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Volume 2 Issue 7 | August 2007

Inside

 

Original Forum Editorial

Month in Review: Bangladesh
Month in Review: International
Exit strategies: Some lessons from history- - Rehman Sobhan
What should have been in the budget-- K. Siddique-e-Rabbani
Tough politics but loose economics-- Nizam Ahmad
The effects of corruption -- Saifuddin Ahmed
Time to declare war on hunger-- Zahin Hasan
Where Deshantori ends, Phiriye Ano Bangladesh begins -- Mridul Chowdhury
A cloud of silence in Bangla Town-- Naeem Mohaiemen
Photo Feature
Epaar Opaar-- Udayan Chattopadhyay
The third pillar -- S. Amer Ahmed
Let's get political--Asif Saleh
Through Big Brother's eyes-- Tazreena Sajjad
Alternate universes: fairy tale, sci-fi or reality?-- Rashida Ahmad
Column: It's no joke

 

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Exit strategies: Some lessons from history

Rehman Sobhan discusses the stark choices facing the nation

The exit strategy for the caretaker government (CTG) may turn out to be its most challenging task because the full agenda of the forces behind such a government have yet to be made explicit. In exploring the options of the CTG and its backers it may be well to take some lessons from the entry and exit of previous militarised regimes in both Pakistan and Bangladesh.

If we look back at the history of military interventions in Pakistan/Bangladesh, all of these have followed a common path and all have ended badly. The special feature of the latest such venture in Bangladesh is so far unique and thus holds the promise that they may end up standing by their commitment to the people of Bangladesh. The preceding military regimes all came into public life promising to clean up politics and eradicate corruption but ended up embracing the very vices which they sought to eliminate from public life. This reversal of fortunes was inherent in their act of self-betrayal and should be heeded as a lesson for all the current players in Bangladesh's unfolding political drama. Let us briefly take stock of these history lessons.

Pakistan
Ayub took power in 1958 though a military coup which proclaimed martial law. The public agenda was to save the country from corrupt and squabbling politicians who could not bring stability or give direction to the country. The less publicised sub-text was to frustrate the possible ascending to power of the Awami League under H.S. Suhrawardy's leadership following the impending national elections in January 1959. Ayub, of course, had a personal agenda of becoming the Ataturk of Pakistan.

What was significant in this first entry of the military into politics in Asia was their reluctance to rule indefinitely under martial law. Ayub's goal of staying in power long enough to implement his reforms to "modernise" Pakistan demanded that he shed his uniform and transform himself into a civilian political leader. This same sense of inhibition about prolonging martial rule has informed successive military regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh through the years. This has meant that ambitious, coup-making generals, intent on staying on in power, had to create their own political party. Herein lay the political malaise which undid all past military regimes. No self-respecting politician was willing to join such regimes -- so the military leaders had to embrace the flotsam and jetsam of national politics in Pakistan and Bangladesh to build their own political party.

The first exercise in political party fabrication by a military regime was initiated by Ayub Khan who constructed the Muslim League (Convention), so termed because he invited a section of the historic Pakistan Muslim League to a political convention which then transformed itself into the "Convention" Muslim League. Those who stayed away from the convention were know as the "Council" Muslim League. A few newcomers to politics, such as Z.A. Bhutto, who saw the military as a short cut to leadership, joined this new party. This tradition of ambitious professionals or failed politicians seeking rapid advancement in politics through the patronage of the military has since been continued by other military regimes in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Such political parties fabricated in cantonments, through assembling some politically worthless entities who were usually unelectable through a free election, needed to be held together by massive state patronage and the opportunity to be "selected" to enter parliament. As a consequence, the electoral process had to be rigged to ensure that such a party would be assured of election.

