Israel's 
          killing of hamas leaders 
        Mayur 
          Patel
          
          The April 18th killing in Gaza of Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi, following 
          on the heels of the killing of his predecessor, Sheik Yassin, provoked 
          an international outcry about Israel's policy of targeted killing. Such 
          tactics have been widely condemned as unlawful under international law. 
          In contrast, the United States, while occasionally uncomfortable with 
          Israel's policy, has acknowledged that Israel has a right to self- defence 
          that could be used in some circumstances to target leaders of terrorist 
          groups much as the United States has asserted its own right to target 
          Osama Bin Laden. From a legal standpoint, there are three critical issues 
          that determine the validity of this policy: the law of self-defense; 
          international humanitarian law; and the principle of proportionality. 
          A good faith analysis can lead to differing conclusions on the legality 
          of Israel's policy.
        Self-defense
          A key determinant in assessing Israeli policy is whether it is for the 
          purpose of self-defense or whether it is a reprisal. The concept of 
          self-defense in international law has two primary sources. First, there 
          is an explicit reference to self-defense in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 
          which states: Nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right 
          of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against 
          a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
          measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
         Measures 
          taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall 
          be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any 
          way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council 
          under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
          necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Measures 
          taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall 
          be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any 
          way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council 
          under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
          necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
        Those who argue 
          in favor of Israel's right to self-defense in this situation hold that 
          Hamas's numerous suicide bombings against Israel constitute an armed 
          attack, much as the United States has argued that the use of civilian 
          airliners to destroy the World Trade Center constituted an armed attack. 
          Furthermore, they note that Hamas has openly declared its intention 
          to strike Israel again. Israel faces an ongoing threat and the Security 
          Council has not yet acted. Consequently, they argue that Article 51 
          provides Israel with a right to employ military force against Hamas's 
          leaders.
        Those who dispute 
          Article 51's applicability generally do not dispute that the number 
          of Israeli casualties is substantial. However, the issue for them is 
          that an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 is an armed attack
        from a state. Hamas 
          is not a state. It cannot even be argued to constitute a de-facto state. 
          According to this view, Hamas's attacks are more akin to the acts of 
          a violent gang, which must be dealt with as a law enforcement problem. 
          Consequently, Article 51 would be inapplicable and the targeted killings 
          would be unlawful reprisals or extrajudicial acts of homicide.
        The other legal 
          source of self-defence is customary international law. In particular, 
          many scholars cite the Caroline doctrine, which sets forth the standard 
          for anticipatory self-defense in customary international law.
        The Caroline doctrine 
          arises from an incident in the 1840s where British soldiers crossed 
          into the United States to destroy a ship ferrying arms to insurgents 
          in Canada. Both the United Kingdom and the United States agreed that 
          anticipatory action was allowed only when the necessity of that self-defence 
          is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment 
          for deliberation. After World War II, the Nuremberg Tribunal reaffirmed 
          the Caroline doctrine.
        It should be noted 
          that after the advent of the U.N Charter, the Caroline doctrine is not 
          universally accepted; many reputable scholars have argued that Article 
          51 of the UN Charter supercedes it. Even conceding its validity, though, 
          reasonable individuals can come to differing conclusions on its applicability 
          in various situations.
        For example, most 
          would agree that missiles being fueled for launch are an imminent threat 
          under the Caroline Doctrine. Few would concede, however, that mere discussions 
          on the construction of such weapons constitute a threat under this standard. 
          However, reasonable people could come to differing conclusions about 
          whether the actual shipment and emplacement of such weapons, for example 
          during the Cuban Missile Crisis, gives rise to a right of self-defense. 
          In that instance, the United States chose not to justify its interdiction 
          of Soviet missiles bound for Cuba as a measure of anticipatory self-defense.
        In the present situation, 
          some of the recently targeted individuals such as Rantissi and Sheik 
          Yassin were not killed while in the process of carrying out an attack. 
          However, they were presumed to be in a position to order future attacks. 
