Reducing the horrendous traffic congestion

Dr. Charisma Choudhury
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TRAFFIC congestion is not only the most severe problem affecting life in Dhaka, but also one of the most discussed and most dissected issues. Numerous meetings, seminars, workshops and 'Talk Shows' are being arranged every month to discuss the solutions to traffic problems in Dhaka, in addition to the 'almost-daily' publications of articles and letters in various newspapers. Transport for Dhaka has been a very active sector of the Government as well with a lot of experimentation going on to identify the best method to tackle the problem. Over the last one year, there have been numerous new transport initiatives in Dhaka: we had the first franchised bus service Shuchona from April, 2009; the CCTV aided surveillance system from May, ban on old vehicle usage from September, the new school and office timings from October, the decision to introduce school buses in November, implementation of automated traffic signals from late November and enforcement of lane-usage rules from December. In addition, a number new road construction projects have been initiated, e.g. construction of the link road between Rokeya Sharani and Airport Road and continuation of the Road no. 11 from Banani to Gulshan over the lake (both of which have already been completed), the new Hatirjheel road, the link road and railway overpass linking Bijoy Sharani and Tajuddin Sharani and the interchange at Kuril junction. More recently, the Government has re-initiated the construction of the tolled Jatrabari- Gulistan flyover, invited an expression of interest for construction of the Bus-Rapid-Transit (BRT) system and called for Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) bids for construction of Elevated Expressway and Metro Rail Transit (MRT). While these multi-pronged approaches certainly reflect the importance given by the Government to tackle the problem of traffic congestion, the experiments so far have produced very few tangible results. This obviously makes us ponder what is missing in our transportation planning and policy framework.

First of all, we have to accept the fact that given the negligence to the urban transport and land-use planning sector for decades, it is not possible to do many of the things that an urban transport planner would ideally have opted to do. For example, it would have been much easier to build wider roads or to develop an at-grade MRT system thirty years back when the percentage of built-up areas was much lower less than 20 per cent as compared to 72 per cent now. However, what we can do now is to ensure that we do not repeat our mistakes which would lead us to an even worse traffic situation thirty years from now. A prerequisite for this is that different projects taken within the planning horizon are coherent, integrated and complementary to each other under a long-term urban and transport plan.

Since the early 1990s, several studies have been taken up by the Government and other funding agencies to evaluate the transport improvements, the Strategic Transport Plan for Dhaka (STP 2006) being the most recent and comprehensive one. STP, which has a planning horizon of twenty years (2004 to 2024), recommends an improved public transportation system coupled with improved roadway system. The improved public transportation system includes new mass rapid transit systems comprising of a blend of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and Metro Rail Transit (MRT) as shown in Figure 1. This was complemented by an extensive road construction program but a reduced program of elevated expressways to keep cost at a minimum.

Interestingly, many of the transport improvement projects, particularly those which have been taken over the last year are not the ones prioritised in STP. For instance, the number one recommendation of STP was to reclaim the full road-widths for traffic and pedestrian movement by removing all unauthorised obstructions (e.g. illegally parked vehicles, dumped garbage and construction materials, make-shift shops etc.). This 'lowest cost' improvement scheme has been totally ignored and the prime focus has been the capital intensive schemes. A more alarming fact is some of these proposed initiatives, which have been modified from the original recommendations of STP or were not listed in there, are actually conflicting with STP. For example, if the Jatrabari- Gulistan flyover is extended up to Palashi and Demra, it will overlap with the Purple line of MRT (Figure 1). The flyover will take up the space required for building the elevated MRT; moreover, the foundations of the columns of the flyover will go deep into the ground and not only make the 'cut-and-cover method' of construction impossible, but also increase the required depth of the MRT tunnel in future. Both of these will lead to large increase in the construction costs. Construction of the flyover without integrating it with the MRT plan will thus make construction of the underground/elevated MRT prohibitively expensive, if not impossible.

Figure: Proposed BRT and MRT Lines (STP 2006) and some proposed construction projects.

Secondly, we need to assess what were the bases of selecting these new initiatives. Were there any technical or economic analyses involved in the decision-making process? Unfortunately, in most cases, not. Interestingly, the first lesson taught to a transport planner is to look at system optimality (i.e. overall network effect of an initiative), whereas the policymakers here are doing exactly the opposite. For instance, the feasibility studies of these projects very often do not cover aspects like probable route or mode diversions, impacts of (as well as on) other proposed or ongoing land and transport development projects etc. There are some on-going discussions about inviting potential investors to conduct their own feasibility studies for a particular project but this poses a high risk that each investor will focus on maximising his own revenue and ignore the potential impacts on other projects, which could be catastrophic. For example, it is expected that the current car, taxi, CNG and rickshaw users are likely to be the major users of the BRT and MRT (which will have significantly better quality of service compared to existing public transport options, but may not be affordable to all). But after construction of a new road or expressway, the travelers who may have otherwise shifted to BRT/MRT may not make that switch. In addition, the road-based construction projects are likely to trigger huge induced demand: that is, people who are currently not using car/taxi/CNG in that route may also shift to these modes due to the improved levels of service offered by a new flyover/expressway construction. While analysing the congestion reduction potential of a project, these indirect system-wide effects are very often not taken into account.

The third and more important concern is how the different proposed development plans fit in together, both physically as well as from the policy-point of view. If we compare the proposed alignment of the expressway with the MRT and BRT routes (Figure 1), we find significant zones of conflict (e.g. in Saidabad, Jatrabari, Palashi and Mohakhali) which are very likely candidates of future bottlenecks.

sk. enamul haq

On the other hand, some of the projects are conflicting from the policy perspective as well. While the focus of our transport policy should be to reduce car dependence and promote a more public transit oriented transportation system (which is recognised world wide as more efficient and sustainable transport solution for mega cities), cars are already a favorable mode for many because of the low fuel (CNG) cost, easy availability of bank-loans, security and social status issues etc. Therefore, if we want a public transit oriented and less car dependent system, improving public transit alone will not be sufficient. Rather, we would need a 'carrot and stick' approach: BRT/ MRT being the 'carrot' and car-discouraging policies and low levels of service in car/taxi/CNG/rickshaws being the 'stick'. Building flyovers and grade-separated interchanges on the other hand promote usage of car based modes and are likely to affect public transport ridership. Such non-coherent transport policies are not recommended in any transportation planning practice.

If we want to achieve tangible benefits from new projects, we need to fix these three 'missing links' in the planning process: lack of long term planning, inadequate focus on system optimisation and lack of coordination among the different projects. For the sake of compatibility among various interventions and overall system optimisation, projects which are not listed in STP or modified from the original proposed version need more careful analysis, as has been rightly highlighted in the STP Advisory Committee Report. This is particularly important since the transportation projects in Dhaka are implemented by multiple organisations, e.g. Dhaka Transport Coordination Board, Dhaka City Corporation, LGED, Roads and Highways and RAJUK, with very little coordination among each other. It is obvious of course that not all projects proposed in STP or not conflicting with STP can be implemented immediately but while sequencing them, care should be taken on their inter-compatibility as well as the issue of inter-modality. Only then we can expect the maximum benefits from each project and ensure an optimum usage of the entire transport system.

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Dr Charisma Choudhury is an Assistant Professor, BUET, Dhaka and Off-campus Researcher, MIT, USA.

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