The technique of electoral engineering which was developed by the Pakistan army during the Ayub regime has been used with regularity over the years. Ironically, the martial law regime of Yahya Khan shelved the rigging process for the elections of 1970, which led to the Awami League winning an absolute majority in the national elections. After that experience, which was obviously the outcome of failed intelligence and ended in the emergence of Bangladesh, the Pakistan military have been more cautious in permitting genuinely competitive elections where a party patronised by them was involved. The violent demise of the martial political leader or the downfall of such a regime through a mass mobilisation were the only way such regimes could be ousted.

This trend of ambitious generals seeking to perpetuate themselves in power by civilianising martial rule has persisted in spite of the costly lessons to the nation provided by the experience of both Ayub and Yahya. The armed forces led by General Zeaul Haq, the chief of staff, again stepped into power in 1977 in the wake of a massive political mobilisation across Pakistan against Z.A. Bhutto's rigging of the national elections held in 1977. On his seizure of power Zeaul Haq promised to hand over power to a freely elected civilian government. Again Zeaul Haq, betrayed his own commitment, tried and hanged Z.A. Bhutto, and eventually chose to stay on in power. Since Zeaul Haq had longer term political ambitions, which included the Islamisation of Pakistan, he had to create a political front where, once again, a faction of the ever-purchasable Muslim League was pressed into service. Junejo, a non-descript Sindhi politician, was appointed prime minister by Zeaul Haq, while Mian Nawaz Sharif, an ambitious young businessman from Punjab, was appointed chief minister of the Punjab. With this fabricated political formation once again in place Zeaul Haq was elected president of a now civilianised regime. When Junejo tried to become his own man he was dismissed by Zeaul Haq and replaced as prime minister by Nawaz Sharif whose rise to power owed to the patronage of General Zeaul Haq. As in the case of Ayub Khan, the Muslim League, backed by Zeaul Haq, could only survive in power through provision of pervasive opportunities for patronage and corruption reinforced by massive rigging of elections engineered by the army.

When eventually Zeaul Huq met an untimely end in a mysterious plane crash, the army permitted Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) to return to power. Benazir's massive governance failures were instrumental in the dismissal of her regime by President Ghulam Ishhaq who was backed by the chief of the armed forces. In the subsequent election, the Muslim League, now led by Nawaz Sharif, was elected to power with the blessings of the armed forces. The army again played a key role in the subsequent ouster of Nawaz Sharif and the return to power of Benazir and the PPP through the electoral process. Yet again, malgovernace by the PPP was instrumental in Benazir's dismissal by President Farooq Leghari, who was a PPP loyalist. Benazir's dismissal was once again backed by the army as was the re-election to power of Nawaz Sharif and the Muslim League.

This game of musical chairs between the PPP and the Muslim League, with the Pakistan army playing the role of sarangi player, was continued by General Pervez Musharraf, who responded to his own dismissal as chief of staff by an increasingly corrupt and autocratic Nawaz Sharif, by capturing state power through an army coup. When Pervez Musharraf came to power he too promised early elections and massive structural reforms to correct the malgovernance bequeathed by the two elected regimes. Musharraf reached out to well-known members of civil society such as Javed Jabbar and Omar Asghar Khan to join his government. Many such luminaries from civil society firmly believed that Musharraf meant what he said and would withdraw from power, after presiding over reforms, followed by a free and fair election. Such was the boast made to me personally by a collection of such civil society figures from Pakistan whom I hold in high esteem, at a conference in Kathmandu held shortly after Musharraf had captured power. I advised them, with Mr. I.K. Gujral to bear public witness, that, as night follows day, Musharraf would transform himself into a political leader, set up a political party, based on the ever serviceable Muslim League, and stay on in power.