          The more one agrees with Israel's assessment that the targeted individuals 
          were "ticking bombs," the more one would believe that a right 
          under the Caroline doctrine arises. One could also argue that since 
          Hamas has already carried out attacks, the Caroline doctrine is inapplicable 
          in a strict sense, even though it remains relevant to show that customary 
          international law recognises a right of self-defense.
        International 
          humanitarian law
          Another legal issue about Israel's policy is whether it comports with 
          international humanitarian law, which comprises the rules that govern 
          the conduct of armed conflict. Under this one question that needs to 
          be resolved is whether those targeted are combatants. The Geneva Conventions 
          on the Law of War, particularly common Article 3, prohibit the intentional 
          killing of civilians. Common Article 3 prohibits:
        "(a) violence 
          to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
          treatment and torture;"
          and "(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
          without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, 
          affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
          by civilized peoples."
        Other international 
          human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil 
          and Political Rights, state that arbitrary execution is unlawful. Individuals 
          who belong to the military wing of Hamas, such as Rantissi, are likely 
          to be considered combatants. Individuals like Sheik Yassin, who was 
          a quadriplegic and supposedly a spiritual rather than military leader, 
          may be subject to more debate on their status as a combatants. Targeted 
          killings also implicate the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention 
          of 1907, which are widely viewed as customary international law. It 
          is believed that most targeted individuals have been killed in helicopter 
          strikes. The Hague Regulations prohibit the killing or wounding treacherously 
          of individuals belonging to a hostile nation or army. Killing or targeting 
          particular individuals during an armed conflict is not illegal in itself 
          under international law, nor is it accurately described as assassination, 
          if the individuals are members of a hostile force. For example, the 
          United States' targeted attack on Admiral Yamamoto during the Second 
          World War was widely considered to be legitimate. The key issue in deciding 
          legality in such cases is whether or not perfidy or treacherous means 
          were employed.
        The employment of 
          treachery is what distinguishes assassination from a traditional killing. 
          Killing individuals by a helicopter strike is generally an accepted 
          tactic of warfare .More stealthy means, however, could be considered 
          as acts of treachery. Some would also argue that persons at mosques 
          or in prayer have no means of defence and thus are impermissible targets. 
          The question becomes murkier, though, if such individuals are inciting 
          followers or giving orders at those facilities for hostile acts against 
          an enemy.
        Proportionality
          The last key issue regarding Israel's policy is whether it violates 
          the basic international law principle of proportionality. Proportionality 
          holds that any given action by a state must be substantially proportional 
          to the given threat or wrong. Israel's policy of targeted killing has 
          resulted in the deaths of multiple civilians. Were those deaths avoidable 
          if different tactics were utilised? Proportionality analysis depends 
          upon the circumstances and the situation. Many have suggested that Israel 
          had a less violent option at its disposal: an arrest. As the occupying 
          power, Israel could potentially deploy troops or police to arrest these 
          individuals.
        Proportionality 
          is an important rule that could distinguish Israel's policy from the 
          American attack on terrorists in Yemen last year via a predator drone. 
          An arrest may be infeasible in the middle of a lawless dessert in Yemen. 
          Civilians are also unlikely to be wounded in such an attack; thus the 
          attack is likely to be proportional under the circumstances.
        Whether Israel's 
          policy is proportional is not an open and shut case. Deploying soldiers 
          or police to apprehend suspects in hostile urban areas is a dangerous 
          affair. Whether more lives are put at danger through an attempted arrest 
          or a helicopter strike is debatable; hence the proportionality of Israel's 
          policy is unclear.
        Concluding 
          Remarks
          Israel's policy of targeted killings raises serious questions of international 
          law, but the answers are not obvious. Although observers view the policy 
          as contravening international law, there is a substantial amount of 
          uncertainty regarding the application of the relevant law to the situation 
          at hand. Thus, good faith analysis could lead to starkly different conclusions 
          on the legality of any such policy.
        Source 
          : American Society for International Law (ASIL), New York.