it can be rendered ineffective not only by its own shortcomings but also by ineffectiveness of the other vital institutions. The lower the level of integrity, professionalism and public trust upon these institutions, the lower the possibility of success of the ACC.
Be that as it may, expectation of the ACC, by virtue of its specific mandate against corruption, is much higher than any other institution. To be fair, the Commission has recently appeared to be much more active. High level public officials including former and incumbent ministers have been questioned in connection with corruption scandals. The number of corruption cases including high-profile ones handled by the ACC is also probably much more than any other period in the past except the controversial period of army backed caretaker government.
However, apparently influenced by political signals captured by a denial syndrome and for lack of proper strategy and determination of the Commission itself they appear to have missed the opportunity to gain public trust and credibility. Their handling of alleged corruption conspiracy in the Padma bridge project and railway scam is a case in point. Notwithstanding the debate on whether or not the Commission was justified about the way they have addressed such cases, the fact remains that the position they took on some related issues often reflected a mirror image of that of the Government. On occasions they handled allegations of corruption in a manner that gave an impression that they were hesitant to take firm action against individuals in positions of power. This may be because of perceived political pressure or for the lack of capacity and courage of the Commission itself, or a combination of both.
In specific terms, for instance, the question that ACC can ask itself as to what would have happened if it could have avoided taking the same stance as the Government in the context of handling some high-profile corruption cases? When the government interpreted the World Bank condition of sending their experts to observe the Commission's investigation process into the Padma bridge corruption conspiracy case as an intrusion into sovereignty, the ACC instantly echoed the same position claiming that the law didn't permit such a role. However, the ACC took a quick u-turn following the Government's change of mind, though no legal reform had by then taken place.
What if the ACC didn't take recourse to such flimsy ground as “the Minister was not sufficiently attentive” in his work for which he could not be investigated? What if they were mindful enough that perhaps the Minister could have actually been particularly attentive and crafty so as to appear innocent when his Secretary changed the composition of the evaluation team for the high profile procurement as many as four times?
What if the ACC didn't wish people to buy the idea that a Secretary of the government could be so powerful or naïve as to take such vital decision on his own especially when the minister was being met by the supply side of the conspiracy, namely, Canadian company SNC Lavalin and its lobbyists? Would the inclusion of the Former Ministers in the list of those to be investigated by itself mean that they were actually guilty?
What would have happened if the ACC could avoid appearing to be short of courage and determination to follow the example of its own enquiry team and take a more professional decision without fear or favour? What if the ACC was able to take a clearer and more positive approach to consider the driver of the assistant private secretary of the former railway minister? Wasn't it incumbent upon the ACC to seek his protection as a key witness in this intensely debated case with the help of the law-enforcement agencies? Couldn't such stance have given the ACC a golden opportunity to gain some credibility in the eyes of the people nationally and internationally?
Although created by the Government the ACC must not perceive itself as a part of the government, rather as an institution to hold the government accountable in public interest. The commission must realise that they should not expect to gain anything from the government or political authority after their tenure. All they stand to gain is public trust and credibility if they play their due role.
On the other hand, there is also a need for a mind-set change in the political and government leadership. In substance, in a country like Bangladesh the ACC will be as successful and effective as the political and top government leaders want it to be. Unfortunately governments have not demonstrated much of credible commitment to create conducive legal and institutional capacity of ACC including resource endowment in terms of human, financial and technical means.
In sum, the experience of ACC in the period since it was created shows that the degree of its independence and effective functioning depends on external as well as internal factors. Externally ACC has always been subjected to political and administrative influence and control, whereas ACC's own persona is far from conductive to professional delivery meeting its mandate of taking action against corruption without being influenced by identity of the individual concerned.
A lot depends on the degree to which its leadership can realise that they have nothing to lose if they ignore and resist external pressures or dictates, and demonstrate the courage and professional excellence needed for their high-profile position of public interest.
The writer is Executive Director, Transparency International Bangladesh.
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