Sadly for Pakistan, my prediction was fulfilled to the last detail. Benazir and Nawaz Sharif were exiled abroad. The more corrupt and purchasable members of the Muslim League along with a corrupt faction of the People's Party were blackmailed into forming a "general's" party which would provide a civilian facade to the presidency of Pervez Musharraf. To ensure the election of the "general's" party the now highly developed skills of the Pakistan army at election engineering, were brought into play to ensure that the "right" results were achieved. It is reported, though I have no reliable information to support this, that such election engineering even ensured that fundamentalist-led parties were elected to power in the provincial elections for NWFP and Baluchistan in order to provide General Musharraf with more political leverage in his dealings with his US allies. As in the case of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zeaul Haq, US patronage, originating in their strategic compulsions of the moment, was crucial in the consolidation of power by these various militarised regimes. Today, Musharraf, who retains dual power as army chief of staff and president, as did Zeaul Haq, is aspiring to retain these powers through an engineered re-election to office of the Muslim League in the forthcoming national elections. The demand for free and fair elections has thus intensified among the democratic forces in Pakistan.

Musharraf's strategy to perpetuate himself in power is under severe challenge as a result of his attempt to subordinate the Supreme Court through the removal of the incumbent chief justice. This assault on the judiciary has triggered a major political mobilisation, led by the lawyers of Pakistan, which has drawn in an alliance of political parties and civil society. This mobilisation has grown in its scope and intensity and has inflicted grave damage to the authority of the Musharraf regime. The effectiveness of the mobilisation obviously strengthened the backbone of the Pakistan Supreme Court which chose to demonstrate its judicial independence by restoring the chief justice to his office. A visibly weakened Musharraf had no choice but to accept the judgment. He now face the prospect of further judicial challenges to his legally questionable attempt to retain absolute power through his dual office of president and chief of staff of the armed forces.

The most recent military assault on the fundamentalist forces in the Lal Masjid in Islamabad, with its high death count, has now opened up another front against Musharraf from the fundamentalists. His current hold on power in Pakistan is thus looking increasingly endangered in spite of the full support of the Bush administration. There is now much talk of a deal between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto to share power. It remains to be seen how this scenario is played out in the near future. Such gestures of political opportunism have eroded all vestiges of good governance, once espoused by Musharraf when he seized power. As a result, corruption in Pakistan has now become as pervasive as it was under the Benazir and Nawaz Sharif regimes.

Bangladesh
Bangladesh's two earlier encounters with military rule followed the same trajectory of their erstwhile Pakistani compatriots. General Ziaur Rahman, when he was first placed in power by a sepoy's mutiny in November 1975, initially promised he would withdraw from power after carrying through much needed reforms and would return power to an elected civilian government. However Zia appears to have nurtured the same ambitions as Ayub Khan -- to reform his society. It therefore took Ziaur Rahman only two years to transform himself from a simple military officer, anxious to restore civilian rule, into a political leader in the mould of Ayub Khan. As in the case of Ayub Khan, in order to realise his political ambitions Zia needed to secure a political base, so he constructed the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). In constructing the BNP Zia embraced a large number of discarded politicians from the Muslim League along with the even less electable followers of Maulana Bhashani. As in the case of Ayub, he drew in a clutch of politically ambitious professionals who thereby made their first entry into politics. These disparate forces were bound together only by their ambitions and their hostility to the Awami League. These political aspirants enjoyed low electability, so their victory in the national elections of 1979 also needed to be engineered. After the assassination of Ziaur Rahman in 1981, Sattar's victory in the presidential election, was similarly ensured through some quite skillful electoral engineering.

The experience of the Ayub Khan regime in Pakistan, had indicated that building a new party, drawn from hitherto unelectable politicians and political novices, not only required electoral engineering but also massive patronage to secure their loyalty as well as to build constituencies for such weak candidates. The tenure of the Zia as well as the Sattar regime which succeed him was, thus, characterised by unbridled corruption. Zia prided himself on his personal integrity and pointed to the need to end corruption as one of the key reasons for his entry into politics. This very principle proclaimed by Zia was compromised from the outset. Zia was fully aware of the corruption which pervaded his regime and sought to use it as a form of leverage over his less probitious party colleagues.

