How 
          to have experienced judges in the Supreme Court
        Hasanat 
          Alamgir
          
          
          Article 96 (1) of our constitution says- subject to the other provisions 
          of this article, a Judge shall hold office until he attains the age 
          of [sixty-five] years. The Jatiya Sangsad has just amended this section 
          of the constitution, and raised the retirement age of the Supreme Court 
          judges by 2 years. 
        If 
          we summarise the arguments of the treasury bench from whatever we have 
          learnt from the media reports, we will find that apparently a growing 
          need of competent and experienced judges in higher judiciary has motivated 
          to focus on this age issue. The government wants to make sure that the 
          higher court has sufficient number of skilled and efficient judges. 
          Supreme Court Judges indeed perform very vital duties, like, explaining 
          the constitution, guiding issues related to human rights, and revising 
          cases against the lower court verdicts. In fact, the Judges themselves 
          have been trying to raise their retiring ages for a while. The bureaucrats 
          of the executive branch have been trying hard to raise their retirement 
          age to 60 years from 57 years for about 2 decades, and no government 
          ever cared about it. Each government opted to contract out bureaucrats 
          they like and trust, rather than extend the overall retirement age for 
          all of them. 
        We have been observing 
          the superior court judges after retiring at 65 have been engaging themselves 
          in numerous quasi and pseudo-judicial employments (e.g., Press Council, 
          Election Commission, Court of Settlement, Administrative Appellate Tribunal, 
          Law Commission, Judicial Administration Training Institute, etc.). By 
          giving them an opportunity of working in the judiciary for 2 more years, 
          the nation will be benefited from their valuable expertise. If the need 
          is real, and the judges demand it, then the government's compliance 
          is definitely admirable. Unfortunately, the mistrust among the public 
          and the political parties about government's covert motive is so high 
          in our country that it is hard to believe that a government does anything 
          without any concealed cause. 
        Now, why is the 
          need of experienced judges become so acute in our higher judiciary? 
          The Law Minister has cited specific examples that twenty five Supreme 
          Court judges - 19 of High Court and 6 of Appellate Division are set 
          to retire in next four years. He is concerned that judges having less 
          than 10 years of experience in the Appellate Division and High Court 
          will work at important benches. What has led to this likelihood that 
          there will be so many untried judges in the higher judiciary in near 
          future? How can we make sure that we have adequate number of qualified 
          sitting judges in our higher judiciary? 
         Political 
          malice and whim has played a key role in creating such a situation. 
          The previous government appointed 40 additional judges, nine of whom 
          were confirmed during its tenure. That left confirmation of 31 others, 
          who could not complete their 2 years probation period, in the hands 
          of the later government. This government being suspicious of those appointee's 
          previous political perhaps 0identity and ideology, and eager to recruit 
          judges allied closely to its own political philosophy declined to confirm 
          services of 15 of the judges. It is known from different sources that 
          the then Chief Justices recommended confirmation for most of these judges. 
          If these judges were absorbed, they would have gained already 3-4 years 
          of experience by this time.
Political 
          malice and whim has played a key role in creating such a situation. 
          The previous government appointed 40 additional judges, nine of whom 
          were confirmed during its tenure. That left confirmation of 31 others, 
          who could not complete their 2 years probation period, in the hands 
          of the later government. This government being suspicious of those appointee's 
          previous political perhaps 0identity and ideology, and eager to recruit 
          judges allied closely to its own political philosophy declined to confirm 
          services of 15 of the judges. It is known from different sources that 
          the then Chief Justices recommended confirmation for most of these judges. 
          If these judges were absorbed, they would have gained already 3-4 years 
          of experience by this time. 
        The current government 
          has also given new appointments to 26 additional judges. If this government 
          can run its full tenure, these judges will possibly be absorbed; but 
          from the third year of its term, any new recruits will have analogous 
          destiny like those 15 judges, if a different government takes over in 
          next election. A vacuum will recur, and we will again be scared of having 
          an acute shortage of learned judges. 
        It can be rationally 
          anticipated that a judge should work no less than 15 years at the High 
          Court Division before going up to the Appellate Division, and a continuous 
          work experience of at least 18-20 years can train one best for qualifying 
          to be the Chief Justice -- the judicial head of a country of 140 million 
          people. It is observed in the higher judiciary, that most of the new 
          recruits start in their early or mid 50s. If a judge is recruited when 
          he is 52 years, if everything goes well, he will be confirmed at 54, 
          and if he is expected to serve there for 12/13 years, he will have almost 
          no possibility to get to the Appellate Division. We have recently observed 
          a fairly good number of judges hold the position of the Chief Justice 
          for about or less than 1 year. Before they have an opportunity to understand 
          the duties and responsibilities of the position, formulate agendas and 
          means for the development of the judicial system, and in so doing offer 
          good leadership, it becomes time for them to retire. A practice to appoint 
          judges at an earlier age (e.g., late 40s) can ensure that we get seasoned 
          judges at the High Court Division, Appellate Division, and that we benefit 
          by a Chief Justice, who can serve longer and better. 
        The inexperience 
          quandary is more widespread when the new recruits happen to be practising 
          lawyers. The jobs of a lawyer and a judge are indeed very different 
          in respect to duties, responsibilities, public relations, and compensation 
          (salary and benefits). When a District Judge is elevated to the higher 
          judiciary, he brings with him extensive working experiences in various 
          capacities (Assistant Judge, Sub Judge, and Additional District Judge) 
          in the lower judiciary. He, also, has the least possibility of allegiance 
          to any political structure. Whereas, for a lawyer, it takes time to 
          get used to act and behave like a judge overnight. 
        Regrettably, it 
          is because of their non-alignment to formed political philosophies, 
          the proportion of District Judge to lawyers is getting smaller in every 
          batch of appointments at our higher judiciary. If we analyse the two 
          recent recruitment, government's uninterest to choose District Judges 
          become obvious. 
        In August of 2003, 
          the government appointed five additional judges at the Supreme Court. 
          In this lot, only one was a career district judge. The rest belonged 
          to the Bar.
        Another set of recruitment 
          in April last year only two were District Judges. It is evident that 
          only 20% places at the higher judiciary are occupied by internal judicial 
          service promotions. 
        The discrimination 
          against the district judges in promoting to the Supreme Court frustrates 
          the judicial cadre service holders as their career potentials shrink 
          terrifically. Their agony multiplies as whenever the senior members 
          of the lower judiciary can make it to the higher judiciary, they almost 
          reach their retiring ages by then. Thus, from the High Court Division, 
          unsurprisingly, they can never go up the ladder to the Appellate Division, 
          forget about ever contending for the position of the Chief Justice. 
          It is imperative that the top judge of the country should have a solid 
          understanding and a firm grasp over the functionalities and intricacies 
          of the lower judiciary including the magistracy. A veteran District 
          Judge is plainly barred to go high under the existing system. 
        Political considerations 
          and discriminations of the government are prevailing in appointment 
          and confirmation of judges to the highest judiciary, as the process 
          is not transparent and not clearly prescribed by law. Getting over with 
          political whim and malice, appointing judges at a younger age, confirming 
          efficient judges (with Chief Justice's recommendation), and raising 
          the ratio of district judges in recruitment can help in ensuring transparency, 
          and create trust in higher judiciary recruitment. 
         
        Hasanat 
          Alamgir is a Doctoral Candidate at the University of British Columbia, 
          Vancouver.