Dhaka Thursday February 25, 2010

Rationalising the Intelligence services

Muhammad Nurul Huda
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THE commissions and omissions of intelligence organisations have invariably attracted concerned quarters and generated lively debate amongst a select segment of the society. The general members of the public have been, at best, marginally curious about intelligence activities although the same in real terms affect them socially and politically.

Concerned citizens may like to know if while rendering service in the area of national security, intelligence agencies have allowed themselves to be misused and abused by the politicians in power for disgraceful purposes. Are they sub-serving the interests of a political party or an individual or controlling and blackmailing opponents of the political party in power or elements within the party in power that are dissident? Is there a tendency that equates national interest with the interest of the party in power? What can be done to reduce the likelihood of non-observance of fairness and objectivity in intelligence functions?

Quite undeniably, the intelligence organization plays a leading role in providing political-analytical inputs to the ruling party and its government. Therefore, its lack of impartiality and objectivity can distort the policy process and thus carries the risk of damaging the credibility and political legitimacy of the State. There exists a reasoned inference that such damage is likely when intelligence organization lacks a legal framework and a well-honed charter of duties.

The need of political intelligence can never be questioned but the equally important need for safeguards and constant vigilance against possible misuse must not be lost sight of. One need to know that intelligence activities carried out in secrecy may infringe individual's rights without the latter being aware of the same.

We had the unfortunate experience of witnessing a very sensitive intelligence organization working principally for the whims and caprices of a virtual dictator and using public funds for creating and destabilizing political parties, political horse-trading and shadowing people on personal and flimsy grounds. No wonder in such a scenario the professional efficiency was sacrificed and public servants turned into personal servants with the attendant ignominy.

The mission and strategy of our intelligence organizations had not been stable. It invariably changed with the change of a political government. Differing political agenda often tended to cloud the pragmatic understanding of our real national interests.

The broad function of maintaining public order for ensuring internal security is closely associated with the task of collecting and collating intelligence in the interest of the state. In reality, in our situation, the interests of the state often got diluted and mixed up with the interests of the government of the day. The situation is marked by an unfortunate lack of understanding and appreciation of the requirements of the state and the government in a democratic and pluralist society like ours.

The unpleasant truth is that intelligence agencies maintain file and shadow the leaders and workers of pronouncedly constitutional politics-oriented parties belonging to the opposition who are recognized partners in the business of politics. At some point of time when such opposition party comes to power, there is an uneasy relationship between the political masters and the agencies. In such a scenario, professionalism becomes the worst casualty, sense of direction is lost and the organization dips into a lackadaisical environment and interests of the state take a back seat giving greater space to partisan considerations.

Under the circumstances, intelligence agencies should not be the judge of its own operations with regard to the necessity and propriety thereof, nor should it be allowed to operate as the agency or instrument of politicians, or degenerate into an institution for controlling the opponents of party in power, or elements within the party in power with which the high command of the party does not see eye to eye. There must be inbuilt constraints.

Security of the State should not involve:
* assessing the election prospects of the ruling party;
* ascertaining the suitability of the candidates for contesting the elections on behalf of the ruling party;
* acting as the super-watchman over the activities of politicians regardless of party identity;
* being used as an instrument of political spying either by the government or an individual in the government.

At the heart of the matter, there should be a prescription for a charter of duties for the intelligence organ, putting responsibilities beyond doubt and to indicate what is permitted and what is prohibited.

The catch-all definition of 'national security' should not be used as a cover to hide a multitude of abuses. It should exclude activities that in effect mean denial of human rights and basic freedoms. The vague and antiquated formulations of colonial days relating to intelligence function should be suitably replaced.

Our intelligence organization needs to work under pragmatic political leadership and if properly and professionally steered, it does not threaten our liberties. If we operate by the book, we will be adequately informed of the perils which face us. The last thing we can afford to do now is to put our intelligence in chains. Its protective and informative role is indispensable in times of unique and continuing violence.

Muhammad Nurul Huda is a columnist of The Daily Star.

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