When Lt. General H.M. Ershad, ousted the BNP regime in March 1982, he justified his entry into power so as to bring an end to the rampant corruption unleashed by the BNP regime. Ershad also sought to tackle the massive debt default accumulated by the BNP patronised business class and to correct the endemic malgovernance which had come to be associated with the BNP regime. At the outset of his declaration of martial law in March 1982, Ershad projected himself as a simple soldier anxious to return to the barracks after undertaking some reforms and holding free and fair elections. He ended up staying in power for nine years, mostly as a civilian president. In the tradition of past generals he constructed his own political party, the Jatio Party, drawing upon the more corrupt elements of the ousted BNP and a few of the remaining Bhashani NAP who had been left out of the BNP embrace. To sustain these essentially discredited politicos, Ershad had to engineer two comprehensively fraudulent elections, preside over a regime of unprecedented corruption, and build the entire edifice of malgovernance which has sustained the enterprise of the three elected regimes who succeeded him in power.

As part of his legacy of malgovernance, Ershad inflicted severe damage on the integrity, credibility and discipline of the armed forces from which it has taken them the best part of a decade to recover. The armed forces have painfully rebuilt their professionalism, established their credentials as international peacekeepers, and have kept themselves aloof from democratic politics in spite of efforts to drag them in during the 1996 political turmoil and more recently. The armed forces came forward on January 11 to oust the caretaker government of Iajuddin Ahmed only after the president had demonstrated his partisan identify which precipitated the emerging confrontation between the BNP and Awami League alliances that threatened to plunge the country into bloody chaos. Any involvement of the armed forces in this confrontation had threatened to compromise their institutional integrity and international image by compelling them to take sides in protecting a partisan and discredited regime.

Exit strategies: Can Bangladesh learn from history?
The present intervention by the armed forces retains several distinguishing features. It has so far not come in behind a martial law decree but within the framework of the Constitution, though with the passage of time this framework is being severely stretched. Because this intervention has remained within the Constitution, the armed forces have not had to present a visible face. Nor has the institutional head of the armed forces proclaimed a personal mission to rule the country. So far the armed force have remained committed to help the CTG to hold a free and fair general election and to then withdraw.

However, as the tenure of the CTG lengthens and its reach increasingly intrudes into the political area due to the actions of its backers, the exit strategy for the armed forces is becoming increasingly problematic. At the end of 2008 there is no reason why free and fair election cannot be held, given the credibility of the CTG and the Election Commission as well as the time and resources invested in the electoral process. The goal of the CTG, which is presumably underwritten by the armed forces, is to eradicate corruption and to prevent such corrupt elements from contesting the elections. These goals are widely shared but are not necessarily the same. Ensuring that few corrupt people contest elections in December 2008 is entirely feasible, given the determination of the EC, the firm actions of the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the full support of the CTG. Eradicating corruption, is, however, a systemic issue which demands that the regime elected to power in December 2008 shares this vision and remains committed to sustain the mission of the CTG. Such a systemic commitment will depend, in considerable measure, on who is elected to power in 2008 and the institutional safeguards put in place by the CTG which can be built into the system no matter who is elected. Building such safeguards is a challenge for the CTG and also to the ingenuity of its advisors in civil society. But however clearly crafted be these interventions by the CTG, it will require another five years of political support by a freely elected government to consolidate such reforms.

It is this problem of sustaining the reform process which provides the real challenge to the exit strategy of the armed forces at the end of 2008. No doubt much hope had been invested in a person such as Muhammad Yunus, to build a new political party wedded to ended corruption and institutionalising good governance. Now that Yunus has withdrawn from the political arena, some new political formations are surfacing (though it is not clear if they enjoy any extra-political patronage). It is here that the armed forces will really have to take account of the lessons from the experience of their predecessors in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The principal lesson for our armed forces is to avoid, at all costs, the task of fabricating or even sponsoring a political party or force made up of the same unelectable political figures. This involvement proved the undoing of Ayub, Yahya, Zeaul Haq, Pervez Musharraf, Ziaur Rahman, and Ershad. To depend on elements who cannot politically sustain themselves and can only be elected through patronage from the cantonment will take Bangladesh down the same road of corruption and malgovernance which proved the undoing of previous military-backed regimes. Such an involvement would not only erode the institutional credibility of the armed forces but compromise their future participation in international peacekeeping operations.

There is thus no alternative for the CTG and their backers but to let the political process in Bangladesh take its own course. This means that our major political parties must be given the freedom to reform themselves. Whether this opportunity will be frustrated by the ongoing presence of the two netris is not for me to say. The parties themselves have to work this out. Attempts by the CTG to somehow eliminate the netris by incarcerating them is likely to become counter-productive and could indeed compromise the credibility of the "reformers" within their respective parties.

In this context, the recent arrest of Shiekh Hasina has already put the "reformers" in the Awami League on the defensive. This is not to argue that the netris should enjoy immunity for any wrong-doing. If there are genuine cases of corruption which can be established against the netris then let the evidence be produced up front and validated in a court of law. It would obviously not be to the advantage of either party to be led by leaders whose integrity is open to public question. But if little hard evidence can be generated and cases have to be fabricated against the netris so that they have to be ousted from their leadership through some extra-legal measures, then the netris will continue to retain their authority in the party whatever may be their formal status or geographical location, whether in a sub-jail in Dhaka or in exile in Miami. One need only witness the political resilience enjoyed by both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in spite of each having demonstrated their corruption and malgovernance over two successive regimes. Today, both leaders continue to call the shots in their respective parties from their exile abroad and one day hope to once again lead their country.

If the two netris can neither be ousted from effective leadership of their parties or are unwilling to bring about meaningful reform in their work this out. Attempts by the CTG to somehow eliminate the netris by incarcerating them is likely to become counter-productive and could indeed compromise the credibility of the "reformers" within their respective parties.

In this context, the recent arrest of Shiekh Hasina has already put the "reformers" in the Awami League on the defensive. This is not to argue that the netris should enjoy immunity for any wrong-doing. If there are genuine cases of corruption which can be established against the netris then let the evidence be produced up front and validated in a court of law. It would obviously not be to the advantage of either party to be led by leaders whose integrity is open to public question. But if little hard evidence can be generated and cases have to be fabricated against the netris so that they have to be ousted from their leadership through some extra-legal measures, then the netris will continue to retain their authority in the party whatever may be their formal status or geographical location, whether in a sub-jail in Dhaka or in exile in Miami. One need only witness the political resilience enjoyed by both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in spite of each having demonstrated their corruption and malgovernance over two successive regimes. Today, both leaders continue to call the shots in their respective parties from their exile abroad and one day hope to once again lead their country.

If the two netris can neither be ousted from effective leadership of their parties or are unwilling to bring about meaningful reform in their parties, then the only credible option is to look to the emergence of a third political force. But as we have observed, such a force cannot be fabricated inside or outside the cantonment because this will condemn Bangladesh to move back on the same cycle of fraudulent democracy and malgovernance which originated under Ayub in Pakistan and was continued by Ziaur Rahman and Ershad in Bangladesh. It is these synthetic exercises in party formation which have corrupted the political culture of both Pakistan and Bangladesh and made it all the more difficult to build a sustainable democratic system. If a third political force is to emerge to challenge the hegemony of the two political parties, with or without their netris, it must emerge from the political soil of Bangladesh and win a free and fair election in December 2008. All that can be ensured by the CTG and their backers is that in the December 2008 election both money and muscle power, the staple of the old political order, will be completely neutralised. If a third party cannot survive in such a genuinely competitive political market place then we will have to take our chances with whatever forces will be elected to power. This may leave us with an uncertain and possibly dangerous future but that is the price we must continue to pay, if we hope to preserve a democratic system. This may hardly be worse than the Pakistan model which led to the disintegration of the country and may fragment it even further.

Rehman Sobhan is Chairman, Editorial Board, Forum.

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